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IABSTRACT
Research in economics is increasingly open to empirical results. The advances in 
behavioural  approaches  are  expanded  here  by  applying  cognitive  methods  to 
financial questions. The field of “cognitive finance” is approached by the exploration 
of decision  strategies  in  the  financial  settings  of spending,  saving,  and  investing. 
Individual  strategies  in these  different  domains  are  searched  for  and elaborated to 
derive explanations for observed irregularities in financial decision making.  Strong 
context-dependency  and  adaptive  learning  form  the  basis  for  this  cognition-based 
approach to  finance.  Experiments,  ratings,  and real world data analysis  are carried 
out in  specific financial  settings,  combining different research methods to  improve 
the understanding of natural financial behaviour.
People use various  strategies in the domains of spending,  saving,  and investing. 
Specific spending profiles can be elaborated for a better understanding of individual 
spending  differences.  It  was  found  that  people  differ  along  four  dimensions  of 
spending,  which  can  be  labelled:  General  Leisure,  Regular  Maintenance,  Risk 
Orientation, and Future Orientation. Saving behaviour is strongly dependent on how 
people  mentally  structure  their  finance  and  on  their  self-control  attitude  towards 
decision  space  restrictions,  environmental  cues,  and  contingency  structures. 
Investment strategies  depend on how companies,  in which investments  are placed, 
are evaluated on factors  such as Honesty,  Prestige,  Innovation,  and Power.  Further 
on,  different information integration strategies can be learned in decision situations 
with direct feedback.
The mapping of cognitive processes in financial decision making is discussed and 
adaptive learning mechanisms are proposed for the observed behavioural differences. 
The  construal  of  a  “financial  personality”  is  proposed  in  accordance  with  other 
dimensions of personality measures, to better acknowledge and predict variations in 
financial  behaviour.  This  perspective  enriches  economic  theories  and  provides  a 
useful ground for improving individual financial services.
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Introduction1.  INTRODUCTION
Research  in  cognitive  finance  stands  in  the  long  tradition  of  the  interaction 
between psychology and economics (Levin,  1996). Economic questions can thus be 
seen as one of the reasons for the development of psychological research. Fechner’s 
(1860) theory of psychophysics for example is based on the St. Petersburg paradox 
discovered  by  Daniel  Bernoulli  in  1738,  describing  a  behavioural  irregularity  in 
gambles.  Currently  these  two  disciplines,  which  drifted  apart  for  some  time,  are 
being brought together in multiple ways.  In behavioural finance,  scientific research 
on  human,  social,  cognitive,  and  emotional  biases  are  used  to  better  understand 
economic decisions. The specification of the field of cognitive finance focuses here 
on methods developed in psychology made applicable for financial questions.
With  the  following  I  propose  the  combined  usage  of  cognitive  methods  for 
specific  financial  agendas.  These  financial  agendas  are  derived  from  problems 
observed in behavioural  finance  (e.g.  context dependency,  self-control,  and mental 
accounting)  which  are  discussed  for  spending  strategies,  saving  strategies,  and 
investment strategies. In this introduction I review the research in this field, outlining 
central  problems,  current  approaches,  and  the  methods  which  are  later  applied  to 
acquire new knowledge about decision strategies in cognitive finance.
1.1.  Context Specific Strategy Usage
Since  Simon  (1955,  1956),  economic  questions  have been  seen  more  and more 
under the constraint of being boundedly rational. This means that we show differing 
behaviour which does not necessarily fall under the general paradigm of rationality. 
Instead  he  stresses  the  characteristics  of  the  task  and  a  “satisficing”  strategy  is 
assumed,  due  to  memory  and  general  computational  limitations.  Decisions  are 
satisfying  but  also  sufficient,  which  entails  that  decisions  can  be  seen  as  being 
ecologically rational once the specific conditions of the task are taken into account. 
Under  the  concept  of  ecological  rationality,  the  guiding  circumstances  in  which 
decisions take place are  moving into focus,  meaning the evaluation of reasons that 
make a decision rational.
Accordingly,  external  conditions  and task characteristics  influence what kind of 
behaviour people choose in the end. The question of context-dependency is tackled
2by  varying  the  characteristics  of the  tasks  or  by  looking  at  decisions  in  different 
domains.
1.1.1.  Context Dependency and Framing
A vast number of experiments exists now which examine how behaviour changes 
according to variations  of the task.  Here only the more prominent are  described to 
illustrate the potential variability in behaviour. In their heuristics and biases program 
Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974;  1983;  Gilovich,  Griffin,  &  Kahneman,  2002; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,  1982; Tversky, Slovic, 
&  Kahneman,  1990)  illustrated  in  a  number  of  experiments  how  answering 
behaviour  depends  on  variations  in  the  format  of the  question.  This  variability  is 
contrasting  standard  probability  theory,  where  only  the  underlying  numerical 
information should be taken into account.
By varying the task characteristics or the frame of a decision, systematic changes 
in peoples’ behaviour can be observed. The framing of a decision therefore can play 
a crucial part in the sort of answers people produce. The conjunction fallacy nicely 
illustrates this dependency,  where simply the general description of the task guides 
the  answering  behaviour  and  thereby  influences  the  resulting  choice.  Thus,  by 
introducing  a  strong  frame,  decision  processes  are  activated  which  contradict 
probability.
In  the  conjunction  fallacy,  one  example  much  discussed  in  the  heuristics  and 
biases program, the probability of two events occurring together is rated higher than 
the single events forming the conjunction.  The following “Linda problem” became 
famous (Tversky & Kahneman,  1983, p. 297):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. 
As  a  student,  she  was  deeply  concerned with  issues  of discrimination  and social 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which of the following is more likely?
1) Linda is a bank teller.
2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
85%  of  those  asked  ranked  the  likelihood  of  option  2  higher  than  of  option  1. 
However, mathematically, the probability of two events occurring in conjunction willalways be less than or equal to the probability of either one occurring alone. Here the 
description of the person frames the answering behaviour.
The Allais paradox (Allais,  1953) is another example of framing which shows that 
the adding of a common consequence to two given alternatives can reverse choices 
and  ,thus  ,observed  behaviour  contradicts  the  independence  axiom  of  choice 
components. This especially is the case if one alternative gains certainty by the added 
common consequence,  also called “the sure thing principle”.  Other framing effects, 
which  also  result  in  preference  reversals,  are  documented  by  the  differences  in 
answering behaviour between probability and dollar bets in gambles (e.g., Slovic & 
Lichtenstein,  1971). Although high probability bets are normally preferred in choice 
situations,  high  dollar  bets  receive  higher  values  when  the  answering  mode  is  in 
selling  prices  or  certainty  equivalents.  Accordingly,  the  framing  of  the  task  or 
question violates procedural invariance.
Various explanations have been discussed to capture the observed irregularities. 
Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974)  proposed  three  heuristics,  namely 
“representativeness”, “availability”, and “adjustment and anchoring” to explain these 
observations. Later prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory were introduced 
(Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1979;  Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1992).  However,  framing 
results  mainly  point  out  how  variable  behaviours  in  experimental  designs  for 
decisions  under  uncertainty  are.  This  general  conclusion  is  further  supported  by 
research regarding the dependency of decisions on the underlying choice set (Roe, 
Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Simonson & Tversky,  1992; Stewart, Chater, Stott, 
& Reimers, 2002). Simply the variation of the existing alternatives in the choice set 
influences  the  choice  itself.  For two  dimensional  alternatives  similarity,  attraction, 
and compromise effects have been shown, where adding a third alternative to a set of 
two  alternatives  alters  the  decision  dependent  on  the  individual  distances  of  the 
alternatives to each other. A range of alternative theories to capture framing effects 
have  been  proposed  (Roe,  Busemeyer,  &  Townsend,  2001;  Stewart,  Chater,  & 
Brown 2006; Usher & McClelland, 2004). Summing up, the stability and universality 
of the utility concept is questioned by these results and only process models which 
take the different influences of the task environment into account can explain these 
context dependent variations.
41.1.2.  Context Dependency and Domain Specificity
An alternative approach to context dependency is to assume that behaviour is task 
or domain specific. Here different sorts of behaviour are directly dependent upon the 
characteristics  of  the  task.  Thus  different  strategies  are  picked  according  to  the 
environment. Gigerenzer, Todd,  and the ABC Research Group (1999) proposed the 
metaphor  of  an  “adaptive  toolbox”  where  different  mental  tools  are  selected 
dependent on the specifics of the task.  Some tools work well in some domains and 
others in other domains.
Research  on  expert  decision  making  documents  different  types  of mechanisms 
acquired to meet the specific demands of a task domain (i.e., Ericsson & Lehmann, 
1996).  Examples  for  domain  specific  strategy  usage  are  the  hot  hand  strategy  of 
using  streaks  of  successful  shots  by  players  as  allocation  cues  for  further  hits  in 
basketball (Bums, 2004) or the tit-for-tat strategy for reciprocal interaction in social 
settings  (Axelrod  &  Hamilton,  1981).  These  heuristics  can  improve  overall 
behaviour, gaining more hits in the first case and achieving cooperative behaviour in 
the  second.  Heuristic  strategies  are  successful  shortcuts  which  are  used  under 
specific  conditions  like  time  restrictions  or  memory  constraints  and  thus  are 
“satisficing”.  Such  heuristic  strategies  could  also  be  of  importance  for  financial 
decisions by experts as well as non-experts.
In general, it is assumed that environmental conditions trigger the usage of one or 
the  other  strategy.  Accordingly,  in  some  environments  more  complex  or  rational 
strategies  are  used.  In  other  environments  the  usage  of  heuristic  strategies  is 
predominant. But when which strategies are selected and how this strategy selection 
process takes place, has yet to be answered.  Here the reference is made to learning 
and  adaptation  mechanisms  which  are  discussed  in  section  1.2.  For  now,  the 
assumption  that  people  use  different  strategies  in  different  domains  is  important. 
When  different  strategies  exist  for  specific  tasks  and  when  these  strategies  are 
adaptive to that environment, the question arises what strategies are used in specific 
financial domains. This is the fundamental reason; to look at the different financial 
areas of spending, saving, and investment separately.
51.2.  Changes in Strategies
A long research tradition in psychology focuses on how behaviour changes. This 
change of behaviour over time falls under the term of learning.  More evolutionary 
influenced theories see changes in behaviour as adaptations shaped over the history 
of the human species. These two approaches are introduced briefly. They can be seen 
as two interacting processes, where adaptation is the result of evolutionary learning 
and the lack of adaptation a necessary condition for individual learning to take place.
1.2.1.  Learning
Many learning models have been proposed in psychology.  I concentrate here on 
one specific but simple learning form namely reinforcement learning. It is seen as the 
most  fundamental  type  of  learning  in  repeated  decisions.  Thus,  reinforcement 
learning  could  be  relevant  to  different  kinds  of  repeated  economic  interactions. 
According  to  reinforcement  learning,  successful  behaviour  or  successful  strategies 
are  supported  and  become  more  frequent.  This  assumption  was  introduced  by 
Thorndike (1898) under the term “law of effect”.  If a strategy produces the desired 
outcome, it is used more frequently under recurring conditions.
An important criterion of reinforcement learning  is  the  assumption  of strategies 
which reflect the goal orientation of behaviour. These strategies are linking perceived 
states of the environment to actions to be taken when in those states. The strategies 
are selected depending on their reward function, the immediate intrinsic desirability, 
and their value function, the long term desirability. An optimization of the behaviour 
is  achieved  by  mapping  strategies  to  environments  or/and  by  matching  the 
distribution of strategies in environments. Accordingly, one important part is finding 
the best strategies for specific environments. The other part is to adapt the strategy 
usage to varying environments to optimize behaviour over time.
The  key  element  of  reinforcement  theories,  the  trial-and-error  learning  with 
delayed rewards, therefore must be seen in combination with the following two other 
characteristics.  It is a learning process which is based on a goal directed interaction 
with  an  uncertain  environment  and  results  from  the  trade-off between  exploration 
and  exploitation.  Reinforcement  models  are  all  derived  from  these  fundamental 
principles  but  formalize  the  learning  process  differently.  Sutton  and  Barto  (1998) 
provide  a  detailed  overview  about  different  reinforcement  models.  The  central
6assumption here is that specific reinforcement processes are also taking place in the 
domain  of financial  behaviour,  which  form  the  strategies  we  observe  in  financial 
decision making. Financial strategies then are seen as the result of learning processes 
or  more  generally  as  the  result  of  adaptation  and  not  of  optimized  utility 
maximization.
1.2.2.  Adaptation
Learning is a form of adapting to current environments. But adaptation can also be 
seen  as  an  evolutionary  process  where  specific  strategies  have  been  developed 
depending  on  the  demands  of  the  environment.  The  adaptation  to  ancestral 
environments  is  often  seen  as  the  reason  for  current  misadaptation  (Tooby  & 
Cosmides,  1990a). This misalignment between behaviour and current environments 
is only of interest here, inasmuch as ancestral mental mechanism are developed to be 
used  for  present-day  tasks.  Therefore,  I  assume  that  mechanisms  which  were 
successful in the past are applied to the demands of the modem world.  Adaptation 
then  mainly  means  that  we  have  developed  different  strategies  to  cope  with  the 
demands we face in the interaction with our environment, assuming a differentiation 
mechanism which fosters  some  strategies  in  some  situations.  This  mainly  supports 
the assumption that behaviour is domain specific and that we have to investigate the 
peculiarities of the task.
Some  examples  should  provide  a  better  intuitive  understanding  of this  relation 
between  adaptation  and  financial  behaviour.  Firstly,  regarding  saving  behaviour, 
diversification can be  seen  as  a successful  individual  strategy.  By  spreading  one’s 
wealth into different categories the risk of a total failure is minimized and therefore 
the chances for survival are improved. When we nowadays “don’t want to put all our 
eggs into one basket” a similar optimization process is in place as it was in former 
times.  A  simple  1/n-rule  (Benartzi  &  Thaler,  2001),  where  funds  are  equally 
distributed  over  investments,  might  have  its  origin  in  this  historically  approved 
strategy.  Secondly,  spending  behaviour  can  be  seen  as  a  set  of  strategies  in  a 
population  for  spreading  consumption  over  different  goods.  Group  selection  in 
sociobiology (Wilson,  1975; Wilson & Sober,  1994) documents that it is important 
for the  success  of a population to  have  different  strategies  in place to  optimize its 
supply as a whole. Similar mechanisms of strategy diversity could be in place now, 
which might have led to the existence of qualitatively different spending strategies in
7our  population.  Thirdly,  investment  behaviour  might  show  similar  mechanisms  as 
ancient evaluations. The evaluation of food or people might have its parallel to the 
evaluation of companies. When we have specific mechanisms for the categorization 
of objects  these  might just  as  well  apply  for the  categorization  of companies  and 
respective investment strategies.
This gives  an impression of how financial behaviour can be reframed under the 
assumption of evolutionary adaptation. However, evolutionary theory is mainly seen 
as  a possibility to  generate new  ideas  for a theory of cognitive finance.  Obviously 
there  is  a gap between  modem  financial  decisions  and  the  environments  in  which 
humans  evolved.  But  adaptations  may,  however,  set  some  of  the  cognitive 
background. The detection of “cheaters” (Cosmides,  1989) and the building of trust 
are  modem  examples  of mechanisms  which  have  a  long  tradition  not  only  in  the 
human race and could also form an important basis for financial cooperation.
1.3.  Behavioural Finance
Within  finance  research,  experimental  and  behavioural  observations  produce  a 
growing  area  of  interest.  In  contrast  to  standard  finance  theory  which  is  mainly 
interested  in  optimal  behaviour,  behavioural  finance  takes  empirical  observations 
into account and aims to integrate them into finance theory.  Linked to the areas of 
spending, saving, and investment the following research topics are of importance.
1.3.1.  Hedonics of Spending Strategies
Within spending behaviour the affective component can be stressed. In contrast to 
standard economic theory, where revealed preference through choice is the basis for 
constructing a utility function,  the focus is  in emotions occurring together with the 
choice  activity.  This  highlights  the  hedonic  experience  of  a  choice  which  can 
influence  the  spending  behaviour  people  show.  Prelec  and  Loewenstein  (1998) 
propose a “double-entry” mental accounting theory which formalizes these hedonics 
of  a  spending  experience.  It  postulates  an  interaction  between  the  pleasure  of 
consumption and the pain of paying and assumes a “coupling process” which refers 
to  the  degree  to  which  consumption  calls  to  mind  thoughts  of payment,  and  vice 
versa.  The  first determinant of coupling  is  the  degree  of temporal  separation.  The 
second factor is the diversity of benefits associated with a payment, or the diversity
8of payments  associated  with  a benefit,  making it more or less  possible to  assign  a 
particular payment  to  a  particular benefit.  Similarly,  Gourville  and  Soman  (1998) 
researched  the  behavioural  implications  of  temporally  separating  the  costs  and 
benefits of consumption. The results suggest that individuals mentally track the costs 
and benefits of a consumer transaction in order to reconcile those costs and benefits 
on  completion  of the  transaction.  When  costs  precede  benefits  this  can  lead  to  a 
systematic  and  irrational  attraction  to  sunk  costs,  meaning  an  overspending  if the 
result is not yet achieved. However, consumers gradually adapt to a historic cost with 
the passage of time,  an effect known  as  “payment depreciation”,  which  devaluates 
costs  and can lead to  sunk cost processes.  Soman  (2001) tested the hypothesis that 
the payment method alters the strength of the relationship between past expenses and 
future spending. Expenditure reduces budgets, and hence decreases future spending. 
Past  payments  strongly  reduced  purchase  intention  when  the  payment  mechanism 
requires  the  consumer  to  write  down  the  amount  paid,  such  as  a  cheque  which 
requires filling in, unlike a credit card slip which one simply has to  sign.  Purchase 
intention  was  also  reduced  when  the  consumer’s  wealth  is  depleted  immediately 
rather than with a delay, such as a payment made by cash or debit card. The first is 
attributed to a rehearsal taking place and the second considers the immediacy of the 
payment. It is proposed that these phenomena are due to their effect on memory and 
recall.
Generally,  as  spending  is  closely  associated  with  consumption,  we  can  assume 
that  affective  dimensions  influence  this  behaviour.  Loewenstein  (1996,  2000) 
stresses  the  influence  of immediate  emotions  on behaviour.  In  a  similar  strain,  so 
called  two  system  or  dual  process  models  of reasoning  have  been  proposed  (i.e., 
Evans,  2003;  Sloman,  1996).  But how  these  systems  integrate  to  form  the  overall 
behaviour and how  differences  in  spending behaviour can be  explained,  is  still  an 
open question.
1.3.2.  Mental Accounting and Self-Control in Saving Strategies
It  is  well  documented  that  people  organize  their  finances  in  “mental  accounts” 
with strong influences on the resulting behaviour (Heath & Soli,  1996; Thaler,  1985, 
1999).  Mental  accounting  assumes  that  wealth  is  mentally  divided  into  different 
categories which are used to guide the behaviour. Specific wealth can be labelled and 
then used accordingly. This approach is transferred by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) to a
9life-cycle  theory  of  saving  behaviour.  Households  act  as  if they  use  a  system  of 
mental  accounts  that  violate  the  principle  of  fungibility.  For  example  mental 
accounts  which  are  considered  “wealth”  are  less  tempting  than  those  which  are 
considered  “income”.  Thus  the  level  of  saving  is  affected  by  the  way  in  which 
increments to wealth are framed and income paid in the form of a lump sum bonus 
will  be  treated  differently  from  regular  salary  income,  even  if  the  bonus  is 
completely  anticipated.  An  empirical  investigation  of  this  behavioural  life-cycle 
savings  model  (Levin,  1998)  supports  that  consumption  spending  is  sensitive  to 
changes  in  income  and  liquid  assets  which  are  assets  that  are  relatively  easy  to 
transform into cash, but not to changes in the value of other types of assets, i.e. non­
liquid assets such as houses and social security. This occurs despite the fact that the 
value of non-liquid assets is relatively large for most of the households in the sample. 
The findings hold when liquidity constraints of borrowing against future income are 
taken into account. The composition of spending is also sensitive to the composition 
of wealth in different income and asset types,  again contrary to classical economic 
theory.
Closely  related  to  mental  accounting  is  the  theory  of  self-control.  Thaler  and 
Shefrin (1981) proposed a model of saving that includes internal conflict, temptation, 
and  willpower.  Individuals  are  assumed  to  behave  as  if  they  have  two  sets  of 
preferences:  one concerned with the short run (the “doer”)  and one concerned with 
the long run (the “planner”). Since willpower, which represents the real psychic costs 
of resisting temptation, is costly, the planner also uses rules and mental accounting to 
restrict  future  choices  in  order  to  smooth  consumption  over  time.  For  example 
Bertaut  and  Haliassos  (2001)  assume  self-control  mechanisms  to  explains  the 
“puzzle  of debt  revolvers”.  About  two  thirds  of US  households  have  a bank-type 
credit  card,  and  despite  high  interest  rates  most  maintain  a  significant  credit  card 
debt.  Yet  the  majority  of these  debt  revolvers  have  substantial  liquid  assets  with 
which  they  could  pay  off this  debt.  The  fact  that  they  do  not,  violates  economic 
arbitrage. This behaviour is explained as a self-control mechanism. An “accountant 
self’ controls the expenditures of a “shopper self’ by only paying off a portion of the 
credit  card  debt,  limiting  the  purchases  that  can  be  made  before  encountering  the 
credit limit.  This  documents  that there  are  some  self-control  mechanisms  in place.
10However the larger range of mechanisms and how they are applied in detail is not yet 
researched.
1.3.3.  Risk and Incentives in Investing Strategies
Investment behaviour is  closely linked to  the perceived risk associated with the 
investment.  The  conventional  economic  approach  copes  with  risk  of outcomes  by 
assuming a maximization of the expected utility or the subjectively expected utility 
(Edwards,  1954).  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  later  expand  this  model  by 
proposing four key features in their prospect theory of choice under uncertainty:
•  Reference  point:  outcomes  are  assessed  relative  to  a reference  point  which 
often is the status quo but can be manipulated by the framing of a decision.
•  Risk attitude: general risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses.
•  Loss aversion: losses loom larger than gains.
•  Non-linear decision weights: over-weighting of small probabilities relative to 
highly  probable  events  and  under-weighting  of  outcomes  that  are  merely 
probable in comparison with outcomes that are certain.
These features  enable the prediction of a large  number of biases  and deviations 
from economic theory that are observed in laboratory studies of decision-making.
A  conceptually  different  approach  to  choice  under  uncertainty  is  to  stress  the 
incentives  people  have  for  a  specific  choice.  The  choice  of an  investment  can  be 
understood by the factors supporting that specific choice. Fox and Tversky (1998) for 
example, provide an empirical test of the implications of support theory, which states 
that probability judgements are weighted by a “level of support” factor. They show 
that judgements concerning  specific events  are more  strongly supported than those 
concerning  combined  events,  as  pertinent  information  is  more  easily  recalled  or 
assessed. The sum of the judged probabilities of individual events is therefore greater 
than  the judged  probability  of the  same  combined  events.  Unpacking  the  ways  in 
which  an  investment  might  be  profitable  can  increase  the  attractiveness  of  the 
investment.  Other  approaches  stress  the  post-decisional  evaluation  stage,  which  is 
anticipated in the choice situation. Loomes and Sugden (1982) for example point out 
the importance of an anticipated regret of an investment failing.
11Various choice models pointed out different factors of importance. It is clear that 
we have incentives for our choices. Macmillan,  Siegel,  and Narasimha (1985) give 
an  overview  of  different  incentives  venture  capitalists  have  for  investing  in 
companies. However, Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) see a lack of insight by venture 
capitalists and in general by experts into their own decision processes. In particular, 
it is not clear how we link the perception of a company we want to invest in, to these 
investment incentives and how the available information is integrated into a choice.
1.4.  Methods for Capturing Cognitive Processes
Various methods have been proposed to capture or describe mental processes on 
the individual level  (i.e.,  think aloud technique,  introspection)  and diverse imaging 
methods are on the advance. In this thesis I use a combination of different methods, 
which work on an aggregated level, to capture the underlying cognitive processes in 
place.  Here  an  overview  is  provided  about  the  methods  applied.  Specifics  are 
discussed later in the respective chapters.
1.4.1.  Experiments
A  classic  research  vehicle  in  psychology,  and  also  to  a  growing  extent  in 
economics,  is  the  experiment.  This  formalized  methods  allows  for  systematic 
hypothesis  testing  of behavioural  questions.  In  an  experiment,  a  specific  research 
question is isolated which can then be investigated more systematically. Real world 
situations  are  translated  into  an  experimental  setting  where  key  variables  can  be 
selectively manipulated to find their causal consequences. This is a huge advantage 
of experiments  in  contrast  to  observations  where  causation  is  often  only  inferred 
from correlation.
While  in  the  standard  experiment  variables  are  manipulated  to  find  causal 
relationships  between  each  other,  exploratory  experiments  can  be  used  for  the 
development  of  ideas.  The  latter  is  useful  in  new  settings  for  the  generation  of 
hypotheses.  A  further  specification  is  to  separate  between  field  and  laboratory 
experiments,  which  enables  one  to  vary  the  abstraction  level  of the  behaviour  of 
interest.
In  the  cognitive  sciences  another  distinction  is  made  between  process  and 
outcome  orientation.  Generally,  behavioural  outcomes  are  the  experimental  focus.
12Alternatively, process variables can be used as a dependent variable to give insights 
into the procedural mechanisms involved (Covey & Lovie,  1998). This appears to be 
an  important  approach  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  underlying  cognitive 
mechanisms of behaviour.
However experiments, as theoretical abstractions of real world situations, always 
bring a simplification with them. Therefore in a new setting it is often useful to also 
use other explorative techniques.
1.4.2.  Ratings
An easy and straight forward method for evaluations are ratings. Here the area of 
interest is formalized into questions which are rated on provided scales. A classical 
example for this is the test-theory where questionnaires for individual differences are 
developed to capture specific dimensions of personality.
The main questions regard the stability and variability of constructs and respective 
ratings.  One common finding is that Likert scales with a neutral middle point give 
the  best  results  here  (Likert,  1932).  Keeping  also  Miller’s  (1956)  results  in  mind, 
regarding a working memory limitation of seven plus-minus two, a five point Likert 
scale appears to provide a useful basis for psychological rating scales.
Nowadays  diverse  concepts  and  behavioural  aspects  have  been  examined  and 
behavioural  constructs exist for sensation  seeking  (Zuckerman,  1971,  1984,  1994), 
risk  taking  (Coombs,  1975;  Weber,  Blais,  &  Betz,  2002),  empathy  (Chlopan, 
McCain,  Carbonell,  &  Hagen,  1985),  and many  other personal  characteristics.  But 
besides  capturing  personal  characteristics,  ratings  have  been  developed  for  much 
more  diverse  areas  and  even  situations  and  objects  are  the  content  of this  method 
(Osgood, Tannenbaum, & Suci, 1957).
1.4.3.  Real World Data
An  additional  category  of  methods,  which  is  not  that  strongly  developed  in 
cognitive sciences, and thus of growing importance, is real world data analysis. This 
is a systematic analysis of existing behavioural data, with the advantage of directly 
describing the behavioural facets in a real world environment. Examples of this come 
from practitioners, where data storage systems have been employed. Large customer 
warehouses do exist but often, for a behavioural analysis, the academic know-how or
13incentives  are  lacking.  Yet  these  databases  often  allow  a  systematic  tracking  of 
behaviour in diverse areas.
Some  research  areas  traditionally  work  with  real  world  data.  Market  data  for 
example is extensively analysed.  But mainly aggregated behaviour is  the focus.  In 
marketing  a  frequent  approach  is  to  break  this  market  down  into  segments,  often 
working  with  demographic  differences.  Thus  a  direct  analysis  of  behavioural 
differences  is  rare.  An  exception  is  the  current  customer  relation  management 
practice where individual behaviour is tracked over time. However customer relation 
management research in academia remains nascent (Kamakura et al., 2005).
Altogether, this documents the need of behavioural methods for specific financial 
agendas.  Many  approaches  of behavioural  analysis  exist  but  not  in  linkage  to  the 
specifics of financial domains.  A domain specific analysis could help to clarify the 
importance  and  universality  of  behavioural  effects  and  would  help  to  better 
understand  the  behaviour  in  financial  settings.  The  research  question  is  threefold: 
First,  what  strategies  do  people  use  in  different  financial  domains?  Second,  how 
different  are  the  financial  strategies  people  use  within  a  domain?  Third,  is  the 
selection of different strategies adaptive and can be explained by learning processes?
I begin with an example of behavioural tracking of natural spending strategies in 
Chapter  2.  This  examines  individual  differences  in  spending  behaviour  and 
differentiates  between  different  spending  styles  based  on  the  debit  transactions 
recorded by  a financial  service  institution.  Chapters  3,  4  and  5  utilize  ratings  and 
experimental methods respectively for saving and investment strategies. In Chapter 3 
individual  saving  concepts  and  saving  structures,  as  well  as  differences  in  self- 
control  demands  and  self-control  features  are  researched.  Chapter  4  introduces  a 
method  of how  companies  are  evaluated  based  on  semantic  differences.  Then  in 
Chapter 5  different inference  strategies for integrating company information into  a 
choice are compared, which is followed by a final discussion and outlook in Chapter 
6.
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Spending Strategies2.  SPENDING STRATEGIES
In this chapter we are looking at peoples’ spending behaviour to better understand 
this  behaviour  and  to  investigate  the  differences  people  show  in  this  domain.  The 
analysis  is  made  on  real  financial  data  and  introduces  a  method  for  identifying 
psychological differences in financial behaviour based on real world data.
When  companies  make  a  customer  segmentation,  a  common  strategy  is  to  use 
individual  differences  as  a predictor  of future  behaviour.  Recent  advances  in  data 
management  in  large  financial  institutions  give  an  unprecedented  and  potentially 
powerful source of data for identifying such differences.  I show that spending data 
can substantially help to target the direct marketing of a savings product. Behaviour- 
based segmentation does not simply align with classic demographic information. In 
particular, a systematic combination of this independent source and more traditional 
measures can enhance the predictive power of marketing research  and improve the 
relationship  with  customers.  Customer  data  is  a  direct  source  for  a  better 
understanding  of  individuals  and  can  easily  be  applied  for  deriving  and  testing 
psychological assumptions about financial behaviour.
2.1. Behavioural Evaluation
Spending  in  general,  but  especially  shopping,  can  be  seen  as  one  of the  most 
direct expressions  of the underlying demand  structure.  In pursuing our wishes,  we 
display  various  purchase  behaviours  differing  in  sort,  frequency  and  variability. 
These differences in recorded spending activity can be used to characterize different 
sorts  of behaviour.  In  the  following  I  describe  a  method  of using  these  tracks  of 
spending behaviour to capture individual behavioural differences.
2.1.1.  Spending Literature
Economic  literature  on  spending  behaviour  traditionally  focuses  on  consumer 
intentions  and  consumer  attitudes  as  well  as  purchase  incidents  (i.e.,  Dreze  & 
Modigliani,  1972;  Goodhardt,  Ehrenberg,  &  Chatfield,  1984;  Juster,  1966;  Tobin 
1959).  Optimal  consumption  strategies  are  derived  based  on  different  utility 
functions  (Hakansson,  1970;  Mirman  1971),  but  also  the  elasticity  of demand,  as 
price dependent changes in purchase quantity, is discussed (Oliveira-Castro, Foxall,
16& Schrezenmaier, 2006). Another focus lies on the temporal distribution of spending 
over time. The life-cycle permanent income hypothesis (Friedman,  1957; Modigliani, 
1966,  1986;  Modigliani  &  Brumberg,  1954)  is  central  here,  which  proposes  that 
anticipated earnings are regarded in the current spending behaviour to optimise and 
respectively  equalize  spending  over one’s  lifetime.  Alternatively the  smoothing  of 
spending behaviour over time  can  be the result of buffer  stock  as  a precautionary 
saving motive (Campbell & Mankiw, 1990; Carroll,  1997).
Also,  emotions  have  been  stressed  as  important  in  spending  behaviour 
(Hirschman,  1984;  Hirschman  &  Holbrook,  1982;  Holbrook  &  Hirschman,  1982) 
where experiential and hedonic aspects are highlighted. Closely related are impulsive 
buying or compulsive spending (i.e.,  Rook & Fisher,  1995; Weinberg &  Gottwald, 
1982),  which  are  specific  manifestations  of emotional  spending  behaviour.  Other 
features  of  spending  behaviour  are  ecological  aspects  such  as  sustainability  and 
social responsibility. Reisch and Rppke (2004) provide an overview about ecological 
economic consumption.
A  further  characterization  of  spending  behaviour  is  the  usage  of  different 
transaction channels. Generally the best channel structure for a company to optimize 
profits is searched for (i.e., Coughlan,  1985; Jeuland & Shugan,  1983; Schoenblacher 
& Gordon, 2002; Trivedi,  1998). In addition however, the usage of specific channels 
like  the  internet  (Dewan,  Freimer,  &  Seidmann,  2000)  or  credit  card  usage 
(Plummer, 1971) has been researched.
2.1.2.  Individual Spending Differences
The  improved  storage  and  processing  of  transactional  data  by  large  financial 
institutions makes it possible to analyze these differences in detail. Existing research 
in  this  field  mainly  concentrates  on  purchasing  frequency,  retention,  or  customer 
loyalty  (i.e.,  Eriksson  &  Vaghult,  2000;  Stem  &  Hammond,  2004;  for  a  critical 
comment see Reinartz & Kumar, 2002). In this chapter, a psychometric approach is 
adopted  which  examines  the  underlying  consumption  styles  as  differences  in 
financial  behaviour.  Based  on  a  rich  set  of  automatically  processed  and  readily 
available  data  in  personal  financial  services,  a  new  differentiation  method  is 
introduced  which  extracts  financial  traits  directly  corresponding  to  the  observed 
behavioural data.
17Customer  segmentation  is  widely  used  in  marketing,  where  different  predictive 
characteristics  like  “attitudes”,  “lifestyles”,  “psychographics”,  or  “purchasing 
involvement”  have  been  adopted  (Gould,  1997;  Hustad  &  Pessemier,  1974; 
Lockshin,  Spawton,  &  Macintosh,  1997;  Pemica,  1974;  Plummer,  1974;  Slama  & 
Tashchrian,  1985).  Lesser  &  Hughes  (1986)  provide  a  generalizability  test  for 
psychographic  market  segments.  For  an  early  critic  of  segmentation  compare  for 
example Wells (1975).  I focus on the understanding of the individual customer and 
propose  different  dimensions  which  can  be  used  as  a  multiple  purpose  tool  for 
improving  customer  relations.  The  method  proposed  in  this  chapter  differentiates 
between customers by using directly observed behaviour. A promising psychological 
concept  in  this  context  is  that  of personality  factors  to  account  for  differences  in 
financial behaviour. The records of manifested behaviour are analyzed to extract the 
underlying  personal  financial  characteristics,  which  represent  the  main  individual 
differences. The advantage of this direct behaviourally based differentiation is that it 
is independent of additionally gathered data and thus can supplement information on 
attitude, interests, or demographic data.
In what follows,  I first describe the underlying data source  and the data sample 
employed.  In  the  next  section  (2.2)  I  outline  the  method  of  behavioural 
differentiation,  which  includes  data aggregation  as  well  as  data interpretation,  and 
report the advantages of the derived method in relation to a direct mailing example.
2.1.3.  Behavioural Analysis
Behavioural  data  can  easily  be  used  in  a  variety  of data-rich  areas.  Nowadays 
large  quantities  of  behavioural  data  are  mostly  gathered  automatically  by  large 
corporations and government,  and prove easily accessible.  But often these data are 
not  exploited  effectively  by  organizations.  For  example,  in  designing  coupon 
programs,  Rossi,  McCulloch,  and  Allenby  (1996)  have  shown  that  the  largely 
neglected purchase history can be highly valuable for improving the profitability of 
direct marketing.  The  importance  of categorized purchases  is  further supported on 
the  household  level  by  Ainslie  and  Rossi  (1998)  as  well  as  Bucklin  and  Gupta 
(1992).  The  lack  of  direct  data  evaluation  is  mostly  due  to  the  absence  of 
corresponding resources in this fast-developing domain. Thus customer information 
is often not processed systematically by practitioners or academics, and hence its full
18potential is not exploited.  Easily accessible behavioural data are primary data with 
the advantages of being robust against manipulation, errors, and over-interpretation.
I used the data of a financial services retail institution with highly sophisticated 
records  of  customers’  regular  spending  behaviour.  This  pre-recorded  information 
was  aggregated  and  made  usable  through  standard  statistical  procedures.  The data 
processing  is  mainly  automatic  and can  be  applied for a  variety  of purposes.  The 
proposed procedure involves low running costs and can serve marketing purposes as 
well as support and structure the financial service itself.
Figure 2.1. Debit channel usage frequency
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Data description
The  processed  source  data  consisted  of  debit  transactions  made  within  the 
different payment mechanisms shown in Figure 2.1. These data are available at an 
individual  level  in  the  customer  information  warehouse  alongside  other  personal 
information such as demographics, credit scores, lifestyle variables, etc. All recorded 
transactions  are  evaluated  on  the  basis  of the  British  merchant  Standard  Industry 
Classification  (SIC).  This  information  allows  a  separation  of  different  types  of 
spending  behaviours.  The  transactions  are  separated  into  370  different  debit 
categories,  describing  specific  groups  of goods  sold by these  industries.  This  data 
classification is completely automated and thus reliable within the constraints of the
19formalized classification procedure. The predefined categories allow an evaluation of 
individual  spending  behaviour,  and  provide  behaviourally  meaningful  data  by 
enabling a characterization of individuals according to what they spend their money 
on, how much they spend, and how spending in the different areas is distributed over 
time. In the following analysis I focus on the spending frequency and the amount of 
money spent in the different debit categories.
It is important, however, to stress the inevitably partial nature of the available data 
as  only  data  captured  from  a  single  company  are  considered.  Hence  possible 
transactions with other providers are not captured. When  working with the data of 
only one provider a common problem is to miss out on possibly relevant parts of the 
behavioural  style.  I  addressed  this  problem  by  evaluating  only  customers  who 
predominantly  bank  with  one  institution,  leaving  out  about  half of the  customers. 
This guarantees a sample for which most transactions are captured, but it potentially 
neglects  behavioural  variations  of  people  who  are  more  flexible  in  the  use  of 
financial providers. A more adequate consideration of this bias is only possible when 
customer information is shared by different institutions  (Lin,  Chen, Chen,  & Chen, 
2003).  But the chosen method of data analysis proves to be robust against missing 
data (Kamakura & Wedel, 2000). The considered information is further restricted to 
informative  transactions  only.  Within  the  recorded  transactions  the  cash  retrievals 
(ATM) and some of the other transactions which do not classify as specific purpose 
transactions are not followed up. The categorized transactions constitute 74% of the 
total number of transactions.
Sample description
For  computational  ease  in  the  analysis,  the  total  customer  base  of  20  million 
individuals  was  reduced.  Initially  only  “active  customers”  were  selected,  where 
“active” is defined as those customers who have both a credit card and a debit card 
with the financial institution and who  show at least one transaction on each within 
the last three months.  From the resulting  10 million  active customers,  a sample of 
300,000 was randomly selected. Even though, in the analysis I used the aggregated 
annual transactions, an examination of the daily data shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates 
that there are also significant weekly (with the highest spending on Fridays and the 
lowest on Sundays) and seasonal patterns (mainly showing spikes related to different 
holidays) which are not further considered here.
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The sample includes only the age groups between the ages  of  18  and 99  years. 
The age distribution with their amounts spent is shown in Figure 2.3. In addition, the 
definition of active customers influences the representativeness of the used sample. 
Generally the sample is representative for adults of the UK. However, as only credit 
card holders with a regular spending pattern with one provider were included, parts 
of the total population have been left aside. Therefore, the following observations of 
spending behaviour are restricted to these customers only and are to be interpreted 
within these limitations. The average annual income for example is £38,000, slightly 
above the average income of the total UK population of £34,000. The selected data 
provide  a  substantial  record  of differences  in  purchasing  behaviour  for  a  specific 
sample of 300,000 customers.
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2.2.  Usage of Behavioural Data
Using the data of financial  se rvices institutions allows individual  differentiation 
on  multiple purchasing events  which  leaves  aside  specific  shopping  characteristics 
such as brand switching, and focuses on more general drivers guiding the variation in 
overall behaviour. The aim was to reduce the mass of behavioural data into a limited 
number of useful and manageable factors which can then be employed to provide a 
better  understanding  of  individual  customers,  and  which  can  be  used  in  specific 
marketing  campaigns  as  a  direct  business  application,  thereby  promoting 
individualized services in the private financial sector.
2.2.1.  Data Aggregation
The first step in our analysis consisted of finding a suitable level of aggregation 
for the expense  data.  On  the  one  hand,  it  appeared  necessary  that  the expenditure 
categories were sufficiently aggregated in order to enable useful comparisons across 
individuals,  to prevent the analysis from being  swamped by noise from  very small 
expense categories, and to make the analysis tractable. On the other hand, a sufficient 
number  of  expense  categories  to  ensure  that  spending  behaviour  could  be 
differentiated across individuals was needed.
22I, therefore, grouped the initial 370 categories into larger categories. To do this, I 
undertook a cluster analysis of the 370 debit categories into 32 new spending classes. 
Thus,  similar  debit  categories  are  grouped  together  forming  more  or  less 
homogeneous groups of spending incidents depending on the data. For the purpose of 
achieving a specified number of homogenous clusters, I applied the k-means method 
(MacQueen,  1967)  which  generates  different  solutions  based  on  the  number  of 
clusters  specified.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  correlation  of  the  number  of 
transactions  within  the  different  categories  and  searches  for  the  lowest  deviations 
from the means. The number of transactions was taken here to reflect every single 
action but not to rely on the spending category dependent pound values.
One advantage of k-means clustering is that distance information for the items to 
the cluster’s mean and for between the clusters becomes readily available. Table 2.1 
shows the 32 spending clusters derived from the 370 debit categories.  It  simplifies 
the  understanding  and  interpretation  of  the  cluster  results.  Outliers  and  central 
categories  can  be  easily  determined  and  explanations  for  discrepancies  sought.  In 
cases  where  the  reason  for the  behavioural  similarity  is  not  immediately  obvious, 
further  investigation  into  the  categories  could  prove  useful  in  understanding  the 
dependencies between the categories.  For example the grouping of  ‘Stockbrokers’, 
‘Investment’,  ‘Department  of  Social  Security’  (DSS)  and  ‘Rent’  initially  seemed 
counter-intuitive.  However,  once  it  is  understood  that  the  data  underlying  ‘Rent’ 
relate more to commercial rent than to private rent, and that DSS largely consists of 
National  Insurance  payments  on  the  part  of  small  businesses,  then  the  grouping 
makes much more sense, and can be taken to reflect the spending behaviour of small 
businesses or individual entrepreneurs.
Besides  the  clusters’  interpretability,  the  heterogeneity  or  stability  is  of empirical 
importance.  The  distance  of  each  item  from  its  centroid  (cluster  mean)  and  the 
distances  between  the  centroids  themselves  are  good  indicators  of  the  clusters’ 
stability. The clusters vary greatly and have strong overlaps with each other,  often 
with single outliers distorting the cluster solution. The 32 spending clusters provide 
broader classes of spending behaviour which can be applied to further analysis.
23Spending Cluster (in order of 
avg. member distance from 
centroid)
Number of 
Members
Debits 
in £ 
Million
Root
Mean
square
Max.
Distance
from
Centroid
Nearest
Cluster
Distance 
to near. 
Cluster
1  Catalogue Shopping 1 0.18 0 28 1.17
2  Loan Repayments 2 100 6.2% 0.62 31 1.03
3  Subscriptions 2 20 6.3% 0.63 28 0.94
4  Home Maintenance 3 14 5.9% 0.70 29 0.98
5  Household Bills 6 308 5.3% 0.85 9 0.84
6  Petrol & DIY 3 385 6.0% 0.84 20 1.12
7  Children & Graduates 3 6.7 6.3% 0.73 29 0.92
8  Specialist Holidays 3 16 6.4% 0.75 29 0.96
9  Mortgage & Assurance 4 906 6.4% 0.97 5 0.84
10  Education 5 17 6.2% 0.80 29 0.88
11  Pensions & Insurance 5 44 6.2% 0.80 29 0.89
12  Leisure - Luxury 4 229 6.6% 0.99 22 0.82
13  Charity 8 5.6 6.1% 0.84 29 0.93
14  Telerision 4 46 6.6% 0.87 29 0.89
15  Retail-Other 6 17 6.3% 0.83 28 0.98
16  Health 6 47 6.3% 0.84 29 0.90
17  Services -  Financial 7 276 6.2% 0.85 31 0.85
18  Retail - Food & Drink 6 38 6.4% 0.85 29 0.92
19  Services - Commercial 6 13 6.4% 0.89 29 0.88
20  Retail -  General 11 247 6.2% 0.98 24 0.87
21  Services -  Other 9 26 6.2% 0.85 29 0.89
22  Leisure -  Creative 14 116 6.1% 0.89 26 0.75
23  International Travel 4 167 6.8% 0.89 30 0.89
24  Retail - Clothing & Home 13 926 6.3% 1.01 20 0.87
25  Car Purchase & Running Costs 8 99 6.4% 0.90 29 0.91
26  Leisure - Intellectual 12 2 6.3% 0.92 22 0.75
27  Leisure - Sports 10 27 6.3% 0.98 29 0.92
28  Services - Professional 5 80 6.8% 0.94 31 0.87
29  Investment & Self Employed 4 93 7.0% 0.90 31 0.82
30  Travel & Cash 8 112 6.8% 1.02 31 0.85
31  Payment Cards 8 519 6.8% 0.98 29 0.82
32  Career Specific 10 64 6.7% 1.05 29 0.86
Table 2.1. K-means debit category cluster solution
2.2.2.  Data Interpretation
But  what  do  the  data  tell  us  regarding  individual  differences  in  spending 
behaviour  and  cognitive  or  psychological  spending  characteristics?  For  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  personal  differences  in  financial  behaviour  an  abstraction 
method to find the underlying differences in the purchasing characteristics is needed. 
Factor analysis is a common statistical technique in psychometric tests to determine 
the fundamental dimensions of differences within observed data. This method is used
24to  compress  variables  into  a  limited  number  of  factors  which  account  for  these 
differences.  The  derived  factors  are  orthogonal,  where  scores  on  each  factor  are 
uncorrelated  and  hence  independent  from  each  other.  Each  factor  thus  reflects  a 
different  behavioural  aspect.  The  underlying  aim  thereby  is  to  evaluate  spending 
behaviours and to find the dimensions by which to differentiate between customers. 
Personal diagnostic factors are differentially dependent on  specific behaviours and, 
therefore,  describe different aspects of the overall behaviour.  They are seen  as the 
underlying dimensions  of behavioural  variation,  presumed to reflect an underlying 
trait  and  thereby  a  propensity  for  a  specific  behaviour  (Cattell,  1965;  Eysenck  & 
Eysenck,  1985;  Fishbein  &  Ajzen,  1975).  The  results  of the  32  derived  spending 
clusters  provided  the  starting  point  for  a  factor  analysis  where  I  considered  the 
individual amount spent in each cluster.
It is desirable to use a small number of factors whilst explaining as much variance 
as  possible.  To  determine  the  optimal  number  of factors,  I  first  generated  all  32 
possible  factors  and  calculated  the  variance  explained  by  each.  Starting  with  the 
strongest  factor  the  explained  variance  decreases  over  the  factors.  A  measure  for 
selecting a useful number of factors is the eigenvalue of the factors, which measures 
the importance of a factor, by giving an estimation of the variance explained by that 
factor  in  a  given  data  set.  A  common  heuristic  is  to  keep  all  factors  with  an 
eigenvalue  of  at  least  one,  thus  all  these  factors  explain  more  variance  than  the 
underlying  variable.  In  our  final  solution  seven  factors  where  the  eigenvalue  is 
clearly above one were selected. This limit was chosen because only strong, clearly 
interpretable factors are useful,  and factors eight to ten, though slightly above one, 
were not directly interpretable.  In the next step the factors  were rotated  and made 
more  distinct.  The  initial  factor  solution  takes  the  variance  between  the  input 
variables  into  account  and  not  the  differences  between  the  factors  themselves.  In 
order to derive comparable factors, which explain a higher proportion of variance, a 
factor rotation method has to be used.  I wanted to have more than one explanatory 
factor,  where  the  factors  themselves  are  highly  distinct  according  to  the  input 
variables,  therefore  an  equamax  rotation  was  applied  (Landahl,  1938).  This  is  a 
standard optimization  method of orthogonally rotating the factors  according to  the 
data  fit.  Through  this  process  the  factors’  differences  in  explained  variance  is 
decreased, and I obtain high factor loadings for only a few variables on each factor,
25rendering  the  factors  more  distinct  from  each  other  and  making  them  directly 
interpretable.  The  higher  the  factor  loading  of  the  spending  cluster  the  more 
important  is  that  specific  variable  for  that  factor.  The  loadings  of  the  spending 
clusters determine the factor and are used for the factor interpretation.  The shaded 
loadings  in Table  2.2  show  the categories  that were most important for the factor 
interpretation.  The  first  factor,  for  example,  is  highly  dependent  on  the  spending 
clusters  ‘Leisure-Luxury’,  ‘Travel&Cash’,  ‘International  Travel’,  and  ‘Payment 
Cards’  and is, therefore, called ‘Leisure & Travel’. All the factors received labels as 
they  appear  to  capture  specific  characteristics,  though  these  labels  are  subjective 
interpretations. Together the factors describe a substantial amount of the variance in 
the underlying data with the first two as the main dividers (see Table 2.2). The seven 
derived financial personality factors  are shown with their assigned naming and the 
variance explained, measured by their eigenvalue. For each factor the loading of the 
spending  classes  are  listed  as  the  standardized  factor  loadings,  representing  the 
weight of this variable for the respective factor.
The  factor  analysis,  which  was  used  to  find  regularities  in  the  personal 
differences,  revealed  the  underlying  dimensions  of  buying  behaviour.  The  seven 
generated  factors  systematically  represent  the  different  characteristics  in  spending 
behaviour and,  therefore,  reflect  seven  dimensions  of financial  personality.  As  the 
factors  describe  different  parts  of the  individual  personality,  they  can  be  used  to 
differentiate  customers  on  these  dimensions.  Every  customer  can  be  assigned  a 
specific score on each factor by multiplying their percentage of the amount spent in 
each of the derived spending clusters by the loading on the factor. Summed up over 
the factor these create the factor score.  The factor score stands for the degree of a 
specific behavioural trait (described by that factor)  which can be  attributed to that 
individual or group of individuals.  For example, the behavioural trait of factor one 
‘Leisure & Travel’ is determined by weighting the proportion of spending in each of 
the  clusters  by  the  appropriate  loadings.  People  spending  a lot  of their  money  on 
leisure goods and travel thus receives a high score.  People who instead spend their 
money on loan repayments and home maintenance are described by a low or negative 
score on this factor.
26Factor 1
LEISURE & TRAVEL
Factor 2
GENERAL
Factor 3
MAINTENANCE
Factor 4
REGULAR PAYMENTS
Factor 5
RISK & SOCIAL
Factor 6
SERVICE ORIENTATION
Factor 7
FUTURE ORIENTATION
Eigenvalue 2.OH 2.07 1.6 1.5 1.35 1.17 1.12
Leisure - Luxury 0.68 Services - Professional 0.93 Home Maintenance 0.68 Television 0.62 Pensions & Insurance 0.69 Services - Commercial 0.72 Children & Graduates 0.75
Travel & Cash 0.65 Subscriptions 0.93 Petrol & DIY 0.59 Loan Repayments 0.60 Household Bills 0.46 Retail - Other 0.53 Education 0.43
International Travel 0.51 Retail -  General 0.38 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.44 Household Bills 0.44 Charity 0.45 Financial Services 0.39 Mortgage & Assurance 0.22
Payment Cards 0.41 Leisure - Creative 0.21 Retail - General 0.37 Mortgage & Assurance 0.41 Health 0.37 Services - Other 0.24 Payment Cards 0.16
Retail - Clothing & Home 0.40 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.19 Leisure - Creative 0.34 Car Purchase & Run. Costs 0.27 Education 0.19 Payment Cards 0.19 Career Specific 0.15
Leisure - Creative 0.39 Payment Cards 0.17 Services - Other 0.32 Payment Cards 0.24 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.18 Travel & Cash 0.13 Household Bills 0.13
Leisure - Sports 0.35 Leisure - Luxury 0.16 Mortgage & Assurance 0.18 Catalogue Shopping 0.022 Leisure - Luxury 0.17 Leisure - Luxury 0.12 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.12
Retail -  General 0.31 Petrol & DIY 0.09 Leisure - Luxury 0.18 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.21 Mortgage & Assurance 0.17 Leisure - Creative 0.12 Leisure - Luxury 0.11
Car Purchase & Run. Costs 0.23 Health 0.09 Household Bills 0.17 Petrol & DIY 0.19 Payment Cards 0.16 Loan Repayments 0.10 Financial Services 0.11
Health 0.22 Travel & Cash 0.09 Retail - Food & Drink 0.17 Financial Services 0.19 Leisure - Creative 0.16 Charity 0.10 Travel & Cash 0.09
Retail - Food & Drink 0.21 International Travel 0.08 Car Purchase & Run. Costs 0.16 Retail - General 0.15 International Travel 0.13 Catalogue Shopping 0.09 Charity 0.08
Mortgage & Assurance 0.09 Leisure -  Spoils 0.08 Health 0.15 Retail - Food & Drink 0.10 Investment & Self Employed 0.11 Education 0.07 Leisure - Creative 0.07
Petrol & DIY 0.09 Television 0.08 Payment Cards 0.13 Leisure - Sports 0.10 Retail - Food & Drink 0.11 Retail - Food & Drink 0.06 Petrol & DIY 0.07
Leisure -  Intellectual 0.09 Retail - Food & Drink 0.07 Retail - Other 0.11 Pensions & Insurance 0.08 Services - Other 0.06 Retail - General 0.06 Services - Commercial 0.05
Retail -  Other 0.08 Services - Commercial 0.05 Leisure - Sports 0.09 International Travel 0.08 Financial Services 0.06 Specialist Holidays 0.06 Health 0.05
Catalogue Shopping 0.06 Household Bills 0.05 Investment & Self Employed 0.07 Leisure - Creative 0.08 Television 0.06 Subscriptions 0.06 Retail - General 0.05
Investment & Self Employed 0.04 Retail —  Other 0.05 International Travel 0.07 Leisure - Luxury 0.07 Specialist Holidays 0.05 Services - Professional 0.05 Car Purchase & Run. Costs 0.05
Television 0.02 Car Purchase & Run. Costs 0.04 Education 0.05 Education 0.06 Subscriptions 0.05 Retail - Clothing & Home 0.05 International Travel 0.04
Education 0.02 Mortgage & Assurance 0.04 Career Specific 0.03 Leisure - Intellectual 0.04 Petrol & DIY 0.04 Home Maintenance 0.03 Leisure - Sports 0.03
Household Bills 0.01 Charity 0.04 Specialist Holidays 0.01 Retail - Other 0.02 Travel & Cash 0.04 Petrol & DIY 0.02 Retail - Food & Drink 0.02
Charity 0.01 Leisure - Intellectual 0.03 Subscriptions 0.00 Specialist Holidays 0.01 Services - Commercial 0.03 Leisure - Sports 0.02 Subscriptions 0.01
Services -  Commercial 0.00 Services - Other 0.03 Services - Professional 0.00 Subscriptions 0.01 Services - Professional 0.03 Leisure - Intellectual 0.01 Services - Professional 0.01
Specialist Holidays -0.01 Loan Repayments 0.02 Leisure - Intellectual -0.01 Services - Professional 0.01 Leisure - Sports 0.01 International Travel 0.01 Loan Repayments 0.00
Children & Graduates -0.02 Pensions & Insurance 0.02 Charity -0.01 Children & Graduates 0.01 Retail - General 0.01 Mortgage & Assurance 0.01 Television -0.01
Services -  Other -0.02 Investment & Self Employed 0.01 Television -0.01 Health 0.00 Retail - Other 0.00 Health 0.00 Home Maintenance -0.01
Services -  Professional -0.03 Children & Graduates 0.01 Financial Services -0.02 Services - Other -0.02 Home Maintenance -0.04 Career Specific 0.00 Services - Other -0.01
Subscriptions -0.04 Education 0.00 Travel & Cash -0.04 Travel & Cash -0.04 Car Purchase & Run. Costs -0.04 Household Bills 0.00 Leisure - Intellectual -0.05
Financial Services -0.04 Catalogue Shopping 0.00 Loan Repayments -0.04 Services - Commercial -0.05 Career Specific -0.04 Television -0.01 Retail - Other -0.06
Pensions & Insurance -0.06 Home Maintenance 0.00 Services - Commercial -0.06 Investment & Self Employed -0.07 Catalogue Shopping -0.07 Pensions & Insurance -0.02 Investment & Self Employed -0.06
Career Specific -0.07 Specialist Holidays 0.00 Pensions & Insurance -0.08 Home Maintenance -0.10 Leisure - Intellectual -0.10 Children & Graduates -0.03 Specialist Holidays -0.08
Loan Repayments -0.10 Financial Services 0.00 Children & Graduates -0.09 Career Specific -0.11 Children & Graduates -0.15 Car Purchase & Run. Costs -0.06 Pensions & Insurance -0.09
Home Maintenance -0.18 Career Specific -0.01 Catalogue Shopping -0.09 Charity -0.12 Loan Repayments -0.20 Investment & Self Employed -0.19 Catalogue Shopping -0.39
Table 2.2. Equamax rotated factor solutionAltogether it  appears  that people have a complex  “spending personality”  which 
can be described by seven factors. This is a rather new approach for understanding 
differences in spending and captures one aspect of a “financial personality”. It nicely 
describes  observable  differences  and  enables  a  differentiation  of  customers  on  a 
psychological or cognitive basis. The seven spending dimensions can be applied in a 
multitude of ways. One possibility is to segment the customer base according to the 
specific purchasing likelihood. To validate the results, an example for predicting new 
data is given for loan products in the next section (2.2.3). But these methods could in 
principle  serve  any business  strategy  where  individual  spending differences  are  of 
importance and correlate with the behaviour of interest.
2.2.3.  Customer Understanding
The  main  question  then  is  what  the  dimensions  of  spending  behaviour  tell  us 
besides  the  already  known  and  frequently  used  personal  characteristics  like 
demographic information or “lifestyle variables”. What additional explanatory value 
do they provide and,  perhaps more importantly,  how can these insights be used in 
customer relation management or marketing in general?
Variable
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7
Leisure  M  .  Risk  Service  Future 
&  General  am  Regulars  &  Orien-  Orien- 
Travel  enance  Social  tation  tation
General  Age -.07 .01 .08 .04 .37 -.18 -.14
Charac-  Sex -.11 -.12 -.12 .05 -.08 .03 .02
teristics  Spending .01 -.12 -.18 -.04 -.09 .15 .17
Debits .06 -.07 .06 -.02 -.05 .07 .15
Product  Credit Card .22 .09 .04 -.20 -.06 .07 .00
Usage  Debit Card .09 -.02 -.01 -.10 -.12 .09 .01
Direct Debit -.11 -.19 -.24 .09 -.04 .12 .22
Overdraft .06 -.01 .02 -.02 .03 -.01 .05
Loan -.11 -.06 -.11 .15 -.17 .05 -.07
Pension -.04 -.04 -.02 .03 -.04 .00 .04
Saving Online .02 .00 -.05 -.03 -.03 .05 .02
Saving General .01 .00 -.03 -.06 .00 .00 .01
Funds .00 .00 .00 -.03 .05 -.04 -.02
Mortgage -.07 -.09 -.06 .12 -.01 -.01 .15
Table 2.3. Debit factor correlation
28In  the first  step  it has  to  be  shown  that the  seven  spending  dimensions  do  not 
simply align with demographic information, which is usually applied in the domain 
of targeting or individualized services. Table 2.3 shows that this is not the case, and 
that the Pearson Correlation with standard demographic measures like sex, age, and 
income is in general relatively low, although substantial correlations exist for some 
product usages. Therefore, I conclude that additional information is provided by this 
type  of  spending  analysis  allowing  us  to  better  differentiate  between  customers. 
Although  the  relation  between  the  different  personal  variables  needs  further 
investigation,  one  obvious  advantage  of  the  factorial  approach  is  that  it  is  not 
purpose-bound and provides a continuous variable which can be applied in different 
areas -  possibly in addition to existing measures. For the cases of ‘Loan’,  ‘Pension’, 
‘Saving Online’,  ‘Saving General’,  ‘Funds’, and ‘Mortgage’  in Table 2.3, the usage 
of the products is captured by the number of entries representing the holding of the 
product.  ‘Credit  Card’,  ‘Debit  Card’,  ‘Direct  Debit’,  and  ‘Overdraft’  usages  are 
described in  terms  of amounts.  The  gender is  coded 0 for female  and  1  for male. 
‘Spending’ is the total amount spent in the last year, and ‘Debits’ is the total number 
of outgoing transactions in the last year.
To illustrate how to apply the debit factors I provide an example. The factors can 
be used to optimize the targeting method for products with a high factor correlation, 
serving as a predictor for purchasing likelihood. This application can be seen as an 
experiment to test the robustness of the underlying factors in predicting behavioural 
differences.  Therefore,  the  factor  model’s  relevance  for  applications  is  used  to 
document  its  theoretical  significance  for  describing  differences  in  financial 
behaviour. A simplistic method to improve the likelihood of a specific behaviour is 
to use the expenditure database for a cut-off based segmentation. Those debit factors 
which best distinguish customers concerning the criteria of interest were used to limit 
the customer base.  In the case of loan holdings,  factors four and five are the most 
predictive. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of loan holdings for the factor values of 
these two factors for the 300,000 sample. If a specific sample size is desired, the cut­
off can be set accordingly. The differentiation value of the two factors is visualized 
by the cut-off example. Initially, half of the customers who score highly (F4 > .22) 
on  the  fourth  factor  were  selected.  Subsequently,  this  number  of  customers  was 
further  decreased  according  to  their  score  on  the  fifth  factor  (F5  <  .13).  The  two
29factors were selected according to their high correlation with the targeted behaviour. 
The  restriction  of  the  customer  base  with  regard  to  these  two  factor  scores  can 
significantly increase the identification of those customers likely to hold loans from 
1% to 9%. The first selection criterion leaves  166,000 customers with 3% holding a 
loan. The final selection results in 45,000 customers of which 9% are holding a loan.
Figure 2.4. Loan holdings for debit factors four and five
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This  straightforward  hierarchical  selection  method  has  been  used  in  a  first 
implementation  of  the  debit  factors  in  direct  mailing  to  improve  the  mailshot 
selection as well as to optimize the mailshot size. The likelihood of holding a loan 
was used to predict purchase probability. In a sample independent test the additional 
usage  of  the  debit  factors  nearly  doubled  the  response  rate  compared  to  only 
demographic  and  lifestyle  based  data  from  0.196%  to  0.341%  (Figure  2.5).  In 
addition to the existing predictors, the alternative direct mail  selection method took 
the debit factors into account where the spending was  averaged over the past year. 
This information  was used for the following month’s direct mailing.  All customers 
approached were new customers not holding a loan with the provider. The response 
rate  is  the  percentage  of people  who  purchase  a  loan  within  two  months  after the 
mailshot. Although no response data was available for a large part of the debit factor 
mail sample, this substantial uplift in the response rate is assumed to be valid for the
30whole  debit  factor  mail  sample.  Alternatively  the  debit  factors  can  be  used  to 
optimize the size of the standard mail sample.
In  both  cases  all  available  customer  information  was  taken  to  select  the  most 
responsive mailing sample in a logistic regression. This is the standard procedure for 
model  building  in  financial  services.  Both  selection  models  have  in  common 
financial behaviour, product holdings, risk scores, and household information. They 
are  derived  in  the  same  way  and trained  on  past  mailings.  All  data preceding  the 
mailing are regarded, but only the alternative model includes the debit factors. The 
uplift in the response rate by this additional information is substantial, as achieving 
the  same  number of responses  with  the  standard model  would  mean  doubling  the 
mailing size which would add a cost of approximately £100,000 (assuming £0.50 per 
mail).  Thus,  on  economic  grounds  alone  the  debit  factors  achieve  a  fundamental 
gain, in addition to the reduction in “annoyance of the customer” by additional mail.
Figure 2.5. Response rates for standard and debit factor model
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This  illustrates  how  the  debit  factors  can  be  used  to  substantially  improve  the 
effectiveness of a direct marketing campaign. The outlined method supports the idea 
of one reason decision making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,  1999), yet leaves room for 
improvements  and  only  exemplifies  how  the  debit  factors  can  be  used.  To  be 
conclusive, the temporal as well as interregional stability of the debit factors would 
need  further  investigation.  Also,  other  methodological  issues  and  the  different 
advances in the field of segmentation have not been investigated in full detail (for a 
summary  see  Wedel  &  Kamakura,  2000,  2002;  Wind,  1978).  Therefore,  the  real
31value of debit factor based differentiations and the space for applications has yet to 
be further explored. The main result is that a two step approach, where the first step 
is  a systematic understanding of customer behaviour,  can  substantially change and 
improve the efficacy of customer relation management in service industries, although 
long-term  effects,  resulting  from  a  better  understanding  of the  customers’  needs, 
could be the more prominent.
Generally,  this  application  experiment  stresses  the  close  link  of  the  factors  to 
concrete  behavioural  differences  in  natural  everyday  behaviour.  Therefore,  this 
psychologically grounded theory of individual differences in consumer spending has 
strong  implications  for practical  applications  as  well  as  for economic  theory  as  it 
illustrates systematic variations in spending behaviour.
2.2.4.  Conclusion
Data gathering  and  data evaluation  play  a  growing role  in  the  digitalization  of 
transactions.  In  order  to  add  value  to  this  growing  amount  of reliable  data,  it  is 
important to develop an explanatory theory. The focus on the individual enriches the 
data  evaluation  and  allows  for  individualized  services.  This  sort  of  direct  data 
evaluation improves service orientation. It can be seen as a crucial economic factor 
in the further development of customer services.
It is important to incorporate the customer perspective into this progress.  On the 
one  hand  data  protection  and  information  control  have  been  raised  as  issues  for 
public policies and legislation matters (Goodwin, 1991; Milne, 2000; Phelps, Nowak, 
&  Ferrell,  2000).  On  the  other  hand,  the  role  and  potential  of  personal  data  in 
customer  relation  management  has  been  stressed  (Godin,  1999;  Milne  &  Boza, 
1998). Only if the usage of behavioural data finds the support of all concerned, can 
real improvement of data-based customer services be achieved.
As demonstrated, transactional data cannot only be easily transformed into useful 
information for marketing purposes, it can also help to build psychological models to 
provide  a better understanding  of the customers  in  general.  This  can  be  seen  as  a 
method of systematically putting an understanding of the customer first, using data 
drawn from their own behaviour, thus emphasizing the key moment for building and 
maintaining  useful  customer  warehouses.  With  the  use  of  dimensions  rather  than 
segments, I want to promote the development into the direction of individual specific 
relations to enable services which relate directly to individuals and their demands.
32The new technological possibilities demand a new way of thinking and definitely 
new ways of marketing, which go hand in hand with the improvement of analytical 
and  statistical  methods.  Only  on  the  basis  of a  fundamental  understanding  of the 
accessible  data  and  with  the  adequate  methods  at  hand  can  we  provide  reliable 
resources  for  coping  with  the  changing  demands  in  personal  services  and  finally 
reach  the  land  beyond  targeting  alone  -   enabling  the  delivery  of  products  and 
information that is personalized for each customer.
Altogether, a new way is introduced to study previously hidden aspects of human 
behaviour to understand individual personal  differences.  It enlarges the concept of 
personality to behavioural differences in a concrete setting and describes a method of 
using  financial  direct  data  to  enrich  psychological  theory  in  regard  to  individual 
differences in spending behaviour.
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Saving Strategies3.  SAVING STRATEGIES
At least since Keynes (1936), it is part of economic theory that we have a variety 
of different motives for saving, including the need to secure means for the future. To 
bridge the gap between motives and observed behaviour, I assume the necessity to 
understand how people actually try to achieve their saving goals. A new visualisation 
method  for  existing  saving  concepts  is  introduced,  which  shows  that  individuals 
apply  a range  of saving  strategies  to  organize their finances.  Based on  a financial 
personality survey it is shown how external as well as internal control for saving can 
be improved systematically.
3.1.  Saving Literature
When  thinking  about  the  use  of specific  sums  of money,  such  as  a  Christmas 
bonus, we often decide to spread consumption and thus keep some portion for a later 
point in time. However, once the day approaches and the fund becomes available we 
tend to spend the whole lot. This can be seen as a momentary failure and a lack of 
providing means for the future.  In this section I investigate the different aspects of 
saving and of how self guiding tools can be used to improve individual commitment.
Saving behaviour is  a universal  activity to  ensure  that  demands  are  met  in  the 
future.  Humans  apply  different  strategies  to  achieve  this  goal  of  uncertainty 
reduction.  Most  prominent  is  the  delay  of gratification,  namely  the  issue  of self- 
control  in favour of future consumption.  The classic  example,  for coping with the 
lures of the moment, is Ulysses who binds himself to the mast of his ship (Homer, 
900-600  B.C,  Book  12).  More  generally,  environmental  structures  can  help  to 
achieve self-control. These self-control mechanisms and structures are focused in this 
section for the domain of saving behaviour. Elster (1979) and Mele (1995) provide a 
detailed discussion  of the  different  aspects  of pre-commitment  and  the  relation  to 
freedom  of  will  and  autonomy.  In  the  economic  literature  the  problem  of  inter­
temporal  inconsistency  first  appears  with  Strotz  (1955)  as  “spendthriftiness” 
followed  by  a  general  overview  provided  by  Ainslie  (1975)  under  the  label  of 
“impulse control”.
353.1.1.  Economic Model
Starting with  Strotz  (1955)  the  standard economic  model  of wealth  distribution 
over  the  lifecycle  as  an  overall  utility  maximization  (Ando  &  Modigliani,  1963; 
Friedman,  1957; Modigliani & Brumberg,  1954;  Modigliani,  1966,  1986) has been 
challenged  repeatedly  (i.e.,  Bemheim,  Skinner,  &  Weinberg,  2001;  Cordes,  1990; 
Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Thaler, 1980, 1985). The two main 
observations  contradicting  the  integration  into  one  category  of  total  discounted 
wealth  are the  additional  utility of direct or  anticipated consumption  (self-control) 
and the  segregation  into  financial  categories  (mental  accounting).  The behavioural 
life cycle model proposed by Shefrin and Thaler (1988,  1992)  generates  these two 
effects by assuming non-fungible components in wealth based on mentally divided 
accounts.  Also other models capturing these behavioural  characteristics,  have been 
proposed.  Laibson  (1997;  Angeletos  et  al.,  2001;  Harris  &  Laibson,  2001) 
incorporates  hyperbolic  discounting  functions  to  model  dynamically  inconsistent 
preferences and asset specific spending. In contrast to the standard lifecycle model it 
predicts  that  spending  tracks  income.  Others  explain  the  immediacy  effect  by 
incorporating  a  “reference  point”  in  the  utility  function  (Loewenstein,  1988),  by 
“dynamic  self-control”  preferences  (Gul  &  Pesendorfer,  2001,  2004),  or  by 
“temporal construals” where the richness of mental representations of event features 
depends on the distance in time (Trope & Liberman, 2003).
Equally inherent in  the models  are two  distinct  intrapersonal  mechanisms.  This 
separation goes back to Descartes and has entered modem sciences via Freud (1911) 
who distinguished between primary processes  (“pleasure principle”)  and secondary 
processes  (“reality principle”).  Later,  saving behaviour was described as  a conflict 
between multiple selves (i.e., Thaler & Shefrin,  1981). All models have in common 
the  assumption  of a  conflict  between  different  selves  or  the  now  and  the  future, 
reflecting  a  struggle  between  a  “myopic  doer”  versus  a  “farsighted  planner”. 
Implicitly  this  follows  a  deficit  orientation  which  can  be  seen  as  individual  self­
regulation failure (for an overview see Baumeister & Heatherton,  1996; Metcalfe & 
Mischel,  1999).  I  postulate  a  different  conceptualization  of  self-control  which 
stresses  its  potential  of  integrating  the  construct  of  the  self  via  action  (compare 
Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Rachlin,  1995). Self-control as an activity, therefore, can 
serve  to  foster  long  term  saving  (utilitarian  goals)  as  well  as  impulsive  spending
36(hedonistic  goals).  This  defines  self-control  as  a  mechanism  for  integrating  the 
different motivational drives without favouring one or the other.
3.1.2.  Behavioural Aspects
Various patterns of self-control have been described in the literature of financial 
behaviour. In line with Schelling (1984) and Ainslie (1975) these can be categorized 
into three different types.
First, there is the physical or mental restriction of the decision space. Direct acts 
of pre-commitment or personal rules like budgeting describe this category. One sort 
of  self  restriction  is  the  a  priori  elimination  of  behavioural  alternatives.  The 
“virginity  principle”  (e.g.,  “I  do  not  borrow”)  is  an  example  for  a  universal  self- 
control mechanism where specific behaviours are debarred from the decision space. 
A  weaker restriction  is  the reduction  in  liquidity.  It describes  active  limitations  of 
possible future behaviour (Bertaut  & Haliassos,  2001;  Gross  &  Souleles,  2002)  or 
mental structuring of event categories (Benartzi & Thaler, 2001; Heath & Soil, 1996; 
Moon, Keasey,& Duxbury, 1999).
A  second  way  of  controlling  future  behaviour  is  the  manipulation  of  the 
environmental structure. Here the likelihood of the demanded activity is increased by 
adding  situational  components  which  support  this  activity  or  vice  versa removing 
deviation-evoking  stimuli.  Various  changes  concerning  the  perception  of  the 
consequences of an event like costs and benefits have been discussed. These concern 
the  elaboration  of  events  (Gourville,  1998),  the  grouping  of  events  (Soman  & 
Gourville, 2001), and temporal factors influencing the event evaluation (Gourville & 
Soman, 1998; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998; Soman, 2001).
The  third  and  most  common  solution  is  to  change  the  contingency  structure 
between a behaviour and its outcome. This can be done by side bets which include 
behaviour contingent penalties or rewards. A saving behaviour example is a saving 
account that has a penalty for early withdrawals or a saving account that has a reward 
of a higher interest rate if the money is not accessed for a specific time period. But 
when  altering the effect  of an event,  the  specification  of exceptions  from  the rule 
becomes  important.  The  structure  must  be  as  restrictive  as  possible  while  being 
flexible enough to capture the respective behaviour. Ainslie (1975, p. 481) stresses 
that  to  make  the  rule  effective  exceptions  must  be  rare  and  uncontrollable. 
Controllable events can only be part of the concept if they are combined with a high
37level  of effort.  Softer  self-control  mechanisms  in  this  case  are  self manipulations 
which  change  the  interpretation  or  the  psychological  meaning  of  an  event.  An 
individual standard can evaluate the behaviour itself, or the inclination to apply effort 
can  serve  as  a  self-control  tool  to  create  costs  which  bolster  against  less  desired 
activities (Soman, 1998; Trope & Fishbach, 2000).
3.1.3.  Applied Cognition
Many  behavioural  patterns  use  different  mechanisms  in  combination  to  guide 
saving. The categorization above illustrates the variety of possible alternatives which 
can be applied. External control goes hand in hand with internal preparedness,  and 
they are,  therefore,  difficult to distinguish from each other.  In  general  internal  and 
external  mechanism  go  together  for  exerting  self-control.  In  what  follows  we 
evaluate  whether  people  actually  use  self-control  strategies  to  guide  saving 
behaviour.  A lack of sufficient saving for retirement could be due to missing self- 
control devices. By contrast, it could simply be a result of limited control, reflecting 
human imperfection or akrasia. To evaluate these opposing understandings of saving 
behaviour deficits,  I provide a closer look at the demands in the domain  of future 
savings and the ways in which people try to achieve them. The level of sophistication 
and differentiation in self-control demand and self-control strategy use will serve as 
an  indicator of the  willingness  for saving.  Goal  specification  is  often  left  aside  in 
behavioural  research,  and  commonly  the  general  aim  of  value  maximization  is 
assumed. I expect the specific goal to be essential for the selection of the self-control 
strategy.
To explore the definition and incentives people have for saving, I first analyzed 
the dimensions of saving and the different saving structures people employ. Second, 
a systematic analysis of individual differences in saving behaviour is provided. This 
can be seen as a bottom-up approach to improve the understanding of the self-control 
problem.  As participants’  payments  were not dependent on the performance in the 
following saving experiments and only reported behaviour was taken into account, 
more direct evaluations can be  asked for to  support the derived conclusions.  Only 
this  would  cancel  out  a  possible  misalignment  between  reported  and  actual 
behaviour, or the danger that specific behavioural parts are left aside.
383.2.  Saving Concept (Study 1)
To  understand  peoples’  saving  behaviour,  we  need  to  examine  their  actual 
savings. Rather than asking hypothetical questions, I provide an in-depth analysis of 
what people actually do, to stress the ecological validity of the saving concept.
In  order to  evaluate the  different approaches  to  saving,  it is  necessary to know 
how people understand this problem and what their saving goal is. It has been shown 
that  often  diverse  motives  for  saving  exist  (Horioka  &  Watanabe,  1997;  Keynes, 
1936;  Lindqvist,  1981).  So,  I  understand  saving  behaviour  as  a  motivational 
configuration which can serve different goals. I also see the individual definition of 
the  saving  task  as  crucial  for  decision  processes.  This  includes  the  internal 
construction  as  well  as  the  external  structuring  of  saving.  Construal  or  mental 
representation  are  important  for  the  various  self-control  initiatives,  and  for 
understanding the mental representation of saving it is useful to know how people 
structure  their  finances.  The  assumption  of  concepts  stresses  the  importance  of 
cognition. Mental events are understood as the structuring causes of behaviour (i.e., 
Dretske,  1993).  This can equally be assumed for saving behaviour and preliminary 
analyses  of  the  individual  structure  of  the  saving  concept  have  been  proposed 
(Groenland, Bloem, & Kuylen, 1996).
In this explorative experiment I examine the understanding people have of saving 
by asking them to describe their definition of saving and by visualizing their saving 
structures in place. This reveals people’s dimensions for saving and illustrates what 
different  self-control  mechanisms  people  use.  The  research  question  is  twofold, 
covering  saving  construals  and  demands  on  the  one  hand,  and  existing  saving 
features and structures on the other.
3.2.1.  Method
I  used  a one-to-one  interview,  including  a drawing board task.  All  participants 
held a saving product with one leading British financial institution which provided 
access  to  their  customer  database.  The  corresponding  saving  product  allows  for 
several  separate  accounts  called  “saving  pots”  and  includes  the  possibility  for 
different sorts of automatic transfers. In total  13  adults took part in the study:  four 
male, nine female, with an average age of 50 years, and of which eight were full-time 
employed  (one  part  time,  three  retired,  and  one  unemployed).  The  interview,  to
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the  drawing  board  procedure,  to  determine  the  individual  saving  structures,  took 
approximately 40 minutes. The whole session was video taped. Compensation for the 
participation was £20.
The  first  part  consisted  of questions  regarding  the  subjective  understanding  of 
saving (i.e., “What is saving?”), the saving motive (i.e., “Why are you saving?”), and 
the aim of saving (i.e., “What are you saving for?”) in a semi-structured fashion. The 
duration was  situation dependent and varied according to the verbal fluency of the 
interviewee, but at least one answer per question had to be given. The interview was 
transcribed and the answers categorized.
In the second part the participants visualized their existing saving structure on a 
drawing board. I started with explaining the task by describing different features they 
can  use  (i.e.,  automatic  transfers,  account  limits,  alerts,  etc.).  Then,  they  were 
provided with a large drawing board,  different pens,  and as many cards they need, 
representing  different  “saving  pots”.  After  possible  questions  were  resolved,  they 
were  left  alone  to  complete  the  task.  They  had  to  come  up  with  a final  structure 
describing  their  saving  situation  by  capturing  the  transfers  between  the  different 
“saving  pots”  and  possible  other  features  they  use.  When  finished,  they  were 
confronted with  different  scenarios  to  test their  saving  structure  and,  if necessary, 
missing elements were added. The scenarios consisted of general “what if’ questions 
clarifying the understanding and the functioning of the derived saving structures (i.e., 
“If you urgently need an extra £200 cash and your current account is empty, where 
do  you  take  it  from?”).  The  final  structures  were  photographed  and  analyzed 
according to structure differences and featured details.
3.2.2.  Results
The sophistication of the understanding and structuring of the individual concept 
for saving varies considerably between participants. This variation demands a more 
systematic analysis of differences in saving concepts which is the focus of the next 
part  (3.3).  The  individually  driven  descriptions  here  provide  the  saving  problem 
definition and isolate the first mechanisms used for self-control.
Saving Dimensions
All participants  show  a clear understanding of what saving behaviour means  to 
them and they come up with definitions capturing everything from security aspects
40(i.e.,  “Want  to  make  sure  that  I  do  not  run  out  of  money.”)  to  purpose  specific 
savings (i.e., “Save that I can afford something special in the future.”) and saving for 
growth  (i.e.,  “Saving  to  generate  wealth.”).  This  demonstrates  that  some  sort  of 
common understanding exists of what behaviours  saving covers,  as at least two of 
these were mentioned by most individuals (purpose = 100%; security = 58%; growth 
= 50%).  However the definition of saving behaviour and the motives for saving go 
together in the individual understanding of saving. During the interviews it was often 
stressed  that  the  definition  of  saving  behaviour  concerned  a  general  expectation 
about what people ought do, and motives and behaviours were frequently mixed up. 
Thus,  the  individual  saving  construals  seem  to  be  driven  by  motives  rather  than 
actual behaviour, which underlines the prospective character of saving.
When asked for the aims of saving, participants come up with an average of 3.0 
aims.  These  describe  specific  aims  like  saving  for  child  education,  a  new  car, 
retirement, etc.  or general purposes like “providing a buffer” or “increase choices”. 
They can be specific in timing and prominence or rather diffuse. Further support for 
the variation in saving aims can be found when considering all 350,000 customers of 
the  provided  database  who  hold  a  saving  product  where  the  different  accounts 
(“saving pots”) can receive individual names. The actual naming of the accounts can 
be  seen  as  a  labelling  of this  particular  part  of  savings.  The  average  number  of 
accounts per person is 2.8. This number of accounts might just be an indicator for a 
high number of different saving aims as only one provider is considered and possible 
saving  accounts  with  other  providers  are  not  captured.  However  it  also  does  not 
necessarily represent the number of accounts in use due to a large number of dormant 
accounts. Figure 3.1  shows the  10 most frequently used saving labels. It shows the 
saving names frequency for the different accounts  of one financial provider where 
the saving product allows the savings to be divided into a maximum of twelve parts. 
The  percentages  for  different  saving  categories  in  a  total  of one  million  account 
labels  are  shown.  Only  the  5.2%  informative  names  which  describe  specific  or 
general purposes are included in the graph. The individual naming of saving accounts 
is  a relatively  new  possibility  at  the  researched  financial  service  institution.  As  a 
result  a  majority  leaves  the  names  at  their  defaults.  Also  the  labels  ‘Instant’  and 
‘Addition’  could be less meaningful  as they reflect the former products  offered by 
this financial provider.
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I  did  not  analyse  which  categories  go  with  which  and thus  the  simultaneity  of 
different saving categories is not illustrated, but these labels document the variety in 
existing saving aims.  The saving categories are representations of the three general 
saving  motives  but  illustrate  primary  interest  in  specific  purpose  savings.  The 
formulation  of  several  motives  and  the  saving  descriptions  together  support  the 
diversity of the saving construal. Nevertheless, it provides no information about how 
these goals are achieved.
Saving Structures
All participants have some sort of financial structure in place to facilitate saving. 
Yet, the general understanding of this structure is poor and is only revealed through 
the  task.  The  derived  saving  structures,  reflecting  the  different  individual  saving 
concepts, are given in Appendix A.
Broadly  the  results  divide  into  two  categories:  “tiered  structures”  and  “radial 
structures”  (Figure 3.2).  Tiered and radial  structures for organizing financial  flows, 
as  two  different  types  for  separating  savings,  are  derived  from  the  photographed 
individual solutions. The tiered structures (46% of the cases) serve as a sort of buffer
42with a different number of levels. In the radial structures (54%) the current account is 
in the centre, and income is distributed between different saving accounts.
Figure 3.2. Saving structures
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In  all  cases  a  number  of  accounts  are  linked  in  specific  ways  by  tools  which 
control or guide the transfers. The corresponding self-control mechanisms and other 
applied self-control features are listed in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3. Self-control tools in saving structures
Decision
Space
Restrictions
Environment
Manipulation
Contingency
Manipulation
automatic transfers
elimination of alternatives
budgeting
supporting cues 
increase distance
rewards
costs
10  Participants
43The number of participants out of all  13 who apply each of the self-control tools 
in  their saving  structure  are  shown.  ‘Automatic  transfers’  describes  any  automatic 
sweeps between accounts.  ‘Elimination of alternatives’ covers limited access as well 
as  liquidity  restriction.  Under  ‘budgeting’  falls  only  the  explicit  separation  into 
several specific budgets.  ‘Supporting cues’ mean automatic information given by the 
structure to guide saving.  ‘Increase distance’ stands for receiving less information for 
parts  of  the  structure.  ‘Rewards  and  costs’  describe  mechanisms  which  impose 
respective consequences for specific activities.
A  large  proportion  use  automatic  transfers  to  ensure  the  desired  monetary 
liquidity and saving levels. Named features are  ‘penalties’  as well as  ‘bonuses’  and 
‘information suppression’  as well as  ‘lock away periods’. These illustrate examples 
for all  three  self-control  categories.  Methods  of restricting  the  number of decision 
alternatives,  of  changing  the  environmental  structure,  and  of  manipulating  the 
contingency structure itself are used.  They serve different levels of self restriction, 
and often the maintenance of direct final control  over the system is stressed. Also, 
the  explanation  process  in  the  guidance  of  the  task  might  have  supported  the 
inclusion  of  these  features.  Yet,  in  general  the  structures  show  typical  everyday 
saving examples like building up a “rainy day” reserve, keeping surplus separate, or 
imposing commitment by the act of manually storing money. Although participants 
show quite sophisticated saving structures, it is not clear if these are demand driven 
or  rather  a  result  of  product  availability.  On  the  one  hand  the  low  initial 
understanding of their own saving situation supports the assumption that they are just 
the result of the individual historical process of taking up products. On the other hand 
the actual  market situation,  with its homogeneity  and limited flexibility of savings 
products, restricts the complexity of the saving structures in place. The influence of 
individual demands and environmental conditions are not separated.
3.2.3.  Discussion
The different construals for saving behaviour and the elicitation of the individual 
saving structures  illustrates that multiple  saving motives exist and that self-control 
tools are used to achieve these goals. The definition of saving is mainly determined 
by the motives for this behaviour and actual activities seem to be less influential. The 
saving  motives  (namely  security,  growth,  and  purpose)  correspond  with  the  three 
main  motives  mentioned  in  the  literature  on  saving  behaviour.  For  example
44“precaution”,  “calculation”,  and  “foresight”  as  the  corresponding  first  three 
individual saving motives were listed by Keynes (1936, p.  108). The formulation of 
several  motives,  the  existence  of  simultaneous  saving  aims,  and  the  number  of 
accounts  in  the  saving  structures  clearly  support the  existence  of different  mental 
accounts and stresses the importance of mental accounting in self-control. All three 
self-control  categories  found  representations  in  the  derived  saving  structures, 
although  with  a  differing  degree  of  retained  control.  The  reluctance  against 
relinquishing control to the saving system appears more prominent. What variables 
do  support  the  relinquishing  of control,  in  favour  of enabling  self-control,  is  not 
clear.  The  impression  is  that  issues  of trust  and  reliance  have  to  be  addressed  to 
enforce self-control mechanism.
Of course,  the  derived  saving  structures  are  partly  determined  by  the  banking 
environment itself.  But  a natural  view  on people’s  savings  is to  regard the  saving 
behaviour  in  the  environment  people  are  used  to  and  in  which  they  learned  to 
develop the specific behaviour. Any more abstract exploration of how people view 
saving  is  likely  to  ignore  the  important  constraints  that  determine  the  actual 
behaviour. Therefore, I argue that it is crucial to embed the decision problem in the 
world in which it really arises. While the relation between the derived structures and 
the  saving  motives  is  not  established,  the  individual  solutions  indicate  a  possible 
concordance between the two. Where tiered structures are used to promote security 
issues as the distance to the savings is increased, and radial structures are more likely 
to  serve  specific  purposes  as  the  savings  are  separated  into  different  categories. 
However, to support the assumption of the deliberate usage of self-control tools, the 
relation  between  demands  and  saving  structures  has  to  be  examined  more 
systematically.  Although  different  self-control  tools  are  in  place,  their  origin  and 
purpose seem not to be assured. Also, the strong inter-individual variation demands a 
further  examination  of  the  different  factors  which  influence  self-control  and 
eventually the level of saving.
3.3.  Saving Differences (Study 2)
In this part I investigate the different variables influencing the application of self- 
control tools in more detail. Individual characteristics are important on the one hand; 
the  individual  financial  situation,  demographics,  and  saving  motives  influence  the
45way of saving. Also, the sort of personal saving strategy forms the saving behaviour 
(Veldhoven & Groenland,  1993; Wahlund & Gunnarsson,  1996). On the other hand, 
environmental factors like economic conditions and financial management influence 
the observable behaviour. The availability of self-control tools to guide  saving and 
support  in  setting  up  as  well  as  maintaining  self guiding  structures  seem  equally 
important.  This  implies  a  clear  distinction  between  personal  demands  and 
environmental structures.
I developed a questionnaire to tackle these different dimensions  and to evaluate 
their relations. This enables the measurement of the demand level and the need for 
self-control  tools  independent  of  the  actual  realization.  Equally,  self-control 
prospects and existing behavioural patterns are evaluated based on a larger body of 
data,  linking  individual  differences  to  self-control  demands  and  types.  The 
questionnaire  was  designed  in  several  incremental  steps  of  constructing  and 
evaluating  suitable  items.  Starting  with  the  questions  which  resulted  from  the 
interview above and then generating useful additional questions for the dimensions 
of  ‘personal  motives’,  ‘self-control  tool  interests’,  and  ‘individual  self-control 
demands’.
3.3.1.  Method
The self-control survey was partly distributed in shopping areas and was partly an 
online questionnaire linked to the BBC webpage. In total  173 people took part in the 
survey,  of  which  89  answered  the  questionnaire  online.  With  the  online  data  I 
broadened  the  area  of  the  study,  and  due  to  the  mixture  of  retrieval  methods  I 
expected a higher representativeness of the sample (compare Bimbaum, 2000). The 
participation was rewarded by inclusion in a prize draw for £400. Fifty-four percent 
of the sample were female, the average age was 36.4 years,  and the average yearly 
household income was £32,000.
The self-control survey includes 24 items on demographics and current financial 
situation. Eighty-three items concern the “saving personality” on a five point Likert 
scale,  with  15  items  on  personal  motives  (e.g.,  “I  save  to  feel  secure  about  the 
future.”),  12 items on self-control tool interest (e.g., “I would like to be continually 
informed about my level of debt.”), and 56 items on individual self-control (e.g., “ I 
want  to  be  less  involved  with  my  finances.”).  Appendix  B  shows  all  the  “saving
46personality”  questions  used.  The  answers  were  analyzed  according  to  self-control 
usage, personal differences, and group characteristics.
3.3.2.  Results
Participants  expressed  high  demand  for  general  self-control  and  specific  self- 
control tools.  Items on overall need for self-control were rated with averages above 
three (total average 3.29). The results on the self-control tool interest questions also 
showed a number of high specific demands. Average interest for specific self-control 
tools on a scale from one till five (total average 3.07) are shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Self-control demands
Decision
Space
Restriction
Environment
Manipulation
Contingency
Manipulation
I would like to be able to divide my savings into different distinguishable saving categories.
I would like to have the option of different notice periods for withdrawing money from portions of my savings.
I would like to set up an automated financial structure and let it run.
To control my spending I would like to be able to lock money away that / could not access it for a specific period.
I would like to be regularly informed about the amount of my savings. 
I would like to be continually informed about my level of debt.
I would like to have the option o f  different interest rates on different portions of my savings.
I would like to receive a bonus for not touching some of my savings fo ra  longer time period.
I would be more reluctant to spend impulsively if I was being rewarded for maintaining a high saving balance.
I don i have a problem with being charged if I act against restrictions I have previously set.
I would be comfortable having a penalty for withdrawing money from some of my savings to encourage me to spend less.
Costs or penalties for withdrawals on some of my savings would help me to save more money.
5  Average 
Rating
In particular the manipulation of contingencies via bonuses appeared to be in high 
demand.  Also  guidance  by  environmental  cues  was  desired,  but  little  interest  in 
direct restrictions was shown. Answers on the personal saving motive questions were 
in  line  with  the  previous  results  with  examples  for the  three  main  saving  motives 
receiving the highest averages:  “I save to ensure my income meets my needs in the 
future” (security) 3.81, “I save for a number of different goals” (purpose) 3.64, and 
“I would like to save an increasing amount over time” (growth) 3.72.
47A Factor Analysis conducted on the 56 self-control demand questions results in 10 
dimensions for the inter-individual variation. The  10 factors account for 51.78% of 
the observed variance and represent approximations for the captured differences in 
personal characteristics. The scree plot for the initially derived factors and the given 
labels for the  10 factors with an eigenvalue above  1.5  after a varimax rotation are 
shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5. Saving factors
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Factor
Factor Names
1. Self-Control 
2. Hands On Involvement
3. Need for Advice
4. Regular Savings
5. Automation
6. Low Effort
7. Integration
8. Security Worries
9. Planned Budget 
10. Distributed Savings
The  first  two  dimensions  describe  general  control  issues,  followed  by  more 
specific  descriptors  of  saving  behaviour  differences.  Appendix  B  provides  the 
loadings for all factors. To illustrate the factors’  meanings and to see how they link 
to everyday behavioural patterns, I formed descriptive customer samples.  Grouping 
the  highest  and  lowest  scorers  on  the  first  two  factors  resulted  in  four  different 
groups.  In  Table  3.1  these  exemplary  self-control  groups  with  their corresponding 
financial  characteristics  are  shown.  The  45%  of  the  people  with  the  highest 
respective  lowest  factor  scores  were  grouped  together  (‘concerned’  =31  people; 
‘assisted’  = 39 people;  ‘controlling’  = 34 people;  ‘unconcerned’  = 35 people).  Our 
intuitive understanding of the personality factors is reflected in the group differences.
48The  ‘concerned’  group  is the youngest with the lowest income with clear need for 
self-control. Many people in the ‘assisted’ group already use penalties and bonuses in 
their saving accounts. The  ‘controlling’  people, as the oldest group with the highest 
income,  need  the  most time  for their finances.  ‘Unconcerned’  people  are  likely  to 
simplify and integrate their finances, although keeping a number of saving accounts. 
Marked values describe significant group differences.
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Self-Control high high low low Total
Hands On high low high low Avg.
Sex (male) 48% 38%* 41% 62%* 46%
Average Age 28.4* 31.6 44.7* 39.2 36.3
Average Number of Children 0.19* 0.64 0.91 0.91 0.71
Average Household Income (£’000) 23.1* 32.3 34.1 32.3 31.7
Average Number of Savings Accounts 1.71* 1.81 3.12* 2.86 2.38
Saving with Bonuses 20%* 22%* 6%* 11%* 16%
Saving with Penalties 14% 19%* 12%* 13% 15%
Integrate Current Account into a 
Financial Structure
69%* 82% 77% 94%* 80%
Minutes Spent on Finances 
(monthly averages)
51.4 32.2* 77.4* 55.0 56.3
*significant on the p<0.01 level
Table 3.1. Factor based groups
The participants’  high demand for self-control lead to various sorts of behaviour 
which  need  different  self-control  tools.  People  are  likely  to  impose  specific  self- 
control strategies, but the willingness for self restrictions or for relinquishing control 
strongly depends on the individual and corresponding environmental relations. Some 
people  (i.e.,  ‘assisted’  group)  might  directly  buy  into  self-control  tools,  for  others 
(i.e.,  ‘controlling’  group)  it  is  only  possible  via  a  process  of trust  building.  The 
realization  of  self-control  strongly  depends  on  demographics,  lifecycle,  and 
individual variables. The way and level of self-control varies according to financial 
status,  life  stage,  and  personal  preferences.  They  are  interconnected  and  together 
influence  the  application  of  self-control  tools,  and  therefore  differences  in  self- 
control cannot be explained by demographics alone.
493.3.3.  Discussion
The questionnaire reveals differences in self-control demands and shows relations 
with the financial situation and product demands. Self-control as the guiding factor 
for  saving  behaviour  is  supported.  However,  the  relation  between  self-control 
demand and the  actual  application  of self-control  tools  needs  further support.  The 
research design here cannot prove that people in the end are actually more controlled 
when  provided  with  their  specific  self-control  tools,  which  is  crucial  for 
understanding  and bridging the  discrepancy between  planning  and behaviour.  The 
existence of a high need for self-control is in line with the postulation of a “saving 
gap”, a claim made at the individual level by Bemheim (1995) or Farkas and Johnson 
(1997),  which  stresses  the  importance  of  saving  product  designs  to  support  self- 
control  mechanisms.  This  lets  one  assume  that  specific  features  like  lock  away 
periods  or  channel  restrictions,  but  also  the  general  service  including  individual 
planning,  involvement,  support,  and  flexibility,  increase  self-control  and  enable 
saving.
One distinction  introduced here,  for  a better understanding of saving behaviour 
and  its  relation  with  self-control,  is  the  differentiation  between  types  of financial 
personality. The proposal of individually different concepts for saving might help to 
understand the  self-control  mechanism  in place  and could prove useful  for saving 
increasing  policies.  People  approach  the  task  of  saving  differently,  varying  on 
important dimensions like willingness to relinquish control, demand for involvement, 
and level of advice accepted. Only when understanding these individual differences, 
can I fully embrace the concept of self-control and its conditional importance. The 
assumption  of  a  financial  personality  helps  to  systematically  analyze  attitudinal 
differences in relation to variations in saving behaviour. Further proof is needed for 
establishing this claim and areas like self-awareness (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003) or 
the propensity to plan (Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2003) have to be addressed. Also, 
the relation to social theories and personality research could be important. Existing 
clinical  measures  of  self-control  (Rosenbaum,  1980)  and  the  connection  to  other 
behavioural  constructs  like  sensation  seeking  (Zuckerman,  1994),  self-efficiency 
(Bandura,  1977),  and  locus  of  control  (Rotter,  1966)  have  to  be  accounted  for. 
However,  the  construction  of  a  general  psychometric  self-control  scale  might  be 
useful  for  various  fields,  including  personalized  financial  services.  This  survey
50discovered first relations between individual self-control, product characteristics, and 
saving  behaviour.  The  dependence  between  differences  in  self-control  and  actual 
saving rate has also been documented by Romal and Kaplan (1995) who demanded 
stronger  self-control  strategy  encouragement.  A  further  specification  of  the  self- 
control  construct  in  combination  with  the  evaluation  of  direct  behaviour  and  its 
changes over time, according to lifecycle changes, appears necessary.
3.4. Saving Solutions
The  ecological  reality  of  saving  behaviour  shows  that  the  intra-  and  inter­
individual variability in relation to motives, strategies, and lifecycle issues have not 
been  acknowledged  accordingly.  Multiple  saving  motives,  differences  in  goal 
orientation  and  capacities,  individual  foci  and  changing  needs  all  demand  an 
individually  centred,  situation  specific,  expansion  of the  understanding  of  saving 
behaviour.  The  different  saving  strategies  in  relation  to  each  other could possibly 
better explain overall observed patterns of saving than behavioural deficit models.
3.4.1.  Product Demands
Besides similarities with a strategy of conflict between multiple selves (Schelling,
1980), I provide a positive perspective on individual saving tools as means for self- 
control.  This  assumption  itself  is  grounded  in  the  variations  of  the  observed 
behaviours,  yet  is  also  supported  by  cognitive  models  and  neurological 
underpinnings.
Neural processing and the interaction of multiple cognitive systems represent an 
integration which can be seen as an internal communication and a problem solving 
process rather than a conflict. Different mental functions are complementary in inter­
temporal choice (i.e., Manuck, Flory, Muldoon, & Ferrell, 2003; McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein,  &  Cohen,  2004)  which  is  in  line  with  consistent  plans  over  time 
(Becker & Murphy,  1988; Loewenstein & Prelec,  1993). For achieving commitment 
over time, the actual planning of future behaviour is of importance. The influence of 
goal  formation  on  behaviour  has  been  repeatedly  documented  (i.e.,  Bandura  & 
Schunk,  1981; Gollwitzer,  1999). Also, the rare reversion or redistribution in saving 
behaviour  (Skinner,  1992;  Venti  &  Wise,  1987)  supports  this  claim.  What  part 
cognitive  strategies  play  here  and  to  what  degree  saving  is  influenced  by  mental
51causation  (i.e.,  automation,  sequential  learning)  or  social  mechanisms  (i.e.,  social 
control,  conformity)  is  open  to  future  investigations.  Saving  behaviour  probably 
more  strongly  depends  upon  cognitive  and  social  functioning  than  on  economic 
calculus.
3.4.2.  Prototype Generation and Selection
The  underlying  mental  mechanisms  are  mainly  neglected  in  models  of  saving 
behaviour. I argue that the different areas of self-control have direct implications for 
public policy  issues.  For the incentive  structure Laibson  (1996)  and Thaler  (1994; 
Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) demonstrate that variations in delay, penalties, and rewards 
guide the saving behaviour in  saving schemes.  The flexibility in individual  saving, 
depending  on  the  perceived  decision  space,  is  generally  stressed  in  pension  plans 
(Choi,  Laibson,  Madrian,  &  Metrick,  2002;  Madrian  &  Shea,  2001;  Papke,  2003; 
Poterba,  Venti,  &  Wise,  1996).  Following  that  the  total  amount  allocated  to 
retirement savings can easily be manipulated by the introduced pension plans, then 
there  might just  not be  the  demand  matching products  available  on  the  market to 
enable  self-control  techniques  which  secure  saving  levels.  A  common  practice  to 
directly  restrict  the  decision  space  by  using  credit  cards  and  credit  limits  to 
manipulate liquidity (Haliassos & Reiter, 2006; Soman & Cheema, 2002) illustrates 
that  self-control  mechanisms  are  in  place.  Together with  a  supporting information 
structure and based on the persistence of decisions,  I assume that the provision for 
retirement can be improved substantially, and thus the lack of individual consistency 
can  be  diminished.  The  current  observation  of  a  “saving  gap”  (Bemheim,  1995; 
Farkas  &  Johnson,  1997),  meaning  a  lack  of providing  means  for  the  retirement 
particularly  in  the UK  and US,  might then  only be  a mismatch between  available 
products and individual needs.
The individual differences in self-control strongly demand tailored solutions and 
stress  design  components  which  support  the  understanding,  the  involvement,  the 
evolution,  and  the  flexibility  of  financial  products.  Naturally  the  individual 
commitment to save also depends on the inclination for buying and related avoidance 
strategies  (i.e.,  Baumeister,  2002;  Benhabib  &  Bisin,  2005;  Bemheim  &  Rangel, 
2004;  Carrillo  & Mariotti,  2000;  Hoch  & Loewenstein,  1991;  Loewenstein,  1996; 
O’Guinn & Faber,  1989; Wertenbroch,  1998). In contrast to this deficit orientation, I 
focused on the side of general empowerment to increase choice. To enforce saving
52behaviour here, tools for all three self-control strategy categories have to be provided 
on  an  individual  level:  decision  space  restrictions,  environmental  cues,  and 
contingency  structures.  These categories  can be  seen  as  the  fundamental  areas  for 
providing people with the means for managing their behaviour and as strategic tools 
which  can  be  used  in  accordance  with  individual  demands.  They  stand  for  the 
differences  in  self-control  strategies  and  reflect  the  psychological  spectrum  for 
behavioural variation, and thus the diversity of peoples’ strategies.
53Chapter 4 
Investment Strategies I4.  INVESTMENT STRATEGIES I
In  a previous  section  (3.2)  we have  seen  that  various  motives  exist  for  saving 
strategies.  Also  for  investment  strategies  different  motives  exist.  According  to 
portfolio theory (Friedman & Savage, 1948; Shefrin & Statman, 2000) investors have 
a desire for security and also an aspiration for riches, meaning their ideal portfolios 
resemble  a  combination  of a bond  and  a  lottery  ticket.  Leaving  these  investment 
characteristics aside, the broader question for the dimensions people use to generally 
evaluate  companies  is  looked  at  in  this  chapter  and  how  different  company 
characteristics can be integrated in a choice situation is the focus of the next chapter 
(Chapter 5).
Prospect theory has looked at how options or companies are evaluated, but how 
companies are perceived and represented is not yet researched. This appears to be an 
important  part  for  company  evaluations  and  can  form  the  ground  for  company 
comparisons. As with any other object, people perceive companies along a number 
of dimensions.  But  what  are  the  key  psychological  dimensions  that  best  describe 
companies,  organizations,  or brands?  I  apply  research  methods  initially  developed 
for  studying  attitudes,  including  attitudes  to  other  people,  to  look  at  how  people 
represent “corporate personality”.  First,  repeated evaluations  of a small  number of 
companies are used to distil the most useful dimensions for company comparisons. In 
a  second  step,  a  broader  range  of  companies  is  positioned  on  these  derived 
dimensions. The major dimensions that psychologically differentiate companies can 
be labelled honesty, prestige,  innovation,  and power.  Scales of this type may have 
substantial commercial value in helping companies understand and track their public 
perception.
In the continuous interaction with our environment we need not only to be able to 
quickly perceive new information, we also have to rely on existing information as a 
benchmark.  For  example  when  eating  breakfast,  greeting  a  person,  or  running  a 
business, we always have to understand the differences within the various tasks and 
need concepts to guide our behaviour. Behaviour always takes place under a specific 
frame or is embedded in context,  and evaluations  are  always  in relation to  similar 
objects of the respective class of objects.  But is  there a general  mechanism which 
describes  this  formation  of  differences  between  perceived  objects?  Does  the
55evaluation of e.g. food, faces, and fortunes have something in common? Do we apply 
comparable  processes  in  different  domains?  Kelly  (1955)  proposed  the  theory  of 
personal  constructs  for  personality  evaluations,  using  methods  that  appear  more 
generally  applicable.  Osgood  (1962)  promoted  methods  for  finding  “semantic 
dimensions”  for objects  of all  kinds.  More recently computational corpus  analysis 
has  been  applied  for  “dimensionalizing”  semantic  materials  in  a  uniform  way 
(Landauer & Dumais,  1997; Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004). Moreover, in the literature 
on  categorization,  it  is  typically  assumed  that  uniform  principles  guide  the 
representation of diverse categories, although certain fundamental distinctions (e.g., 
the distinction between natural kind versus artifact concepts) are sometimes viewed 
as  representationally  significant  (Gelman,  1988;  Murphy,  2002;  Sloman  &  Malt, 
2003).
The focus in this chapter is to test how well existing research methods, developed 
for uncovering psychological  dimensions,  can be transferred to understanding how 
people represent companies. Public perception is a substantial factor in determining 
consumer purchasing decisions; and also may potentially influence investor decision 
making.  Thus,  it  would  be  of considerable  practical  interest  to  have  a  workable 
model  of  the  dimensions  of  what  I  term  “corporate  personality”.  To  tackle  this 
question I derive an evaluation process for understanding company perception from 
the existing literature.
Research  investigating  how  people  represent  complex  objects  goes  back  to 
Osgood  and  colleagues  postulating  general  dimensions  for  evaluating  objects 
(Osgood,  1962; Osgood, Tannenbaum, & Suci,  1957). In this “semantic differential” 
approach,  lists  of  adjectives  were  searched  for  which  best  capture  meaningful 
differences  between  items.  The  claim  was  made  that  a  restricted  number  of 
descriptive properties can be sufficient to differentiate items within a wide range of 
categories of objects, reaching from colours and shapes to stories and people. More 
recent  approaches  have  applied  the  semantic  differential  to  a  range  of  specific 
domains, including product categories (Hsu, Chuang, & Chang, 2000; Katz, Aakhus, 
Kim,  &  Turner,  2002;  Mondragon,  Company,  &  Vergara,  2005),  perceptual 
categories  (Ohnishi  et  al.,  1996;  Oyama,  Yamada,  &  Iwasawa,  1998;  Tessarolo,
1981), and names (Hartmann, 1985).
56Another  evaluation  approach  for  complex  objects  is  the  psychometric  method. 
Here scales are developed for capturing differences. Underlying factors are extracted 
which  link  directly  or  indirectly  to  featural  differences,  yet  either  way  explain 
variations in observed behaviour. This perspective is common in personality research 
where different “personality dimensions” are used to explain individual differences 
(compare  Eysenck  &  Eysenck,  1985;  Cattell,  1965).  Prior  research  in  brand 
perception  has  documented  interesting  parallels  between  the  perception  of people 
and the perception of brands (i.e., Epstein, 1977). A similar claim is made by Lievens 
and  Highhouse  (2003)  for  the  evaluation  of  organizational  attractiveness.  When 
describing  an  organization,  similar  descriptors  are  used  as  when  describing 
categories  like  ‘friends’  or  ‘strangers’  -  thus,  it  appears  that people may represent 
organizations as having a “corporate personality”,  analogous to human personality. 
However,  Aaker  (1997)  who  formalizes  the  specific  dimensions  for  “brand 
personality” and Slaughter, Zickar, Highhouse, and Mohr (2004) who did the same 
for “organization personality” do observe differences between human and company 
personality.
I begin examining these issues using an exploratory study, to establish some of the 
natural  dimensions  along  which  people  differentiate  companies,  using  a relatively 
open-ended  method.  In  the  light  of Study  3,  Study  4  allows  us  to  systematically 
evaluate these and other company dimensions, provided by the literature,  to get an 
understanding of the relative importance of the company descriptors. Study 5 uses a 
subset  of  descriptors  to  position  diverse  companies  on  these  dimensions  and  to 
highlight the relations to different economic characteristics.
4.1.  Company Concept (Study 3)
The main aim here is to explore, in an open-ended way,  the natural dimensions 
which best describe the concept “company”. Later, I want people to rate companies 
on  different  adjectives.  However,  first  I  needed  a  method  to  generate  a  list  of 
candidate adjectives, which usefully discriminate between companies. For this I used 
an experimental technique called Repetory Grid (RepGrid) which was introduced by 
Kelly  (1955).  RepGrid  was  first  used  by  Kelly  for  the  evaluation  of  individual 
personality differences. To make sure the concept is derived by the participant and 
not  induced by the procedure,  he introduced  an  iterative method  which  is  content
57neutral.  This  keeps  the guidance by the  actual  questions  asked  at  a minimum and 
only builds on formerly given answers without providing any specific material and 
only providing a content free frame. This general method is especially suitable for 
the generation of dimensions people naturally use to evaluate objects and can directly 
be applied for the analysis of any concept. The only difference in the case here is that 
the objects of analysis are companies instead of people. The derived concepts form 
the starting point for the later analysis.
4.1.1.  Method
Six  postgraduate  students  or university  staff (three  male;  three female;  average 
age 27) took part in the study and were paid £6 each. The individual RepGrid session 
lasted  approximately  60  minutes  and  took  place  as  a  one-to-one  interview.  The 
material  consisted  of a  card  for  each  elicited  company  (element)  and  an  initially 
blank table into which the adjectives would be written. The same table was later used 
for the rating of the companies. First, each participant had to generate the names of 
nine  different  well  known  companies,  which  were  written  on  cards.  This  was 
followed by the second step, which Kelley (1955) called triadic elicitation, in which 
triples of companies were selected by the experimenter. Repeatedly two companies 
were contrasted with  a third one  and the participant’s task was to produce bipolar 
pairs of adjectives that differentiated the third company from the other two. In these 
comparisons each company was selected once as the “single” company, resulting in 
nine  descriptions.  These  descriptions  were  always  depicted  in  bipolar  dimensions 
describing the two companies on the one hand and the single company on the other, 
presenting opposing adjectives like international versus national, large versus small, 
friendly versus unfriendly, and so on. In a last step all nine companies were rated on 
a scale from one to five on these derived bipolar adjectives, all in line with Kelly’s 
(1955)  standard  RepGrid method.  The results  were  analyzed  according to  concept 
homogeneity and inter-individual variability.
4.1.2.  Results
All participants found it easy to generate bipolar adjectives to separate their selected 
companies. Also the similarity between the companies based on the rating for their 
elicited adjectives was supported by the participants, as the grouping of the clustering
58results was ad hoc confirmed by the participants. An example of a derived solution is 
given in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. RepGrid example solution
not durable 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 4 2 durable
no quality 5 5 4 3 3 4 5 4 quality
not relaxed 2 ■ I 2 1 2 4 4 5 5 relaxed
rigid 3 4 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 not rigid
formal 4 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 4 not formal
not close 2 3 1 2 3 5 5 5 4 close
not affordable 2 3 3 3 j 5 5 5 5 5 affordable
luxury 1  I 4 3 4 4 5 5 1 4 no luxury
rare positive experience 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 3 1 no rare positive experience
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Ryanair
H&M
Tesco
Costcutters
BT
Barclays
Microsoft
Vodaphone
Chanel
The  named  companies,  the  generated  dimensions,  and  the  ratings  on  these 
dimension (with  1   as the extreme on the left side and 5  as the extreme on the right 
side of the elicited bipolar adjectives in Figure 4.1) are shown for this participant. As 
in  the  case  of the  other participants  the  dimensions  nicely  group  into  higher level 
dimensions,  shown  by  the  hierarchical  clustering  results  which  is  based  on  the 
individual  rating.  For  this  participant  three  groups  of  adjectives  for  describing 
company differences can be seen:  qualitative aspects, personal relation, and level of 
luxury. For all different RepGrid solutions see Appendix C. The selected companies 
mainly  represent  large  retailers  or  famous  brands.  They  cover  supermarkets  and 
banks  as  well  as  current  or  potential  employers  and  favourite  product  producers. 
Participants  are  similar  in  what  companies  they  select,  with  four  out  of  the  six 
participants  picking  the  same  company.  The  frequency  with  which  the  selected
59companies  co-occur  within  the  sample  is  ‘Tesco’  four  times,  ‘Sainsbury’  and 
‘Costcutters’ three times, and ‘H&M’, ‘BT’, and ‘Barclays’ twice.
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6
common
enjoyable
essential
hidden
importance
needed
nice
prestigious
secondary
specific
affordable
close
durable
formal
luxurious
quality**
rare pos. 
experience
relaxed*
rigid
dominant 
freedom of 
action 
identity 
inter­
national* 
powerful
quality**
spacious
high status 
Typical
attractive
cheap*
competitive
distant
feminine
helpful*
modem
regular
relaxed*
abstract
cheap*
educated
helpful*
influential
physical
profes­
sional
trustworthy
useful
adversarial
big
competent
concerned
exploitative
inter­
national*
quality**
socially 
responsible 
well priced
*picked twice **picked three times
Table 4.1. Differentiation dimensions elicited for the generated companies
For  comparing  the  different  companies  people  use  similar  adjectives,  as  is 
apparent  from  inspection  of  Table  4.1.  Here  only  one  adjective,  describing  the 
bipolar dimension, is shown. The other pole is its opposite (i.e., big-small) or simply 
its  negation  (i.e.,  common-uncommon).  The  qualitative  similarities  in  choice  of 
adjectives  used  to  distinguish  between  generated  companies,  broadly  support  the 
assumption of a naturally agreed concept of company differences. Common themes 
are quality, price,  general appearance,  and contact experiences. Adjectives selected 
more than once by different participants are highlighted accordingly.
4.1.3.  Discussion
The elicited dimensions for company evaluations have overlaps within the sample 
but also with other descriptors developed from previous studies (Table 4.2).
60Total number of adjectives 
in the study_____________
49 42 23 23
Brand 
Organization 
Semantic Differential
2
2
3
9
0
9 1
0
Table 4.2. Co-occurrence of named adjectives from different sources
First they show  similarities with the concept of brand personality (Aaker,  1997) 
and  organization  personality  (Slaughter,  Zickar,  Highhouse,  and  Mohr,  2004); 
second with Osgood’s  semantic differentials  (Heise,  1970;  Osgood,  1962;  Osgood, 
Tannenbaum, & Suci,  1957). In the former a large spectrum is used to find the most 
useful dimensions for companies. The latter assumes more general dimensions which 
apply  for  different  sorts  of  objects  and  which  have  been  labelled  Evaluation, 
Potency,  and  Activity.  By  letting  people  derive  the  dimensions  for  describing 
differences between companies here, a more open-ended yet direct way is chosen to 
generate  the  important  dimensions  for  differentiating  between  companies.  The 
RepGrid method can be seen as a more direct approach for finding useful adjectives 
on which to evaluate differences between companies.
The elicited dimensions might prove useful for future evaluations of companies. 
They  are  complementary  to  adjectives  generated  in  the  existing  literature,  thus 
potentially  adding  formerly  neglected  areas  of  systematic  company  differences. 
However, only a larger dataset will allow for reliable interpretation. Therefore, Study 
3 only prepares for the following Studies 4 and 5. All results derived here are used to 
produce a more systematic study. To further evaluate the dimensions differentiating 
between companies, I compare the derived company concepts with existing company 
descriptors in Study 4. Thereby the number of potentially useful adjectives is pruned 
to facilitate later evaluations.
614.2.  Company Evaluation (Study 4)
A  simple  rating  method  is  used  to  evaluate  the  different  proposed  descriptive 
adjectives. This is done to compare systematically the different sources of company 
descriptors. Existing company personality adjectives, the semantic differentials, and 
all  RepGrid  company  adjectives  generated  from  Study  3  are  used  to  measure  a 
restricted number of companies to figure out their descriptive values. Besides finding 
the most useful dimensions, redundancies are captured and the adjectives are put into 
relation.  It  also  enables  us  to  determine  a  set  of  adjectives  which  best  describes 
company  differences.  This  will  allow  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  adjectives 
required, which will enable us to scale-up the resulting methods in Study 5.
4.2.1.  Method
For  the  study,  participants  rated  a  list  of  adjectives  in  relation  to  a  set  of 
companies. As illustrated in the Study 3, the different sources show overlaps in the 
adjectives used. Here I included all proposed descriptors (Aaker,  1997; Slaughter et 
al.,  2004;  Heise,  1970)  and  our  newly  derived  dimensions.  Only  redundant 
adjectives, which described the same dimensions, were left out.
Twenty students (10 male;  10 female; average age 26) took part in the study who 
were paid £12  each.  The computer based rating lasted approximately  120 minutes 
and  took  place  in  separate  rooms  for each  individual.  Participants  had  to  rate  20 
companies on all the  118 adjectives discussed in Study 3. A Likert scale from one to 
five was used for each adjective always taking both ends of the dimension as a single 
evaluation,  so  that  i.e.  ‘good’  and  ‘bad’  were rated  separately.  The  20  companies 
were taken from Study 3 in the following way. The six companies which were named 
more than once and in addition  14 representatives for included industries were used 
to  cover  different  companies.  The  companies  were  displayed  together  for  each 
adjective, but the company order was varied within each set and the adjective order 
was randomized over participants.
4.2.2.  Results
The company ratings  were  analyzed  according to the relation  of inter-company 
variability to inter-individual variability. For this I introduce a measure of how far a 
specific  adjective  differentiates  between  companies.  This  measure  relates  the 
adjective’s  descriptive  power  of differentiating  between  companies  to  their  inter-
62individual variation. The more stable the adjective is over participants and the better 
it  distinguishes  between  companies,  the  higher  is  its  value.  The  most  stable  and 
strongest between-company differentiating adjectives are shown in Table 4.3.
Adjective Total STD STD means 
(over companies)
STD means divided 
by total STD Source
technical 1.18 0.92 0.78 BP
luxurious 1.22 0.90 0.74 RepGrid
international 1.38 0.98 0.71 RepGrid
upper class 1.20 0.82 0.68 BP
cool 1.20 0.78 0.65 BP
quiet 1.07 0.68 0.63 SD
formal 1.26 0.79 0.63 RepGrid
exploitative 0.97 0.59 0.61 RepGrid
leader 1.19 0.72 0.60 BP
original 1.15 0.67 0.58 OP & BP
popular 1.07 0.62 0.58 OP
noisy 1.22 0.70 0.57 SD
status 1.13 0.65 0.57 RepGrid
cheap 1.22 0.69 0.57 RepGrid
low class 1.22 0.69 0.57 OP
young 1.07 0.60 0.56 BP&SD
quality 1.20 0.67 0.56 RepGrid
old 1.19 0.65 0.55 SD
good looking 1.21 0.66 0.54 BP
well priced 1.06 0.57 0.54 RepGrid
glamorous 1.30 0.70 0.54 BP
creative 1.09 0.59 0.54 OP
competitive 1.01 0.54 0.54 RepGrid
powerful 1.20 0.64 0.54 RepGrid & SD
educated 1.15 0.61 0.53 RepGrid
intelligent 1.08 0.57 0.53 BP
busy 1.03 0.54 0.52 OP
big 1.06 0.55 0.52 RepGrid & SD
secure 1.12 0.58 0.51 BP
prestigious 1.14 0.58 0.50 RepGrid
secondary 1.10 0.55 0.50 RepGrid
Table 4.3. Most stable differentiating company adjectives
The  sources  are as  follows:  RepGrid for the newly derived dimensions;  SD for 
Semantic  Differential;  BP for Brand Personality;  OP for Organization  Personality. 
For the shown 31  adjectives the proportion of variance explained by company mean 
differences  is  higher  than  the  proportion  of  variance  over  participants  within  a 
company, meaning that at least half of the total variance (total STD) is explained by 
the differences between company mean values (STD means). Adjectives below this 
cut-off of 50% were left aside due to their relative high inter-individual variability. 
With  this  criterion  of  stable  company  differentiability,  RepGrid  adjectives  were
63included the most, with  14 out of 31 representing our newly elicited dimensions. For 
the other sources there are ten, six, and five cases in the highly differentiating group 
for  the  Brand  Personality,  Semantic  Differential,  and  Organization  Personality 
adjectives respectively. The number of 31  dimensions is in line with the hierarchical 
clustering results,  where  a strong decrease  in the fit of the model,  measured by  R 
square (RSq), is observed somewhere around this number (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Model fit for the number of clusters in the Ward cluster history
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The  clustering  results  for  the  31  most  differentiating  adjectives  are  shown  in 
Figure 4.3. These clustering results  are based on the average company values over 
participants.  The different clustering steps  describe different aggregation  levels for 
company evaluation. The adjectives group together, forming different more abstract 
aspects  of company  characteristics.  They  nicely  separate  into  four  to  six  clusters 
which describe company characteristics on a higher level. Representative classes as 
higher order clusters are  ‘quality/prestige’,  ‘power’, and  ‘price’,  with the adjectives 
‘technical’  and  ‘quiet’  as outliers. These classes form specific  groups of adjectives 
for the evaluation of companies.
64Figure 4.3. Hierarchical clustering tree for the highly differentiating adjectives
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4.2.3.  Discussion
When evaluating a larger number of adjectives from different sources, which all 
describe  companies’  characteristics,  the  newly  elicited  adjectives  prove  highly 
useful. This illustrates the possible improvements we can achieve for the evaluation 
of  companies.  By  comparing  the  adjectives  on  their  stability  of  company 
differentiability,  the  more  important  adjectives  are  isolated.  These  can  be  seen  as 
more general descriptors for companies.
It is interesting that not only single adjectives describe companies, but that these 
also  aggregate  into  factors.  A  first  step  into  this  direction  is  done  in  this  part by 
grouping the adjectives  into clusters.  Note that these adjectives  are broadly in line 
with  Osgood’s  three  general  Semantic  Differentials:  Evaluation  (prestige/quality), 
Potency  (power),  and  Activity  (price).  However,  a  larger  body  of  companies  is 
needed for generating the fundamental factorial  dimensions  which  guide  company 
evaluations independent of the restriction to companies taken from  Study  3. Thus,
65our  next  study  applies  a  smaller  number  of adjectives  to  a  much  wider  range  of 
companies.
4.3.  Company Positioning (Study 5)
To estimate the relative importance of the different company dimensions and to 
learn more about their similarities, I ran a further study to distil the most important 
factors for the evaluation of companies. Study 5 uses the adjective evaluation results 
of Study 4 and expands the analysis to a larger number of companies. This enables a 
derivation  of  the  common  company  features  which  then  can  be  related  to  other 
company characteristics.
4.3.1.  Method
Sixty-four  well  known  UK  companies  and  globally  operating  international 
companies  (UK:  51  companies;  international:  13  companies)  were evaluated on 41 
adjectives in an online survey. These 41 adjectives represent the dimensions captured 
with the 31  adjectives from Study 4 and keeping social adjectives, like friendly and 
helpful,  and  trust  related  adjectives,  like  pleasant  and  personal,  available  in  more 
detail in the pool to not miss out on these dimensions. In total  1282 people took part 
in the study (40% female, 38.5 average age). Participants were recruited and paid via 
Ipoints web-service. Ipoints is a platform for running experiments where people gain 
points dependent on the length of the task which then can be redeemed for specific 
products on offer. The evaluation lasted approximately 10 minutes. Every participant 
evaluated  all  64 companies  on  four randomly  allocated adjectives.  The companies 
were  displayed  together,  yet  the  order  was  randomized  for  each  adjective.  Each 
adjective  was  rated by  at least  100 participants  on  a five point Likert scale,  as  in 
Study  4.  Factor  analysis  is  then  used  to  describe  the  underlying  dimensions  of 
company evaluations.
4.3.2.  Results
The usage of the adjectives on a broader range of companies enables a grouping 
of the  adjectives,  forming  general  dimensions  of perceived  company  differences. 
These groups or factors  illustrate the underlying categorical  differences  and nicely 
link to economic measures for company performance.
66In the factor analysis, the eigenvalues of the principal factors flatten out after the 
fourth factor which  is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Factor five is with  an eigenvalue of 
1.08 slightly above one, but due to the observed jump between factors five and four, 
I only consider a four factor solution in the further analysis (compare Cattell,  1966).
Figure 4.4. Eigenvalues for the different number of factors
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The equamax rotated factor solution is shown in Table 4.4. The rotated solution 
nicely  separates  into  the  factors  that  can  be  labelled  ‘Honesty’,  ‘Prestige’, 
‘Innovation’,  and  ‘Power’.  The  first  factor  which  I  labelled  ‘Honesty’  captures 
fairness and trustworthiness of a company.  ‘Prestige’ is a dimension of how valued a 
company  is.  With  ‘Innovation’  the  vividness  and  flexibility  of  a  company  is 
described.  ‘Power’  as  the fourth factor captures  the  importance or dominance of a 
company.
67Factor 1
Honesty
Eigenvalue 14.2
Factor 2
Prestige
9.2
Factor 3
Innovation
8.4
Factor 4
Power
4.3
fair 0.92 prestigious 0.96 fresh 0.90 dominant 0.90
helpful 0.89 luxurious 0.96 energetic 0.89 powerful 0.81
supportive 0.88 high status 0.92 fashionable 0.85 established 0.81
cooperative 0.88 formal 0.87 innovative 0.84 popular 0.71
honest 0.87 good quality 0.74 creative 0.82 active 0.59
caring 0.87 intelligent 0.71 original 0.82 essential 0.43
attentive to people 0.87 reliable 0.60 active 0.70 family-oriented 0.41
friendly 0.87 safe 0.58 competitive 0.68 exploitative 0.36
good value 0.83 attractive 0.58 popular 0.57 energetic 0.32
soc. responsible 0.82 trustworthy 0.51 attractive 0.45 high status 0.29
trustworthy 0.82 global 0.48 global 0.43 safe 0.28
essential 0.81 pleasant 0.40 personal 0.40 reliable 0.25
pleasant 0.80 honest 0.39 friendly 0.39 competitive 0.25
personal 0.78 powerful 0.37 dominant 0.37 attractive 0.24
safe 0.68 soc. responsible 0.36 attentive to people 0.30 global 0.20
reliable 0.68 caring 0.34 good value 0.29 good quality 0.19
family-oriented 0.65 established 0.34 pleasant 0.29 pleasant 0.19
attractive 0.55 fashionable 0.32 intelligent 0.24 personal 0.19
good quality 0.54 supportive 0.27 good quality 0.24 supportive 0.19
intelligent 0.54 attentive to people 0.24 helpful 0.21 creative 0.18
cheap 0.45 cooperative 0.23 reliable 0.21 helpful 0.18
original 0.40 helpful 0.22 fair 0.21 prestigious 0.15
fresh 0.37 innovative 0.21 powerful 0.19 original 0.14
creative 0.33 personal 0.19 cooperative 0.19 cooperative 0.14
innovative 0.30 creative 0.16 family-oriented 0.19 innovative 0.11
high status 0.19 fair 0.15 supportive 0.19 attentive to people 0.10
established 0.15 original 0.12 honest 0.17 friendly 0.10
prestigious 0.11 sleepy 0.12 caring 0.15 trustworthy 0.10
formal 0.11 fresh 0.08 trustworthy 0.12 fashionable 0.07
competitive 0.08 dominant 0.01 cheap 0.09 soc. responsible 0.06
sleepy 0.06 essential -0.03 essential 0.09 intelligent 0.06
popular 0.04 friendly -0.08 luxurious 0.08 tacky 0.04
active 0.03 family-oriented -0.11 high status 0.06 fair 0.04
luxurious 0.03 active -0.14 exploitative 0.05 good value 0.04
energetic -0.01 energetic -0.17 prestigious 0.02 luxurious 0.03
dominant -0.05 exploitative -0.18 safe 0.00 fresh 0.01
fashionable -0.12 popular -0.22 tacky -0.02 caring -0.01
powerful -0.12 good value -0.33 soc. responsible -0.13 formal -0.01
global -0.24 competitive -0.48 established -0.30 honest -0.03
tacky -0.46 cheap -0.81 formal -0.37 cheap -0.04
exploitative -0.84 tacky -0.84 sleepy -0.93 sleepy -0.23
Table 4.4. Equamax rotated factor solution
These factors are then put in relation to economic company descriptors taken from 
Datastream, a database which continuously provides available company information. 
Here  the  factor  values  for  the  British  companies  were  correlated  with  economic 
measures  of  ‘size’,  ‘evaluation’,  ‘growth’,  and  ‘profit’.  Table  4.5  shows  the 
spearman  correlation  for  the  four factors  based  on  the  25  companies  listed  on  the 
London  Stock Exchange.  Company measures,  as  taken from Datastream,  are  ‘size’ 
for total assets employed,  ‘evaluation’  for market to book value,  ‘growth’  for three
68year growth in sales,  ‘profit’  for pre-tax profit.  Strongly significant correlations are 
marked in the table.
Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4
Honesty_______ Prestige______Innovation_______Power
Size -0.02 0.56* -0.23 0.06
Evaluation 0.13 0.24 -0.27 0.33
Growth -0.14 -0.32 0.52* -0.14
Profit -0.14 0.75* -0.31 0.27
* significant on the p<0.01 level
Table 4.5. Factor spearman correlation for company performance measures
The  derived  factors  show  direct  relations  to  objective  company  characteristics. 
The  Prestige  factor  strongly  correlates  with  the  measure  for  company  size  and 
company  profit;  the  Innovation  factor  correlates  with  the  measure  for  company 
growth. The honesty and the power factor do not show any significant correlations 
with the selected economic company descriptors, but might proof useful for company 
developments over a longer time horizon.
4.3.3.  Discussion
The factors can be of potential use for the understanding of company perception 
and the development of evaluation criteria for companies. The factor correlation also 
indicate  possible  relations  with  economic  measures  which  might  prove  useful  as 
performance predictors. Evaluations over time and on a larger body of companies are 
necessary, though, to confirm the strength and the directionality of these relations.
Also  interesting  relations  can  be  drawn  from  the  derived  factors  to  Osgood’s 
concept of Semantic Differentials  (Osgood et al.,  1957).  The Innovation factor fits 
with their Activity dimension, Prestige goes together with the Evaluation dimension, 
and  Power  with  the  Potency  dimension.  Only  Honesty  comes  in  as  an  additional 
factor  for  the  evaluation  of companies  which  seems  not  to  be  part  of  Osgood’s 
original schema. The broader implications of these results is discussed in more detail 
next.
694.4.  Company Characteristics
The  derived  factors  can  potentially  be  applied  in  diverse  areas.  This  potential 
depends  greatly  on  the  factors’  universality  and  how  stably  they  link  to  other 
company characteristics of interest. These two questions guide this discussion.
4.4.1.  Universality of Corporate Personality Dimensions
Are  the  corporate  personality  dimensions  universal?  A  first,  very  positive, 
observation  in  relation  to  the  likely  generalizability  of  factors  of  corporate 
personality is that they connect well with Osgood et al.’s  (1957) classic attempt to 
find universal  semantic differentials. This  suggests that there are general principles 
guiding the evaluations of objects that are structuring how people judge companies. 
No doubt, of course, the evaluation of companies has its idiosyncrasies and possibly 
other  objects  might  have  their  own  peculiarities  too.  Osgood’s  proposed  general 
dimensions  are Activity,  Evaluation,  and Potency.  It is interesting to consider how 
these original  dimensions,  which have  a clear sense when  applied to,  for example, 
living things, translate into the related factors concerning companies. The translation 
of  the  Activity  dimensions,  in  the  case  of  companies,  into  an  Innovation  factor 
appears  straight  forward  as  innovation  can  be  seen  as  resulting  from  concerted 
activity within groups. Activity is somehow equal to the rate of change at which an 
entity  updates  itself.  Our  Prestige  factor  stands  in  close  relation  to  Osgood’s 
Evaluation  dimension.  The  prestige  of  a  company  is  described  by  evaluative 
qualitative criteria.  Potency is  a measure of strength and freedom of action,  or the 
ability to influence and create one’s environment. The power of a company directly 
reflects  this  ability.  The  additionally  derived  factor  Honesty  could  somewhat  be 
understood  as  part  of the  Evaluation  dimension.  But  the  results  here  show  that  a 
company’s honesty is  somehow distinct from the more general  quality evaluations 
and  should be  treated  as  a  separate  dimension.  In  passing,  it  is  worth  noting  that 
Honesty  relates  directly  to  questions  of  trust,  the  public  perception  of  which  is 
presently a central concern in many areas of commerce.
These conclusion are further supported by the work of Slaughter et al. (2004) who 
also report a honesty dimension for Organization Personality. Their first factor (Boy 
Scout)  is  described  by  adjectives  like  “friendly”,  “family-oriented”,  “pleasant”, 
“personal”,  “attentive to  people”,  “helpful”,  “honest”,  and  “cooperative”,  which  is
70quite  similar to  our Honesty  factor.  Factor two  is  Innovativeness  and factor three 
Dominance which are directly in line with our results. Their factors four (Thrift) and 
five  (Style)  are  comparable  to  our Prestige  factor or  Osgood’s  general  Evaluation 
dimension. Also Aaker’s  (1997) first factor, named Sincerity, describes an honesty 
dimension  as  the  most  important  dimension  for  their  Brand  Personality  with  the 
loading  adjectives  “down-to  earth”,  “honest”,  “wholesome”,  and  “cheerful”. 
Although receiving somewhat differing labels, also the Prestige factor (Competence 
and Sophistication) and the Power factor (Ruggedness) find their representations. An 
interesting  question  for  future  work  is  how  far  this  viewpoint  holds  for  future 
evaluations of the company concept; currently, it seems that some clearly common 
themes arise from different methods for evaluating how people perceive companies. 
So  far,  research  appears  to  be  showing  a  relatively  consistent  picture  which 
represents the natural way of evaluating companies.
The  Semantic  Differential  has  been  used  for  attitudinal  research  and  the 
evaluation of diverse objects. Besides persons, it has not been applied to many living 
objects.  Yet  when  researching  the  affective  characterization  of  cities,  Ward  and 
Russell  (1981)  derive  similar  results  reporting  as  the  main  first  two  factors  an 
evaluation (“angenehm”) and an activity (“erregend”) dimension. In the light of their 
work,  and  our  own  results  on  company  perception,  it  is  natural  to  ask  how  far 
Osgood’s  dimensions  apply  to  other types  of objects,  e.g.,  animals  or celebrities? 
Can  we  find  similar  regularities  in  these  domains?  If  so,  there  really  might  be 
cognitive simplification processes involved which  are similar across evaluations of 
complex  entities.  If  different  classes  of  objects  are  mapped  according  to  similar 
dimensions we might be able to derive valuable information for the understanding of 
basic cognitive processes. An important general question arises, such as whether the 
underlying dimensions are separable or integral.  If these dimensions  are  separable, 
and  hence  can  directly  be  judged  independently  by  participants;  or  if  they  are 
integral, in which case reconstruction of the dimensions will necessarily be indirect, 
using methods such as that described here. In both cases the corporate factors link to 
behavioural variation, although separable dimensions would establish a more direct 
relation  between  the  different  factors  and  specific  behaviours.  Therefore,  to  test 
causal  behavioural  dependencies,  would  first  require  a  direct  evaluation  of  the
71dimensions.  Only  when  the  dimensions  are  separable,  we  can  assume  cognitive 
representations which directly structure the behaviour.
4.4.2.  Stability and Usefulness of Corporate Personality Dimensions
How  stable  and  useful  are  dimensions  of  corporate  personality?  With  the 
introduction  of  personality  factors  for  companies,  a  new  way  of  describing 
companies  is  introduced.  This  mainly  aims  at  an  alternative  description  of 
companies, which directly reflects the public understanding of companies. However 
we  have  seen  that  the  proposed  corporate  factors  also  show  links  to  economic 
variables  and might in general be useful  as performance indicators.  Thus,  tracking 
measures  of  corporate  personality  might  add  important  dimensions  to  economic 
measures of company performance and could be used both in shaping marketing and 
brand strategy, and potentially also in evaluating and predicting company success.
One important point for the application of the factors is their variability. I assume 
that  the  values  on  the  factors  are  not  stable  over  time  and  that  changes  can  be 
expected  over  longer  time  horizons.  This  stresses  the  potential  of  the  corporate 
factors as indicators to track changes over time. The performance of a company over 
time on these dimensions  could be used,  for example,  to evaluate the  impact of a 
high-profile advertising campaign.  Also sources  of variations,  due to, for example, 
regional  differences,  can  not  be  ruled  out,  but  prior  work  on  the  inter-cultural 
stability  of  factors  supports  the  assumption  of  stable  dimensions  for  company 
evaluations. Geeroms, Vermeir, Kenhove, and Hendrickx (2005) generated preferred 
Brand  Personality  factors  across  11  countries.  The  four  corporate  factors  find 
representations  in their eight factor solution  (i.e.,  Belonging,  Recognition,  Vitality, 
and Power). Although perhaps more interesting is the link they built between these 
factors  and  consumer  motives,  which  stresses  the  interactive  component  of  the 
evaluation process and illustrates that motives or goals can play a key role here.
There may too be a relationship of motives or goals with the factors of corporate 
personality. If so, there is a link to issues like consumer demands, attractiveness as an 
employer and employment confidentiality,  differences  in  short term  and long term 
performances, as well as general social acceptability of a company. Thus, improved 
measures  of  corporate  personality  provide  the  cornerstone  for  a  wide  range  of 
practical applications, and they generally enrich economic theory. The dimensions of 
company personality help economists to better understand judgments about products
72and  also  about  company  investments  which  appear  not  to  be  purely  based  on  a 
rational evaluation of company information. A company perception bias reflected in 
these  dimensions  can  play  a crucial  part  in  these  decisions.  But even  if we know 
what  the  considered  company  information  is,  we  can  assume  different  ways  of 
integrating  this  information  into  a  choice.  The  next  chapter  focuses  on  different 
integration strategies and provides a learning explanation of how information about 
companies is considered.
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Investm ent Strategies II5.  INVESTMENT STRATEGIES II
Traditionally  subjective  utility  maximization  postulates  an  integration  of  the 
different anticipated outcomes in a choice. If different company details are available 
these can be taken  as predictors for the outcomes and are integrated accordingly.  I 
follow a strategy conceptualization and assume a choice between different available 
strategies which are applied to predict company performance. This exemplifies how 
company  measures  can  be  used  and  describes  a  cognitive  modelling  approach  of 
inferences under uncertainty.
5.1.  Performance Prediction
Herbert  Simon  (1956)  promoted  the  idea  that  human  cognition  should  be 
understood  as  an  adaptation  to  the  environment.  Consequently,  different 
environments  should  lead  to  different  inference  strategies,  so  that  people  develop 
repertoires of strategies to deal with the problems they face. The claim that human 
cognition  can  be  understood  by  assuming  that  people  possess  a  repertoire  of 
cognitive  strategies  has  been  asserted  for  various  domains,  including probabilistic 
inferences  (Gigerenzer,  Todd,  &  the  ABC  Research  Group,  1999),  preferential 
choices (Einhom, 1970,  1971; Payne,  1976; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; 
Rapoport  &  Wallsten,  1972;  Svenson,  1979),  probability judgments  (Ginossar  & 
Trope,  1987),  estimations  (Brown,  1995;  Brown,  Cui,  &  Gordon,  2002), 
categorization (Patalano, Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 2001, Schunn & Reder,  1998), 
resource  allocations  (Ball,  Langholtz,  Auble,  &  Sopchak,  1998),  memory  (Coyle, 
Read, Gaultney,  & Bjorklund,  1998), cognitive development of mathematical skills 
(Lemaire  &  Siegler,  1995;  Siegler,  1999),  word recognition  (Eisenberg  & Becker, 
1982), and social interactions (Erev & Roth, 2001; Fiske,  1992).
If one  adopts  the  view  that people  are  equipped with  a  strategy  repertoire,  the 
pressing  question  is  how  individuals  select their strategies.  I call  this  the  strategy 
selection problem.  As  a solution to  this  problem,  several  authors  have  followed  a 
cost-benefit approach to strategy selection (see Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Christensen- 
Szalanski,  1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,  1988,  1993; Smith & Walker,  1993). 
According to this theoretical approach, individuals trade a strategy’s costs against its 
benefits in making their selections. The costs of a strategy are related to the cognitive
75effort  required  for  processing  it  and  the  benefits  are  related  to  the  strategy’s 
accuracy. People anticipate the “benefits and costs of the different strategies that are 
available and choose the strategy that is best for the problem” (Payne et al.,  1993, p. 
91).  The  trade-off of costs  and benefits  is  influenced by  the  characteristics  of the 
task,  the  person,  and  the  social  context.  According  to  Payne  et  al.  (1993),  the 
selection  process  could be  a conscious  process  of applying  a meta-strategy,  or  an 
unconscious  decision  triggered  by  experience.  Busemeyer  (1993)  has  made  the 
criticism  that  the  trade-off  process  has  not  been  examined  (or  explicated) 
sufficiently. Then, it is necessary to advance the theoretical approach by providing a 
computational model that describes the strategy selection process. The assumption of 
a meta-strategy could run into the problem of an infinite regress, as the meta-strategy 
also needs to be selected. In addition, a meta-strategy, conceptualized as constrained 
optimization, could make the selection process of a simple strategy, overall a rather 
complex  cognitive process.  I will  follow  an  alternative explanation  and  argue that 
people  do  not  consciously  select  a  strategy based  upon  a trade-off process  of the 
anticipated  effort  and  accuracy  of  strategies,  but  rather  they  learn  to  select 
appropriate strategies. From this learning perspective, I aim to answer three crucial 
questions:  First,  do  people  select  different  inference  strategies  in  different 
environments? Second, do people learn to select the strategy that performs best in a 
particular environment? Third, how can a learning process of selecting strategies be 
described?
5.1.1.  Strategy Repertoire
Do  people  select  different  strategies  for  inferences?  Consider this  problem:  Of 
two  companies,  you  must  choose  the  more  creditworthy.  For  this  inference,  one 
could use the information garnered from different cues, for instance, the company’s 
financial flexibility. Thus which and how many cues should be considered, and how 
should the information from the cues be used to make an inference? I focus on this 
probabilistic  inference  problem,  which  differs  from  the  preferential  choices  that 
Payne et al.  (1988) have examined. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) showed that a 
simple lexicographic heuristic, called Take The Best (TTB), can perform surprisingly 
well: Assume each cue has either a positive or a negative cue value and that the cues 
can  be  ranked  according  to  their  validities.  The  cue  validity  is  defined  as  the 
conditional probability of making a correct inference on the condition that the cue
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negative cue value. TTB searches for the cue with the highest validity and selects the 
company  with  the  positive  cue  value.  If  the  cue  does  not  discriminate,  then  the 
second most valid cue is considered, and so on. If no cue discriminates, TTB selects 
randomly.  This  inference  strategy  is  “noncompensatory”,  because  a cue  cannot be 
outweighed  by  any  combination  of less  valid  cues,  in  contrast  to  “compensatory 
strategies”, which integrate cue values. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) showed that 
TTB  matches  or  outperforms  many  alternative  strategies  in  inferential  speed  and 
accuracy,  including  a  linear  weighted  additive  strategy  (WADD).  For  each 
alternative,  the  WADD  strategy  (sometimes  also  called  “weighted  linear  model”), 
computes the sum of all cue values multiplied by the validity of the cue,  and then 
finally selects the  alternative with the largest sum.  The  simplicity and accuracy of 
TTB makes it psychologically plausible that people select it for inference problems. 
However, it has been suggested that the empirical support for this heuristic is weak 
and that direct tests  are  needed  (e.g.,  Broder,  2000;  Chater,  2000;  Lipshitz,  2000). 
Under which conditions do people actually apply noncompensatory strategies?
Recent  studies  have  examined  how  different  strategies  can  predict  inferences 
(Broder,  2000,  2003;  Broder  &  Schiffer,  2003;  Newell  &  Shanks,  2003;  Newell, 
Weston, & Shanks, 2003). Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999, 2003) showed that, under 
greater  time  pressure,  a  lexicographic  heuristic  achieved  the  best  fit  with 
experimental  data  and,  under  lesser  time  pressure,  compensatory  strategies  (in 
particular WADD) were best in predicting participants’  inferences. In a similar vein, 
Broder (2000, Experiment 3) showed that TTB predicted participants’ inferences best 
when  relatively  high  explicit  information  acquisition  costs  existed,  whereas  under 
low  information  costs,  compensatory  strategies  reached  a  greater  fit.  TTB  also 
predicted individuals’  inferences well when the cue information had to be retrieved 
from  memory,  whereas  a  compensatory  strategy  (most  frequently  WADD)  had  a 
better fit in predicting inferences when the information was provided via a computer 
screen (Broder & Schiffer, 2003). The selection of different strategies also depends 
on the overall payoffs they produce, such that TTB is selected more frequently when 
it produces the highest payoff compared to other strategies  (Broder,  2003).  Newell 
and  Shanks  (2003)  and  Newell,  Weston,  and  Shanks  (2003)  showed  that  the  way 
people search for cues follows the predicted search by TTB under high information
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under low information costs. However, search behaviour appears to be only loosely 
connected with the predicted information search by a particular strategy, even if the 
strategy predicts the choices better than  alternative  strategies.  People,  for instance, 
search  for  unnecessary  information  or  look  up  information  twice  (Newell  et  al., 
2003; Rieskamp & Hoffrage,  1999).  Therefore,  I assume that when people apply a 
strategy, they will search for the information required by the strategy, but they might 
also search for additional information, for instance, to consolidate their preliminary 
decision (Svenson,  1992).  Besides this recent work on inferential choice,  there is a 
large body of research examining strategy selection for preferential choice,  such as 
the important contribution by Payne et al. (1988,  1993), and by Creyer, Bettman, and 
Payne (1990)  studying learning effects. Abelson and Levi  (1985) or Ford,  Schmitt, 
Schechtman, Hults, and Doherty (1989) provide an overview here.
In  sum,  the  reported  results  provide  evidence  that  noncompensatory  heuristics 
predict inferences well when the costs for applying compensatory strategies are high. 
In  contrast,  when  the  information  search  is  not  costly  or  when  the  use  of  more 
information  leads  to  a better performance,  people  rely  on  compensatory  strategies 
such  as WADD.  Thus,  people’s behaviour is adaptive:  strategies that perform well 
are also appropriate for describing behaviour.
5.1.2.  Strategy Learning
Do  people  learn  to  select  strategies  for  inferences?  Most  of  the  reported 
experiments  gave  feedback about the correct  decisions;  adaptive  strategy  selection 
could be the result of learning. Only Newell. Weston, and Shanks (2003, Experiment 
1) reported that their participants seemed to change their strategies in later trials due 
to  learning.  Unfortunately,  this  learning  effect  was  not  analyzed  in  detail.  Broder 
(2003)  also examined learning with  a preliminary learning phase,  however did not 
observe a learning effect. The experimental design was not really suitable for testing 
learning effects, since it led to “a significant amount of noise” in the measurement, as 
Broder  admitted  (2003,  p.  616).  Thus,  it  appears  necessary  to  examine  whether 
adaptive strategy selection can be explained by learning.
In general, past research has presented a mixed picture of whether people are able 
to learn inference strategies adaptively.  Learning has been studied extensively with 
the  “multiple  cue  probability  learning”  (MCPL)  paradigm  initiated  by  Hammond
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Cooksey,  1996; Klayman,  1988). A prototypical MCPL task of repeatedly estimating 
an object’s criterion value based on several cues differs from the inference task of 
choosing between two objects or companies. Nevertheless, many MCPL experiments 
document substantial learning effects (e.g., Hammond & Summers,  1972), although 
the optimal response is often not reached.
Categorizations  are  also  inferences.  For  instance,  in  a  frequently  used  medical 
diagnosis  task  (e.g.,  Estes,  Campbell,  Hatsopoulos,  &  Hurwitz,  1989;  Gluck  & 
Bower,  1988;  Koehler,  2000;  Nosofsky,  Kruschke,  &  McKinley,  1992;  Shanks, 
1991), a patient’s disease (the category) must be inferred based on a set of symptoms 
(cues).  Categorizations  differ  from  inferential  choices—only  one  object  (patient) 
instead of two objects is considered,  and the criterion is membership in a category 
instead of a continuous criterion value that defines the correct choice. Modifying the 
diagnosis task as an inferential choice would imply asking the participant which of 
two  patients  is  more  likely  to  suffer  from  a  disease,  although  one,  none,  or both 
patient(s)  might  be  afflicted.  Despite  these  differences,  categorization  studies 
demonstrate that people are often very successful at learning categories of a limited 
number  of objects.  However,  in  general,  many  authors  are  rather  sceptical  about 
people’s  ability  to  learn  to  make  inferences  “optimally”  (Busemeyer  &  Myung, 
1992;  Connolly  &  Gilani,  1982;  Connolly  &  Wholey,  1988;  Wallsten,  1968), 
whereas  other authors  stress  how  well  people  learn  to  adapt to  different  inference 
problems (Anderson, 1991; Ashby & Maddox,  1992; Massaro & Friedman,  1990).
5.1.3.  Models for Strategy Selection
Computational learning models have a long tradition in psychology, starting with 
the  seminal  work  of Estes  (1950),  Bush  and  Mosteller  (1955),  and  Luce  (1959). 
More  recent  learning  theories  differ  from  traditional  ones  by  proposing  specific 
learning  mechanisms  (e.g.,  Borgers  &  Sarin,  1997;  Busemeyer  &  Myung,  1992; 
Camerer  &  Ho,  1999a,  1999b;  Erev,  1998;  Erev  &  Roth,  1998;  Harley,  1981; 
Rieskamp,  Busemeyer,  & Laine,  2003;  Stahl,  1996,  2000;  Sutton  & Barto,  1998). 
These  theories  assume  that  people  often  do  not  solve  a  specific  decision  problem 
from scratch; they may not perform very well at the beginning, but, through learning, 
they  can  improve  their  decisions  substantially  and,  potentially,  find  the  optimal 
solution. I propose a learning theory as an answer to how people select strategies for
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allow them to generalize from experience in particular situations to new situations. 
The following learning theory defines a strategy selection learning process. This does 
not  rule  out  a  strategy  consisting  of  building  blocks  that  might  be  learned  and 
acquired  separately.  However,  for  simplicity’s  sake,  I  will  not  examine  how  the 
specific building blocks are learned, but rather will focus on the selection process of 
complete strategies.
Strategy Selection Learning Theory (SSL)
According to SSL, people possess a repertoire of cognitive strategies to solve the 
judgment  and  decision  problems  they  face.  Through  feedback,  the  unobservable 
cognitive strategies, instead of stimulus response associations,  are reinforced.  From 
their  strategy  repertoire,  people  are  most  likely  to  select  the  strategy  they  most, 
subjectively,  expect to  solve the problem.  These  strategies’  “expectancies”  change 
through learning depending on the strategies’  past performance in solving the task. 
For simplicity’s sake, I focus on a prototypical compensatory strategy (WADD) and 
a prototypical noncompensatory strategy (TTB) that are suitable to predict inferences 
under varying conditions as reported above.
According  to  SSL,  individuals  have  a  set  S  of N  cognitive  strategies.  For  the 
following  studies  I  assume  that  the  strategy  set  of  SSL  consists  of  only  two 
strategies, hence N  = 2  and S =  {WADD, TTB).  The individual’s preference for a 
particular cognitive  strategy  is  expressed by  positive  expectancies  with  i  as  an 
index for the cognitive strategies. Following Luce (1959, p. 25, cf. Thurstone,  1930) 
the probability that strategy i is selected at trial t is defined by
=   (1)
Z;=i«iO)
The  strategies’  expectancies  in  the  first  period  of  the  task  can  differ,  and  are 
defined by
ql(i) = EVr w P i ,  (2)
where EVr is the random choice payoff, w is the initial association parameter, and 
p is the initial preference parameter. The random choice payoff is the payoff that can 
be  expected  from  applying  a  random  choice  strategy  for  the  task,  letting  the 
expectancy  depend  on  the  random  choice  payoff  facilitates  comparisons  between 
different tasks (when EVX  is zero,  as in the following studies,  it is set to  1   to avoid
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the  random  choice  payoff  of  the  task).  The  initial  association  parameter  w  is 
restricted to w  > 0 and expresses an individual’s initial  attachment to the available 
strategies relative to  later reinforcement.  SSL assumes that individuals have initial 
preferences for selecting particular strategies  at the beginning of a task.  The initial
Z
N
= 1 .
The number of initial preference parameters equals the number of strategies minus 
one;  in  the  case  of two  strategies  this  implies  one  free  parameter.  Thus,  I  do  not 
assume  an  initial  expectancy  parameter  as  a  free  parameter  for  each  strategy, 
equivalent to the proposed model. To explain this, I follow my conceptualization for 
two  reasons:  First,  both  parameters  should  present  two  distinct  psychological 
mechanisms:  The  initial  preference  parameters  show  how  participants  evaluate 
strategies  differently  at  the  beginning  of the  task,  whereas  the  initial  association 
defines how strong new reinforcement has to be and how often it has to be provided 
to develop or change a strategy preference.  Second,  it simplifies  generalizations to 
other  tasks:  When  considering  tasks  where  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  several 
cognitive  strategies,  one can keep the  initial  association  parameter,  but may either 
increase  the  number  of  free  initial  preference  parameters  or  group  strategies 
according to their similarity, and use only one preference parameter for each group. 
After a decision is made, the expectancies of the cognitive strategies are updated for 
the next trial t by
qt(i) =  + h-\(0 rt.\(/),  (3)
where  It-\{i)  is  an  indicator  function  and  rt.\(i)  is  the  reinforcement.  The 
reinforcement of a cognitive strategy is defined as the payoff rt.\{i) that the strategy 
produced.  The  indicator  function  equals  one  if  strategy  i  was  selected  and 
equals zero if the strategy was not selected. It is assumed that a strategy was selected 
if the necessary information for applying the  strategy was acquired and the choice 
coincides  with  the  strategy’s  prediction.  This  definition  becomes  a  problem  if 
strategies make identical predictions, when it could be incorrectly inferred that both 
strategies  were  selected.  Therefore,  when  two  or  more  strategies  make  the  same 
prediction that coincides with the individual’s choice (and the necessary information 
for these strategies has been acquired), it is assumed that It.\(i) equals the probability 
with  which  the  model  predicts  the  selection  of  these  strategies.  In  this  case,  the
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change. By definition, if qt{i) due to negative payoffs falls below a minimum value 
p,  qt{i)  is  set  to  p;  for  the  following  studies  p  =  0.0001  was  used.  I  define  the 
strategies’  reinforcements  explicitly  in  terms  of  the  monetary  gains  and  losses  a 
strategy produces. However, in principle, reinforcements naturally also include non­
monetary  aspects,  such  as  the  cognitive  effort  required  to  process  a  strategy  (see 
Payne et al.,  1993).
Finally, SSL assumes that people make minor errors when applying a strategy, so 
that, by mistake, they deviate from the strategy’s prediction. Without any application 
error, the conditional probability p(a\i) of choosing alternative a out of the set  {a, b} 
when strategy i is selected is either p(a\i) = 1  or p(a\i) = 0 for deterministic strategies 
like TTB and WADD (in cases when the cues do not allow a discrimination between 
the  alternatives  p(a\i)  =  0.5).  Incorporating  an  application  error  e  into  strategy 
application leads to the predicted probability of
p t(a\i,e) = (1 -  e) •  p t(a\i) +  •  p t (a\i) ,  (4)
k - 1
where  p t (a\i)  denotes the probability of choosing any other alternative than a out
of k available alternatives  (i.e.,  alternative b in the case of two  alternatives),  given 
strategy i was selected. For the sake of economy, the application error is assumed to 
be  the  same  across  strategies.  In  sum,  the  probability  of  choosing  alternative  a 
depends on the probabilities of selecting the strategies and the corresponding choice 
probabilities of the strategies, so that
Pt (fl) =  Pt (0 ‘ Pt  £) •  (5)
Besides  the  psychological  plausibility  of  human  errors,  the  application  error 
parameter  allows  an  evaluation  of  whether  a  reasonable  set  of  strategies  was 
assumed.  If  people  apply  cognitive  strategies  that  differ  substantially  from  the 
assumed strategy set (i.e., strategies that make different predictions), then the result 
will be a relatively high application error.
SSL proposes  a solution  to  the  strategy  selection  problem:  when  assuming  that 
people possess  a repertoire  of cognitive  strategies  for the  inference problems  they 
face, SSL provides a computational description of how strategies could be selected. 
SSL  is  a  simple  learning  model  with  three  free  parameters,  implementing 
mechanisms that have been proposed in previous learning theories:  the choice rule
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Roth,  1998),  and  conceptualizing  strategies  as  the  objects  of reinforcement  (e.g., 
Busemeyer  &  Myung,  1992;  Erev  &  Roth,  2001;  Stahl,  1996).  SSL’s  prediction 
depends  on  its  parameter  values.  Generally,  however,  when  no  extreme  initial 
preference for one strategy exists,  the initial  attachment to the strategies  is not too 
strong,  and  the  application  error  rate  is  small,  SSL predicts  that  the  strategy  that 
performs best in  a particular environment will be  selected  after  sufficient learning 
opportunity. I test SSL against four alternative models: three of them represent more 
general learning models and the last represents exemplar models.
Alternative Reinforcement Learning Theories
The  three  general  learning  models  were  constructed  by  extending  SSL,  each 
incorporating one additional psychological mechanism.
SSL  assumes  that  strategies  are  selected  according  to  a  linear  selection  rule 
represented by Equation  1. This implies that even when the decision maker, due to 
exhaustive  learning,  detects  the  performance  superiority  of  one  strategy  over  the 
others,  the  best-performing  strategy  will  not  necessarily  be  selected  exclusively. 
Therefore,  many  recent  learning  theories  apply  exponential  selection  rules  (e.g., 
Ashby & Maddox,  1993; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Camerer & Ho,  1999a,  1999b). 
Consistently, SSL can be extended by replacing Equation 1  with 
eRln  qt  ( i)
PfW   N  enln q t(j)  ’  ^
where p is a sensitivity parameter that allows the model to predict relatively large 
selection probabilities, even for low-expectancy differences across strategies, in the 
case of a high value for the sensitivity parameter. However, in the case of low values 
for the sensitivity parameter (i.e., lower than one), the model can also predict that a 
superior strategy is not learned, since it is selected too rarely. In the case of p = 1, the 
“exponential selection model” is equivalent to SSL.
Most learning theories assume that reinforcement that has been received recently 
influences behaviour more strongly than reinforcement that was received longer ago 
(e.g.,  Camerer  &  Ho,  1999a,  1999b;  Erev  &  Roth,  1998;  Estes,  1976;  Sutton  & 
Barto,  1998). This implies that the expectancy of a cognitive strategy declines over 
time and that a strategy becomes unlikely to be  selected if it does not receive  any
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<  1, can be incorporated into SSL by modifying the updating rule (3) as 
qt(i) = (1-<|)) qt-\{i) + h-\(i) rt.\{i)•  (7)
The  forgetting  parameter determines  how  strongly previous  expectancies  affect 
new expectancies. The “forgetting model” predicts an accelerated learning process in 
comparison  to  SSL,  since  the  forgetting process  quickly  wipes  out  initial  strategy 
preferences in favour of the best-performing strategy. In addition, due to forgetting, 
strategies’  expectancies  can  converge  to  the  minimum  allowed  value,  so  that  the 
preferred strategy will be more or less selected exclusively. A value of zero for the 
forgetting parameter makes the model equivalent to SSL.
The  idea that people  imagine  strategies’  performances  goes back to  theories  of 
“fictitious  play”  (Brown,  1951).  Through  an  imagination  process,  people  might 
realize  that  alternative  strategies  could  have  solved  whatever  problem  they  were 
facing  more  adequately.  Therefore,  not  only  the  selected  strategy,  but  unselected 
strategies as well, could receive reinforcement when people imagine their outcomes 
(cf. Camerer & Ho,  1999a,  1999b; Cheung &  Friedman,  1997).  To incorporate such
an imagination process into SSL the updating rule  (3) is modified to
qt (i) = qt_x  (i) + [5 + (1 -  8)7,(/)] •  rM (i),  (8)
with as an imagination parameter, restricted to 0  <  8  <  1.  Hence,  the selected 
strategy  receives  its  reinforcement  of  r,  and  unselected  strategies  receive  their 
reinforcement  of  r  multiplied  by  8 .  If  8  equals  one,  all  strategies  receive 
reinforcement  as  if  they  had  been  selected;  values  between  zero  and  one  allow 
alleviated  reinforcement  for  unselected  strategies.  The  “imagination  model”  can 
predict  particular  learning  effects:  First,  an  accelerated  learning  process  at  the 
beginning of a learning situation compared to SSL results, since the strategy that is 
not  preferred  by  the  decision  maker  will  also  receive  reinforcement.  Second,  the 
strategies’  expectancies  will converge to  a constant ratio,  so that, contrary to  SSL, 
the model predicts that the learning process does not lead to an exclusive selection of 
the best-performing strategy even  after sufficient learning,  yet rather to a selection 
probability  that  depends  on  the  ratio  of  the  strategies’  performances.  If  the 
imagination parameter  8  equals  zero,  then  the  imagination  model  is  equivalent to 
SSL.
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The  central  aim  of this  approach  is  to  propose  a computational  theory  for  the 
strategy repertoire  approach.  However,  there  are  alternative  approaches  that  could 
predict  people’s  inferences.  For instance,  models  that  have  been  proposed  for the 
domain of categorizations could also be applied to  inferential choices.  The models 
include, among others, neural network models (e.g., Gluck & Bower,  1988; Shanks, 
1991; Sieck & Yates, 2001), exemplar models (Lamberts, 2000; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978;  Nosofsky,  1986;  Nosofsky  &  Johansen,  2000),  and  combinations  of  both 
(Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992). Gluck and Bower (1988) 
proposed  a  neural  network  model  for  categorization  processes  that,  in  a  nutshell, 
claims that people integrate the information of objects’ dimensions (cues), and due to 
learning  the  weights  of the  dimensions  change.  The  neural  network  model  shares 
some  properties  with  SSL,  as  it  also  assumes  that  people  use  a  strategy  to  make 
inferences,  namely,  a compensatory strategy.  Contrary to  SSL,  the model  assumes 
that this compensatory strategy is  modified due to learning,  whereas  SSL assumes 
that  strategies  are  “modified”  by  switching  to  different  strategies.  Despite  this 
difference,  both  models  make  similar  learning  predictions.  The  fundamentally 
different exemplar-based approach claims that objects are categorized by comparing 
them  with  memorized category  representations.  In  general,  exemplar models  have 
been  successfully  applied  in  various  domains,  for  example,  memory  (Hintzman, 
1988),  automatization  (Logan,  1988),  social  cognition  (Smith  &  Zarate,  1992), 
likelihood judgments  (Dougherty,  Gettys,  &  Ogden,  1999),  and  attention  (Logan, 
2002).
Juslin and Persson (2002, see also Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 2003; Juslin, 
Olsson, & Olsson, 2003) have proposed an exemplar model for the inferential choice 
task  that  is  the  decision  problem  focused  here.  According  to  the  exemplar-based 
approach, inferences in an inference situation (the probe) are made by searching for 
similar  inference  situations  (the  exemplars)  in  memory.  The  inference  is  made 
according  to  the  best  responses  that  were  memorized  for  these  exemplars.  Thus, 
people  do  not  learn  to  select  abstract  strategies  that  they  apply  to  an  inference 
situation,  however  instead  learn  “stimulus-outcome  associations”.  In  addition, 
exemplar models differ from SSL in the type of learning assumed: Exemplar models 
require feedback about whether a decision was correct or incorrect, thus representing
85forms of supervised learning (Sutton & Barto,  1998, p. 4). In contrast, because SSL 
only receives feedback about a decision’s reward, but not whether it was correct or 
whether  a  different  decision  would  lead  to  a  better  outcome,  SSL  represents 
unsupervised reinforcement learning (although the decision’s reward, sometimes -  as 
in Study 6 and 7 -  yet not always, allows the inference that there could have been a 
better decision).  Since exemplar models have been  applied successfully as  an “all­
purpose  inference  machine”  (Juslin,  Jones,  Olsson,  & Winman,  2003,  p.  925)  and 
offer  a fundamentally  different  explanation  of how  inferences  are  made,  they  are 
strong and interesting competitors for SSL.
In  the  following  a  modified  version  of  the  exemplar-based  model  (EBM) 
proposed  by  Juslin,  Jones,  Olsson,  and  Winman  (2003)  is  defined.  According  to 
EBM,  when  making  inferences,  individuals  compare  the  choice  situation  with 
previous choices between alternatives.  Contrary to Juslin, Jones,  et al.  (2003),  it is 
assumed that during  such  a retrieval  process the whole choice  situation containing 
both alternatives is retrieved, not single alternatives. Each alternative is described by 
a  vector  of  cue  values  that  can  be  positive,  negative,  or  unknown.  A  pair  of 
alternatives,  representing  an  exemplar,  can  then  be  described  by  a  “cue 
configuration”. For each cue in this configuration, nine possible combinations of cue 
values  are  possible  (i.e.,  positive-positive,  positive-negative,  positive-unknown, 
negative-positive,  etc.).  When  making  inferences,  the  cue  configuration  of  the 
present pair of alternatives  (probe)  is compared with the configuration of previous 
pairs (exemplars) by determining the similarity between the configurations, defined 
as
^ ) = n i 4 , .   (9)
where dijm is an index that takes a value of one if the combination of cue values of 
the probe i corresponds with the combination of cue values of the exemplar j  on cue 
m; otherwise it takes the value sm, which is an “attention weight” parameter varying 
between zero and one (cf. Juslin, Jones, et al., 2003). The attention weights represent 
the subjective importance of cues; the smaller the value the greater the impact on the 
perceived  similarity.  The  number  of  parameters  equals  the  number  M   of  cues. 
Finally,  the  probability  that the  first  alternative  a  of the  alternative  pair  {a,  b)  is 
chosen is shown by
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the first alternative a was the correct choice, whereas the index  j  e b denotes that the 
sum is reached over all exemplars j  where the second alternative b was the correct 
choice. Note that a particular exemplar for which alternative a was the correct choice 
could have identical cue values as another exemplar for which alternative b was the 
correct choice. Thus, with respect to categorization research, the choice situation is 
“ill  defined”  (Medin,  Altom,  &  Murphy,  1984),  since  for  choice  situations  with 
identical available information, the correct responses can differ.
In  the  following  studies,  participants  made  inferences  in  different  environment 
conditions when provided with  outcome feedback.  These  studies  were designed to 
explore the three main questions: Do people select different strategies? Do they learn 
to  select  the  strategy  that  performs  best?  Finally,  can  SSL  predict  the  learning 
process? To evaluate SSL, the theory is compared pair-wise with its competitors. In 
principle, the goal is to select the model that best captures the underlying cognitive 
process. Therefore, the model with the highest generalizability is  searched for, that 
is, a model’s ability to “fit all data samples generated by the same cognitive process, 
not  just  the  currently  observed  sample”  (Pitt  &  Myung,  2002,  p.  422).  Of  the 
different model selection techniques (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002), I will rely on the 
Akaike  information  criterion  that  trades  the  model’s  fit  against  the  model’s 
complexity (see Akaike,  1973; Bozdogan, 2000; Burnham & Anderson,  1998) when 
estimating a model’s generalizability (Browne,  2000). Akaike information criterion 
is an appropriate model selection criterion for nested models (Myung & Pitt,  1997); 
it applies to SSL in comparison to the three alternative learning models. To compare 
SSL with EBM, I consider the models’ fits (neglecting the models’ complexities) and 
additional qualitative predictions of the models.
5.2.  Company Selection in Different Environments (Study 6)
First,  Study  6  examines  whether  people  improve  their  decisions  when  they 
repeatedly  make  inferences  with  feedback  about  their  performance  and  the  study 
explores how well TTB and WADD are able to predict the inferences. Second, Study 
6  tests  SSL’s  learning  prediction  that  people  learn  to  select  the  best-performingstrategy,  and it compares  SSL with its competitors.  For this test, participants made 
decisions  in  two  differently  constructed  environment  conditions:  In  the  first 
“compensatory environment”, the application of the compensatory strategy WADD 
led to the highest performance, defined as the received payoff, whereas in the second 
“noncompensatory  environment”,  the  application  of the  noncompensatory  strategy 
TTB led to the highest performance.
5.2.1.  Method
Forty people (23  women and  17 men) with an average age of 25 participated in 
the experiment. The computerized task, which was conducted in individual sessions, 
lasted  approximately one hour.  The participants  were mainly  students  (85%)  from 
various  departments  at  the  Free  University  of  Berlin.  Participants  received  the 
payoffs  they  reached  in  the  experiment  as  a  payment  for  their  participation;  the 
average payment was around €14 (£10).
Participants were instructed that, from two unnamed companies, they had to select 
the more creditworthy company (i.e., the company that would pay back a loan), and 
that only one company was the correct choice. For each decision they made, they had 
to  pay  15  cents  (10  pence),  described  as  a  “handling  fee”  and,  for  each  correct 
decision,  they  earned  a payoff of 30  cents  (20  pence).  With  this  payoff structure, 
participants who randomly chose between the companies netted a payment of zero. 
Each company was described by  six  cues  and their validities.  The companies’  cue 
values, which could be either positive or negative, were presented in random order in 
a  matrix  form  using  a  computerized  information  board  (see  Figure  5.1).  The 
information  board  shows  the  cue  values  for  both  alternatives,  which  could  be 
acquired by clicking on the boxes. The cue values were concealed in boxes that had 
to be opened by clicking on the box. Once a box was opened the cue values remained 
visible until a choice was made. The received payoffs were presented at the bottom 
of  the  screen.  The  importance  of  the  six  cues  was  explained  by  means  of  their 
validities, which were presented next to the names of the cues. The cues (and the cue 
validities  given  to  the  participants)  were  ‘efficiency’  (0.90),  ‘financial  resources’ 
(0.85),  ‘financial flexibility’  (0.78),  ‘capital  structure’  (0.75),  ‘management’  (0.70), 
and  ‘qualifications  of  employees’  (0.60).  All  cues  are  common  for  assessing 
companies’ creditworthiness (Rommelfanger & Unterhamscheid,  1985).
88Figure 5.1. Decision situation
Please select either company A or company B
Criteria  Probability of  Success  Rating
Financial Flexibility 78 % ???
Efficiency 90 % +  +
Capital Structure 75% ???
Management 70% +
Financial Resources +
Qualifications Employees 60% ???
_ ii
Correct + 0.20€
Handling Fee: - 0.15€
Sum: + 0.15€
Account: + 4.40€
In both experimental conditions, participants made  171  choices without any time 
constraints.  These  171  items consisted of 3  initial  items  to familiarize participants 
with the task, followed by seven blocks, each consisting of the same set of 24 items. 
The items within each trial block were randomly ordered, and the position of the two 
companies for each item  (left or right on the screen)  varied randomly.  To examine 
participants’ potential initial preferences for one of the two strategies for solving the 
task, no feedback was provided in the first trial block.  In the following trial blocks, 
outcome feedback on the decisions’ correctness was provided to allow for learning.
For  all  items,  the  strategies  WADD  and  TTB  always  made  an  unambiguous 
prediction  of  which  of the  two  companies  to  choose;  therefore,  their  predictions 
never relied on random choice.  In the compensatory environment, the item set was 
constructed  such  that  WADD  reached  an  accuracy  of  92%  (i.e.,  22  correct  of  a 
possible 24 predictions) compared to TTB with an accuracy of 58% (i.e.,  14 correct 
predictions  out  of  24).  In  the  noncompensatory  environment,  the  strategies’
89accuracies were reversed such that WADD reached an accuracy of 58% compared to 
TTB with an accuracy of 92%. It is important that the inferior strategy still leads to 
an accuracy above chance, otherwise an adaptive selection of a strategy would be to 
choose  the  opposite  of  the  strategy’s  prediction.  When  analyzing  participants’ 
choices,  such  “opposing  application  of  strategies”  needs  to  be  taken  into 
consideration,  making  the  data  analysis  complex.  In  addition,  the  accuracies  of 
strategies  below  chance  are  less  realistic  (Martignon  &  Laskey,  1999).  To  infer 
which strategy had been selected based on the participant’s choices, it was crucial to 
construct a decision problem for which strategies’  predictions differed substantially. 
Therefore, in addition to the specific accuracy levels of the strategies, the items were 
so constructed that for both environment conditions,  strategies’  predictions differed 
for 12 of the 24 items. All items were created from a set of 50 companies, for which 
the validities of the cues were determined. However, due to the necessary properties 
of  the  item  set,  that  is,  the  strategies’  performances  and  the  separability  of  the 
strategies’  predictions,  the  validities  of  the  selected  item  set  in  the  experiment 
deviated from those told to the participants (the deviations ranged between 0.05 and 
0.43).
In sum, the experimental design has two factors:  environment (between subjects; 
compensatory  vs.  noncompensatory  environment),  and  trial  block,  with  seven 
repetitions of the item set (within subjects). Study 6 tests the learning prediction that 
the best-performing strategy of the strategy set should reach a higher fit in predicting 
participants’  choices after sufficient learning opportunity.  In addition,  Study 6 tests 
whether SSL is the best model to describe a potential learning process.
5.2.2.  Results
Before evaluating the learning models, I first looked for learning effects, that is, 
whether participants improved their decisions through feedback.
Participants were able to increase their payoff substantially across the seven trial 
blocks, illustrating a strong learning effect. Figure 5.2 shows the average payoffs (in 
Euros)  received by the participants  across  the  seven  trial  blocks  in  Study 6  in  the 
compensatory  and  noncompensatory  environment  conditions.  A  repeated 
measurement  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  was  conducted  with  the  average 
obtained payoff as the dependent variable, the trial block as a within-subjects factor, 
and the environment as a between-subjects factor. The average payoff of €1.36 (SD =
900.78) in the first trial block increased significantly to an average payoff of €2.50 (SD 
= 0.67) in the last trial block, F(6, 33) = 12.5, p = .001, rf = 0.69. Additionally, there 
was an environment effect, since participants did better, with an average total payoff 
of  €15.88  (SD  =  2.84),  in  the  compensatory  environment  than  in  the 
noncompensatory environment, €12.41 (SD = 3.94); F(l) = 10.2, p = .003,  rf = 0.21. 
I did not observe any interaction between the trial block and the environment.
Figure 5.2. Learning curves in different environments
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What  strategy  do  people  select  for  making  their  inferences?  To  answer  this 
question, the percentages of predicted choices by TTB and WADD were determined 
for half of the items of each block for which the strategies made different predictions. 
Figure  5.3  shows  the  percentage  of  choices  predicted  by  the  better-performing 
strategy for each environment condition. This is the percentage of predicted choices 
by the best-performing strategy in the compensatory (A) and the noncompensatory 
(B) environment conditions of Study 6 (only for those items for which the strategies 
made different predictions). Additionally, the figure shows the predicted probability 
by the different learning models with which the best-performing strategy is selected.
91SSL’s  prediction  differed  from  the  percentage  of  predicted  choice  by  the  best- 
performing  strategy  with  a  mean  square  error  (MSE)  of  0.23%.  The  fit  for  the 
exponential selection model was MSE = 0.22%, for the forgetting model it was MSE 
= 0.31%, and for the imagination model it was MSE = 0.16%.
Figure 5.3. Predicted choices for Study 6
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92At the beginning of the task, WADD was better at predicting participants’ choices 
regardless  of  the  environment  condition.  This  indicated  an  initial  preference  for 
integrating  all  available  information  when  making  an  inference.  It  also  explained 
why  participants  received  a  higher  payoff  in  the  compensatory  environment 
compared  to  the  noncompensatory  environment,  since  the  initially  preferred 
compensatory strategy led to a higher payoff in the compensatory environment. After 
the first trial block, this preference changed depending on the environment condition. 
For the compensatory environment, the fit of WADD increased over the trial blocks. 
In contrast, for the noncompensatory environment, TTB’s fit increased,  implying a 
decrease  for  WADD’s  fit.  This  result  supports  the  hypothesis  that  people  select 
different  strategies  for inferences  and that they  learn to  select the best-performing 
strategy.  In  the  last  trial  block,  WADD  predicted  88%  of  all  choices  in  the 
compensatory  environment  and  TTB  predicted  71%  of  all  choices  in  the 
noncompensatory  environment  (for  all  items  with  differing  predictions  of  the 
strategies). Since the validities told to the participants differed from those of the item 
set used in the experiment, participants might have learned the validities of the item 
set for the strategies they used.  However,  a WADD strategy using the validities of 
the  item  set  predicted  only  64%  of  all  choices  in  the  compensatory  environment 
compared to  a fit  of 88%  for WADD  using  the  validities  told  to  the  participants. 
Likewise, a TTB strategy for the noncompensatory environment using the rank order 
of the validities of the item set predicted only 53% of all choices compared to 76% 
for TTB using the rank order of the validities told to the participants. Alternatively, a 
WADD strategy using the validities of the item set predicted only 56% of all choices 
in  the  noncompensatory  environment.  As  strategies  with  the  presented  validities 
produced the best outcome, the usage of these validities rather than a learning of the 
actual validities of the item set can be assumed.
How did participants search for information? In 83% of all the choices they made, 
participants opened the information boxes in the order in which they were presented, 
starting with the cue at the top of the screen. On average, participants opened 98% of 
all information boxes. This search behaviour was not very surprising, since looking 
up information in the order presented was the quickest way of opening the boxes, and 
searching  for all  information  was  not  surprising,  since  information  acquisition  did
93not  incur  any  costs.  Therefore,  it  appears  reasonable  to  conjecture  that  most 
participants  simply  opened  up  all  the  boxes  before  they  started  to  process  the 
information.
How well did SSL predict the learning process we observed? For all three studies 
in this chapter each learning model was fit separately to each individual’s learning 
data  as  follows:  The  model  predicts  the  probability  with  which  a  participant  will 
choose either company a or company b for each trial, conditioned on the past choices 
and payoffs received before that trial. It was operationally defined that a strategy was 
selected only if the necessary information for the strategy had been searched for and 
if the  choice  coincided  with  the  strategies’  prediction.  Thus,  if  a  participant,  for 
instance,  did  not  search  for  the  most  important  cue,  TTB  could  not  have  been 
selected, and if a participant searched for only one single cue, WADD could not have 
been selected. However, I allowed a shortened information search for WADD: Given 
a  subset  of  cues  it  is  often  possible  to  infer  the  prediction  of  WADD  without 
searching  for  all  cues  (e.g.,  if the  three  most  valid  cues  support  one  alternative). 
Therefore,  if WADD’s prediction could have been determined based on the partial 
information the participant had searched for, I allowed that WADD could have been 
selected.  Due  to  the  generally  extensive  information  search  in  Study  6,  both 
strategies  could  have  been  selected  for  almost  all  choices  according  to  the 
information search.
The  accuracies  of  the  models’  predictions  for  each  trial  were  evaluated  by 
determining  the  likelihood  of the  observed  choice,  and  a  model’s  overall  fit  was 
assessed by determining the sum of the log likelihood for all choices across the  168 
trials. As a goodness-of-fit, I used the G2 measurement (Burnham & Anderson,  1998) 
defined in Equation  11, for which fly I   0, r-1) is the likelihood function that denotes 
the probability of choice  y given the model’s parameter set  0  and all  information 
from the preceding trial t-1.
G2 = -2£!!i ln(/(y 10, r -1))  (11)
Applying  maximum  likelihood  estimation  for  each  model  and  individual,  the 
parameter values that minimized G2 were searched for. Reasonable parameter values 
were first selected by a grid-search; thereafter, the best-fitting grid values were used 
as a starting point for subsequent optimization using the simplex method (Nelder & 
Mead,  1965).  For all  models  and  all  studies here,  the  initial  association parameter
94was restricted to 0.0002  <  w  <  20. The optimization procedure was applied to each 
of the  40  participants.  Here,  and  in  the  following,  I  use  the  term  “predict”  in  a 
broadly descriptive sense.  Since the models  were fitted to the data,  the model that 
predicts  the  data best  is  the  model  that  is  best  at  describing  the  results  given  the 
optimized parameters (see also Roberts & Pashler, 2000). For this reason, I did not 
select  models  according  to  their  fit,  but  relied  on  the  models’  estimated 
generalizability by using the Akaike information criterion.
SSL  captured  the  choices  with  an  average  probability  of  .79,  with  an  average 
predicted  probability  of  .82  (with  SD  =  .04  across  the  seven  blocks)  for  the 
compensatory  environment  and  of  .77  (SD  =  .02)  for  the  noncompensatory 
environment. When ignoring the probability prediction and considering only whether 
the  alternative  SSL predicted  as  most  likely  was  chosen  by  the  participants,  SSL 
could  predict  88%  of  all  choices.  Thus,  SSL  obtained  a  good  fit  by  taking  the 
dynamics of the inference process into account. Consistent with the results shown in 
Figure 5.3, the average initial preference parameter of Pttb = -30 obtained expressed 
a  preference  for  WADD  at  the  beginning  of  the  task.  In  fact,  for  only  5  of  40 
participants was  an optimized initial preference value for TTB  above  .50 obtained. 
The  average  obtained  value  of  the  application  error  parameter  of  £  =  .05 
demonstrated that the assumed set of strategies was reasonable; in fact for only two 
participants  was  a  value  above  .20  obtained,  indicating  a  relatively  error-prone 
strategy application.
How well did SSL compete against the alternative learning models? I compared 
SSL  pair-wise  with  each  alternative  learning  model  by  considering,  for  each 
participant, whether SSL or the alternative model had the higher generalizability. The 
generalizability of the models  was  evaluated by their Akaike  information  criterion 
values (Akaike Information Criterion defined as AIC = G2-2k with k as the number 
of  parameters).  The  fits  of  the  models  were  also  compared  by  a  generalized 
likelihood ratio test (Wickens,  1989, pp.  100-103).  For each model, the sum of G2 
values  for  all  40  participants  was  determined  (each  participant’s  G2  value  is 
computed according to Equation 11). The difference of the sums is approximately  %2 
distributed  with  d f =  40  (the  degrees  of freedom  result  from  one  additional  free 
parameter  for  each  of  the  40  participants  for  the  more  general  models).  For  the 
purpose of model selection, SSL was compared pair-wise with the more general four-
95parameter models. The percentage of participants for which the more general model 
reached  a  smaller  (better)  AIC  value  was  determined.  When  compared  with  the 
general models, SSL obtained a better AIC value for the majority of participants (p 
according to a sign test).  SSL reached a higher generalizability for the majority of 
participants in the comparison with the forgetting model and the imagination model. 
When  compared  with  the  exponential  selection  model,  SSL  reached  a  higher 
generalizability for only 52.5% of the participants (see Table 5.1).
_______Learning model____________________
Exponential  Forgetting  Imagination
selection model  model  model
Initial association w 7 (SD = 7) 3 (SD = 6) 9 (SD = 8) 4 (SD = 6)
Initial preference 
Pttb
.30 (SD = .15) .26 (SD = .22) .31  (SD = .15)
.28 (SD = 
0.18)
Application error £ .05 (SD = .07) .05 (SD = .07) .05 (SD = .07) .05 (SD = .07)
Additional parameter —
p = 1.5 
(SD = 2.8)
< |) = 0.05 
(SD = 0.11)
8  =0.12 
(SD = 0.11)
Predicted probability 
of choices
.791 .797 .793 .792
G2 = 4357 G2 = 4419 G2 = 4405
Sum of G2 values G2 = 4439 (X 2(40) = 82, (X 2(40) = 20, (X 2(40) = 33,
p = .001) p = .997) p = .758)
Median AIC 113 115 115 115
Participants with AIC 
improvement for 
more general model
—
47.5% 
(p = .875)
7.5%
(p = .001)
22.5%
(p = .001)
Table 5.1. Optimized parameter values for Study 6
Besides  describing  the  choice  behaviour,  can  SSL  also  explain  the  adaptive 
selection  of  cognitive  strategies?  The  percentage  of  choices  predicted  by  the 
strategies  TTB  and  WADD,  respectively,  can  be  taken  as  an  approximation  of 
participants’  strategy  selection  and can be compared to the probability with which 
SSL predicts this selection per trial block (see Figure 5.3). For both environments the 
probability SSL predicted for the selection of the best-performing strategy accurately 
matched the  percentage  of choices  predicted by  the best-performing  strategy.  The 
three alternative models did not obtain substantially better fits. This good match is 
surprising  considering  that  the  models’  parameters  were  fitted  with  respect  to 
participants’ choices and not to the strategies’ predictions.
96The exemplar model proposed by Juslin, Jones, Olsson, and Winman (2003) does 
not  aim  to  describe  the  initial  learning process.  Instead,  it focuses  on how  people 
make inferences after they have learned exemplars. Thus, to determine a fair test of 
SSL, EBM was used only to predict the choices of the last two blocks. For each of 
these 48 choices, a prediction was made by comparing the cue configuration of the 
pair of alternatives  with  the cue  configuration  of the pairs  in  all  subsequent trials 
excluding  the  first  block  of  24  trials,  for  which  no  feedback  was  provided.  For 
instance, when making a prediction for the last trial, EBM determined the similarity 
of that pair of alternatives  (probes)  to  the previous  143  pairs  (exemplars)  starting 
with the inference of the 25th trial and ending with the  167th trial. Since each block 
repeated  the  same  24  items,  the  similarity  of a  probe  to  identical  exemplars  was 
frequently determined. Therefore, in contrast to Juslin, Jones, et al. (2003), I used a 
frequency-sensitive form of EBM (Nosofsky,  1988). Although the same items were 
presented repeatedly, the exemplars that were generated could, in principle but which 
was rarely the case in this study, differ due to participants’ information searches.
The  model  predicts  the  probability  with  which  a participant  will  choose  either 
company a or company b. To assess the model’s overall fit for a given individual and 
set of parameters, the G2 measurement was determined for the last 48 choices. The 
six  free  attention-weight parameters,  which  were  restricted  for  all  three  studies  to 
0.001  <  sm   <  0.999,  were  fitted  separately  to  each  individual’s  data.  Reasonable 
parameter values were first selected by a grid-search technique; thereafter, the best- 
fitting  grid  values  were  used  as  a  starting  point  for  subsequent  optimization.  The 
average optimized parameter values were, in decreasing order of the cues according 
to their validities: 5i = .10, 52 = .40, 53 = .50, 54 = .09, 55 = .32, and 56 = .66 for the 
compensatory environment and s\ = .11, 52 = .51, 53 = .85, 54 = .29, 55 = .62, and 56 = 
.31  for  the  noncompensatory  environment.  Thus,  the  attention  weights  did  not 
correlate substantially with cue validities; only the attention weight of the most valid 
cue obtained a high attention weight relative to the other cues.
EBM  predicted  the  choices  with  an  average  probability  of  .76  for  the  two 
environments.  SSL reached  a better  fit  as  it  predicted  the  choices  in  the  last  two 
blocks with an average probability of .86 for the compensatory environment and .78 
for  the  noncompensatory  environment.  However,  SSL’s  predictions  were  derived 
from fitting the model to all blocks, and its fit could be improved when fitted to the
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comparing,  for each  participant,  the  model’s  fit  in  predicting  the  choices,  thereby 
ignoring the models’ complexity, since AIC is not appropriate for non-nested models 
(see also Roberts & Pashler, 2000). SSL had a better fit compared to EBM for 60% 
of all participants  (p =  .268 according to a sign test),  although SSL had only three 
free parameters compared to EBM with six free parameters. Thus, SSL was slightly 
more  appropriate  than  the  exemplar-model  to  predict  the  choices  when  only 
considering the fit of the models and neglecting their complexities.
However, more important to testing a theory’s fit are qualitative predictions that 
can be derived from the theory. Following the strategy repertoire approach, it makes 
a difference whether, for a particular inference situation, strategies differ or coincide 
in  their  predictions.  If  the  strategies’  predictions  differ,  the  person’s  choice  will 
depend  on  the  strategy  he  or  she  is  using.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  strategies’ 
predictions coincide, the person will make the same choice regardless of the strategy 
he or she is using. Accordingly, SSL’s prediction depends on whether the strategies 
TTB  and  WADD  make  coinciding  predictions:  When  both  strategies  predict  the 
same  alternative,  then  the  predicted  choice  probability  of the  most  likely  chosen 
alternative  will  be relatively high.  In contrast,  when  the two  strategies  in  question 
predict  different  alternatives,  then  the  predicted  choice  probabilities  of  the  most 
likely  alternative  will  be  relatively  moderate  (unless  one  of the  two  strategies  is 
predicted to be selected with a very high probability). When following the exemplar- 
based  approach,  the  models’  predictions  will  depend  on  the  similarities  of  the 
inference situations with previous inference situations and not on the predictions of 
strategies.
Therefore,  as  a  second  model  selection  criterion,  for  all  items  in  the  last  two 
blocks,  the  models’  average  predicted  choice  probability  for  the  most  likely 
alternative  were  determined,  separated  for  “incongruent  items”  (defined  as  those 
items for which TTB and WADD make different predictions) and “congruent items” 
(defined as those items for which TTB  and WADD make identical predictions).  In 
fact,  SSL’s  predictions  differed  as  assumed,  since  the  most  likely  alternative  was 
predicted with an average probability of .82 for incongruent items compared to  .93 
for  congruent  items,  t(39)  =  6.41,  p  =  .001;  d  =  1.01.  EBM  did  not  predict  this
98difference,  since  the  most  likely  alternative  was  predicted  with  an  average 
probability of .82 for both types of items.
The results support SSL’s prediction: consistent with SSL for incongruent items, 
participants chose the most likely alternative predicted by SSL in 79% of all cases, 
whereas  for congruent  items  the most likely  alternative  was  chosen  in  96%  of all 
cases,  t(39)  =  8.13, p  =  .001;  d =  1.29.  Contrary to  EBM’s  predictions,  a  similar 
effect  was  also  found,  so  that  for  incongruent  items,  the  most  likely  alternative 
predicted by EBM was chosen in 74% of all cases, whereas for congruent items the 
most likely alternative was chosen in 92% of all cases, t(39) =  12.06, p = .001; d = 
1.91.
5.2.3.  Discussion
Study 6 demonstrated that when people repeatedly make probabilistic inferences 
their  performance  improves.  In  addition,  it  showed  that  people  apparently  select 
different strategies for the inference task.  In the first trial block with no  feedback, 
WADD predicted more choices in comparison to TTB, indicating that WADD is the 
strategy  people  initially  prefer  to  select.  This  is  what  one  would  expect  in  an 
unfamiliar task in which the information is provided without any costs and does not 
need  to  be  retrieved  from  memory  (for  the  difference  between  inference  “from 
memory” and inference “from givens” see Gigerenzer & Goldstein,  1996; Broder & 
Schiffer,  2003).  The  initial  preference  for  WADD  also  explains  why  participants 
perform better (i.e., reach a higher payoff) in the compensatory environment, because 
by selecting WADD in the compensatory environment, they select the strategy that 
produces the higher payoff right from the beginning. However, the initial preference 
for a particular strategy changes as a result of feedback. After sufficient experience, a 
person is likely to select a different strategy. Study 6 suggested that people learn to 
select the strategy that performs best in the environment.
The  standard  cost-benefit  approach  (e.g.,  Payne,  Bettman,  &  Johnson,  1988) 
predicts  that  people  select  strategies  depending  on  the  experimental  conditions. 
Accordingly, WADD should predict more choices in the compensatory environment 
and  TTB  should  predict  more  choices  in  the  noncompensatory  environment.  The 
results support this prediction. However, the cost-benefit approach does not specify 
how the strategy selection process changes over time due to learning.  SSL fills this 
gap and describes how strategy selection changes adaptively. In particular, the shift
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can only be explained by a learning approach. SSL is the best learning model when 
compared with the three competing learning models. The additional mechanisms that 
are captured by the more general learning models do not appear to be essential for 
predicting  the  observed  learning  process.  Only  when  SSL  is  compared  with  the 
exponential selection model do both models perform equally well according to their 
generalizability. With the obtained average sensitivity parameter for the exponential 
selection  model  of,  on  average,  1.5,  it  is  possible  to  predict  a  relatively  high 
probability with  which  a strategy is  selected compared to  SSL,  even  for relatively 
small  expectancy  differences  of the  strategies.  The  exponential  selection  model  is 
thereby able to predict an accentuated learning rate at the beginning of the learning 
process (in particular in the noncompensatory environment), which gives the model -  
for  some  participants  -   a better  fit  than  does  SSL.  The  following  studies  explore 
whether this advantage holds for other situations.
I  derive  these  conclusions  from  a  strategy  repertoire  perspective.  Is  this 
perspective  justified  based  on  the  comparison  of  it  with  the  exemplar-based 
perspective? The results of the comparison of SSL with EBM suggest that the answer 
is yes. First, although SSL has only three free parameters compared to EBM, with six 
free  parameters,  it  still  reached  a  better  fit  for  the  majority  of  the  participants. 
Second, there is a qualitative prediction that SSL makes, depending on the strategies’ 
predictions, that speaks in its favour. When the strategies select the same alternative, 
then  SSL predicts  the  choice  of this  alternative  with  a relatively high  probability, 
compared  with  situations  in  which  the  strategies  select  different  alternatives. 
Consistently, participants’  choices matched SSL’s prediction more frequently when 
the  strategies’  predictions  coincided.  Contrastingly,  the  exemplar  model  does  not 
predict  this  difference.  Nevertheless,  participants’  choices  were  more  in  line  with 
EBM’s prediction for items where the strategies select the same alternative -  a result 
that cannot be explained by the exemplar model. In sum, for Study 6’s probabilistic 
inference  task,  SSL  provided  the  best  account  of  people’s  inference  processes. 
However, this conclusion needs to be restricted,  since Study 6’s inference situation 
was  not advantageous to  an exemplar-based  inference process.  The learning phase 
was relatively short given the large number of exemplars. In many studies in which 
exemplar models  are  tested  (e.g.,  Juslin,  Jones,  Olsson,  & Winman,  2003),  only  a
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the opportunity to  acquire a good memory representation  of the exemplars  against 
which  new  instances  can  later be  compared.  In  Study  6,  the learning phase  could 
have been  too  short  for participants  to  memorize  exemplars  and this  may  explain 
EBM’s  lower  fit.  Nevertheless,  participants  were  still  successful  in  making  their 
choices and we observed a strong learning effect.  Thus,  although EBM potentially 
could be a better model when more opportunity for learning exists, with the limited 
learning opportunity given in Study 6, the strategy repertoire perspective provides a 
better account of people’s inferences.  For an inference task with  a relatively small 
learning  opportunity,  individuals  seem  to  rely  on  an  abstraction,  that  is,  the 
application  of a  cognitive  strategy,  rather  than  on  comparing  inference  situations 
with  previously  made  inferences.  Study  7  will  further  test  the  generalizability  of 
these conclusions in a different inference situation.
5.3.  Company Selection with Memory Costs (Study 7)
One important criticism of the inference situation of Study 6 is that participants 
were  provided  with  cue  validities.  There  are  situations  in  which  people  have 
knowledge about the validity of the information they use, however they often have to 
learn  how  good  cues  are  for  making  inferences,  and  these  validities  have  to  be 
retrieved  from  memory.  Such  a  situation  is  examined  in  Study 7.  In  addition,  the 
demands  on  memory  in  Study  7  are  increased  by  instituting  a  more  active 
information  search,  so  that  the  available  pieces  of information  are  never  visually 
presented simultaneously.  Instead,  the cue values have to be acquired sequentially. 
Increased cognitive demands for applying a cognitive strategy might make it more 
likely that people rely on memorized exemplars to solve inference problems. Thus, 
Study 7 tested whether the results and conclusions of Study 6 can be generalized to a 
situation with increased cognitive demands.
5.3.1.  Method
Forty people (17 women and 23 men) with an average age of 24 participated in 
the experiment. The computerized task, which was conducted in individual sessions, 
lasted approximately one hour and 30 minutes. The participants were mainly students
101(88%)  from  various  departments  at  the  Free  University  of  Berlin.  Payments 
depended on the participants’ performance; the average payment was €22 (£14).
As in Study 6, participants were instructed to select the more creditworthy of two 
unnamed companies that were described by six cues, presented on  a computerized 
information  board.  Again  only  one  company  was  the  correct  choice.  Contrary  to 
Study 6, the experimental session started with a validity-learning phase that took, on 
average, 40 min and included 70 items. Each item contained the information of three 
discriminating cues randomly selected from the set of six cues, so that each cue was 
presented 35 times. After a participant made a choice, he or she was informed as to 
which  company  was  correct  without  receiving  any  payoffs  or  paying  any  costs. 
Thereafter, a histogram was presented that showed, for all cues, how often each cue 
was  successful  versus  unsuccessful  in  predicting  the  correct  choices  for  all  items 
viewed  up  to  that  point.  By  presenting  three  cues  simultaneously,  the  learning 
process  was  reinforced,  because  participants  were  required  to  compare  the  cues, 
making the validity differences between them more salient. Restricting the number to 
three cues implied that participants were hindered in learning cognitive strategies for 
solving  the  task.  The  cues  (and  their  validities)  in  the  learning  phase  were 
‘efficiency’  (.77),  ‘financial  resources’  (.71),  ‘financial  flexibility’  (.66),  ‘capital 
structure’  (.60),  ‘management’  (.57),  and  ‘qualifications of employees’  (.54). These 
validities  for  the  learning  phase  were  essentially  the  same  as  for  those  in  the 
subsequent inference phase, with a maximum deviation of 0.015.
At the end of the validity-learning phase the participants had to estimate the cue 
validities:  Participants were asked for each cue separately,  “How often, out of  100 
decisions,  does  this  cue  make  a correct prediction,  given  that  one  company  has  a 
positive cue  value  and the  other company has  a negative cue  value?”  Participants 
could  earn  a  maximum  bonus  of  about  €2.00  (£1.40)  when  they  made  perfect 
estimates;  in  the  case  of the  worst  possible  estimates  they  would  have  received 
nothing, as the estimates were evaluated by the quadratic scoring rule (Yates,  1990). 
The scoring rule was not explained in detail; instead participants were told that the 
better  their estimates  were  the  higher their bonus  would be.  The  validity-learning 
phase was quite successful, since the average correlation*between estimated validities 
and real validities was r = .88 (SD = .17, Median = .94, and for more than 70% of all 
participants,  the  correlation  was  above  .90).  However,  because  the  estimated
102validities deviated from the real validities, each participant’s individually estimated 
validities were used for the predictions of the cognitive strategies and subsequently 
for the learning models’  predictions. In fact, I repeated the whole analysis by using 
the objective cue validities, which did not substantially affect the results and did not 
change  my  conclusion.  However,  by  using  the  subjective  estimated  validities  I 
followed  a  more  conservative  method  by  not  making  potentially  unjustified 
assumptions about the success of the cue-validity learning phase.
After the validity-learning phase, participants proceeded with the inference phase 
with 185 choices. For each choice, the cue information could be acquired by clicking 
on  information  boxes.  In  contrast  to  Study  6,  only  one  information  box  could be 
opened at a time, so that when another information box was opened, the previously 
opened  box  automatically  closed.  The  185  items  consisted  of  3  initial  items  to 
familiarize participants with the task, followed by seven trial blocks, each consisting 
of the same set of 26 items. For all items, the strategies always led to unambiguous 
predictions of which of the two companies to choose, and for 50% of the items, they 
led  to  different  predictions  (to  construct  the  item  set  and  determine  strategies’ 
predictions, the actual cue validities were employed). As in Study 6, no feedback was 
provided in the first trial block, followed by six blocks with outcome feedback. For 
each choice they made, participants paid 20 cents (14 pence); they then received 40 
(28 pence) cents for a correct choice.
Study  7  had  two  experimental  factors:  environment  (between  subjects; 
compensatory vs.  noncompensatory environment)  and trial block (within  subjects). 
In the compensatory environment condition, the item set was constructed such that 
WADD reached an accuracy of 88% compared to TTB with an accuracy of 61%. In 
the  noncompensatory  environment  condition,  the  strategies’  accuracies  were 
reversed.
5.3.2.  Results
A repeated measurement ANOVA was conducted with the average obtained payoff 
as the dependent variable, the trial block as a within-subjects factor, and environment 
as a between-subjects factor. I documented a strong learning effect, since the average 
obtained payoff of €2.32 (SD = 0.84) in the first block increased substantially across 
the seven blocks to a payoff of €3.21 (SD = 0.80) in the last block, F(6, 33) = 9.8, p = 
.001,  rf = 0.64. Participants received an average total payoff of €21 (SD = 3.8) in the
103compensatory  environment  compared  to  a  payoff  of  €19  (SD  =  3.2)  in  the 
noncompensatory environment, F(l,  38) = 2.6, p = .112,  if = 0.06.  No  interaction 
between  trial  block  and  environment  occurred.  Figure  5.4  shows  the  payoff 
development across the seven trial blocks for both environment conditions. Here the 
average payoffs (in Euros) received by the participants across the seven trial blocks 
in  the  compensatory  and  noncompensatory  environment  conditions  are  shown  for 
Study 7.
Figure 5.4. Learning curves for the different environments with memory costs
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How well do the two strategies predict participants’ choices? Figure 5.5 shows the 
percentage of choices predicted by the best-performing strategy. The percentage of 
predicted choices by the best-performing strategy  in the compensatory (A)  and the 
noncompensatory  (B)  environment conditions  of Study 7  (only  for those  items for 
which the strategies made different predictions),  and the predicted probability with 
which  the  best-performing  strategy  is  selected  by  the  SSL  theory  and  the  three 
alternative learning models are shown. SSL’s prediction differed from the percentage 
of predicted  choice  by  the  best-performing  strategy  with  a  mean  square  error  of 
0.20%.  The  fit  for  the  exponential  selection  model  was  MSE  =  0.12%,  for  the
104forgetting model it was MSE = 0.20%, and for the imagination model it was MSE = 
0.16%.
For both environments, WADD and TTB predicted a similar proportion of choices 
for  the  first  trial  block.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  Study  6,  no  initial  preference  for 
integrating the available information  according to WADD  was observed.  However, 
again,  the  learning  prediction  that  people  learn  an  environment’s  best-performing 
strategy  is  supported.  The  WADD’s  and  TTB’s  fits  increased  in  the  respective 
compatible environments across the seven trial blocks. In the last trial block, WADD 
predicted, on average, 77% of all choices in the compensatory environment and TTB 
predicted  an  average  of 68%  of all  choices  in  the  noncompensatory  environment, 
when considering all choices for which the two strategies made different predictions.
Figure 5.5. Predicted choices for Study 7
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How did subjects search for information? In contrast to Study 6, in only  14.6% of 
all  choices  did  participants  open  up  the  information  boxes  in  the  order they  were 
presented on the screen, whereas in 27.4% of all choices, participants opened up the 
cues in the order of the individually judged cue validities. This change, in contrast to 
Study 6, can most likely be attributed to the fact that the information boxes did not 
stay open by themselves. Participants also looked up most of the information, as they 
searched  for  an  average  of 85%  of all  information.  Although  a  little  less  than  in 
Study  6  where  participants  searched  for  98%  of  all  information,  this  rather 
corresponds with  a compensatory strategy.  Again, this can be  attributed to the fact 
that information search did not involve any monetary costs.
How well did SSL predict the learning process? Similar to Study 6, each learning 
model  was  fitted  to  the  participants  individually  to  obtain  40  sets  of  optimal 
parameter  estimates  (see  Table  5.2).  SSL  captured  the  choices  with  an  average 
probability  of  .74  for both  environment  conditions.  When  only  considering  if the 
alternative most likely predicted by SSL was chosen by the participants, SSL could 
predict 81%  of all  choices.  Consistent with the results presented in  Figure 5.5, the 
average initial preference parameter of Pttb =  .50 for SSL expresses no preference 
for  WADD  at  the  beginning  of  the  task.  The  average  obtained  value  for  the 
application  error  parameter  (£  =  .07)  is  slightly  greater  in  comparison  to  that  of
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concluded that an adequate set of strategies was assumed. To compare SSL against 
the  alternative  learning  models,  I evaluated each  model  according to  its  estimated 
generalizability. In all three pair comparisons, SSL reached a higher generalizability 
for at least 70% of all participants (see Table 5.2). In sum, SSL obtained a good fit 
by taking the dynamics of the inference process into account.
_______Learning model____________________
Exponential  Forgetting  Imagination
selection model  model  model
Initial association w 9 (SD = 9) 6 (SD = 8) 11  (SD = 9) 6 (SD = 8)
Initial preference 
Pttb
.50 (SD = A4) .52 (SD = .25) .49 (SD = .15)
.50 (SD = 
0.15)
Application error e .07 (SD = .07) .07 (SD = .07) .07 (SD = .07) .07 (SD = .07)
Additional parameter —
p= 1.4 
(SD = 2.3)
(j) = 0.04 
(SD = 0.09)
5  = 0.39 
(SD = 0.42)
Predicted probability 
of choices
.742 .744 .744 .743
G2 = 5742 G2 = 5778 G2 = 5776
Sum of G2 values G2 = 5803 (%2(40) = 61, (%2(40) = 25, (%2(40) = 27,
p
i
i
f
t
, P = -97) p = . 94)
Median AIC 146 148 147 148
Participants with AIC 
improvement for 
more general model
— 30%
(p = .017)
10%
(p = .001)
15%
(p = .001)
Table 5.2. Optimized parameter values for Study 7
To predict the selection  of the cognitive strategies,  I took TTB’s  and WADD’s 
percentages  of  predicted  choices  as  an  approximation  of  strategy  selection  and 
compared  them  with  the  probability  with  which  SSL  predicts  the  selection  (see 
Figure  5.5).  For  both  environments,  SSL’s  predicted  selection  probabilities 
accurately match the percentage of predicted choices by the best-performing strategy. 
This again is an impressive match between strategy selection predicted by SSL and 
the choices predicted by the cognitive strategies.
Identical to Study 6, EBM was used only to predict the inferences of the last two 
blocks. For each of these 52 inferences, a prediction was made by comparing the cue 
configuration  of a pair  of alternatives  with  the  configuration  of all  previous  pairs 
excluding the first block.  The  six  attention-weight parameters  of EBM  were fitted
107separately for each individual, using the same optimization procedure as in Study 6. 
For the six attention weights, the optimized parameter values, in decreasing order of 
the cues according to their validity, were:  si  = .18, 52 = .23, 53 = .63, 54 =  .72, 55 = 
.30, and 56 = .76 for the compensatory environment; and si = .25, 52 = -21, 53 = -20, 54 
= .70, 55 = .40, and 56 = .56 for the noncompensatory environment. As in Study 6, the 
attention weights did not correlate substantially with the cue validities.
EBM  predicted  the  choices  with  an  average  probability  of  .78  for  the 
compensatory  environment  and  with  an  average  of  .74  for  the  noncompensatory 
environment. In comparison, SSL predicted the choices of the last two blocks with an 
average probability of .75  for both environment conditions.  To compare  SSL with 
EBM, I simply determined which model had a better fit for each participant, ignoring 
the  model’s  complexity.  According  to  the  G  fit criterion,  SSL  and EBM  did  not 
differ, as SSL had a better fit for 47.5% of all participants.
Analogous to Study 6, for the last two blocks I determined the models’  average 
predicted  choice  probability  for  the  alternative  that  is  most  likely  predicted to  be 
chosen. These were determined separately for incongruent items, for which TTB and 
WADD  made  diverse  predictions,  and  for  congruent  items,  for  which  they  made 
identical predictions.  SSL’s prediction differed as assumed:  SSL predicted the most 
likely choice with an average probability of .70 for the incongruent items compared 
to .87 for congruent items, t(39) = 7.55, p = .001; d =  1.19. EBM did not predict this 
difference, since the most likely choice was predicted with an average probability of 
.80 for incongruent  items  compared  to  .81  for congruent items,  t(39)  =  1.53, p  = 
.135; d = 0.24.
Consistent  with  SSL,  for  incongruent  items  participants  chose  the  most  likely 
alternative predicted by  SSL in 70%  of all cases,  whereas  for congruent items the 
most likely alternative was chosen in 92%  of all cases, t(39) = 7.84, p =  .001; d = 
1.24. Contrary to EBM’s prediction, a similar effect was also found for the exemplar 
model:  For  incongruent  items  the  most  likely  alternative  predicted  by  EBM  was 
chosen in 76% of all cases, whereas for congruent items the most likely alternative 
was chosen in 90% of all cases, t(39) = 6.92, p = .001; d - 1.10.
5.3.3.  Discussion
Study 7  again demonstrates that people improve the accuracy of their decisions 
when they receive outcome feedback. Even in a situation where cue validities have to
108be  learned,  people learn  to  select the  strategy that performs  best for the  inference 
situation.  In  contrast to  Study 6,  in  Study 7  we  observed no  initial  preference for 
WADD. This seems to be the result of the increased cognitive demands of Study 7. 
The  validities  had  to  be  retrieved  from  memory  and  the  cue  values  had  to  be 
remembered,  which  seem  to  make  the  selection  of  a  noncompensatory  heuristic 
preferable.  The  larger  cognitive  demands  of  Study  7  might  have  also  made  the 
inference process more complicated, since the best-performing strategies had a lower 
fit in predicting choices  in  the last trial  block compared to  Study  6.  Possibly,  the 
remembered validities and cue values are more vulnerable to error, so that a person’s 
inference  process  deviates  frequently  from  the  strategies’  predictions.  This 
conjecture  is  supported  by  an  on  average  higher  value  for  the  application  error 
obtained for SSL. When comparing SSL with the more general learning models,  it 
described the learning process more accurately.  In particular, SSL reached a higher 
generalizability  compared  to  the  exponential  selection  model,  which  reached  a 
similar  generalizability  in  Study  6.  The  learning  effect  at  the  beginning  of  the 
experiment  was  less  pronounced when  compared with  Study  6,  and this  moderate 
learning effect could be equally well predicted by SSL. Thus, the additional learning 
mechanisms of the more general learning models are not essential for predicting the 
learning process.
As in Study 6, EBM could predict participants’ choices with a similar probability 
as SSL. However, when focusing on the models’ predictions considering items with 
identical  or diverse predictions  of the cognitive  strategies,  SSL’s  predictions  were 
supported. In contrast, EBM did not make different predictions for the two types of 
items, although participants’ choice proportions differed for the two types. Therefore, 
although the fit of the two models did not differ, the second model selection criterion 
favours SSL.
The adaptive behaviour in Study 6 and Study 7 was observed under conditions of 
substantial  accuracy  differences  between  the  two  strategies.  Whereas  the  best- 
performing  strategy  reached  an  accuracy  of  approximately  90%,  the  worst- 
performing strategy reached an accuracy of approximately 60%. Such large accuracy 
differences  between  strategies  might  not  be  common  in  real-world  situations 
(Martignon  &  Laskey,  1999).  Therefore,  Study  8  tested  whether  the  results  and
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accuracy differences between strategies are smaller.
5.4.  Company Selection with Information Costs (Study 8)
Simple  noncompensatory  strategies  often  reach  accuracies  of a  similar  level  to 
those  of more  complex  strategies  that  integrate  the  available  information.  The  so- 
called flat maximum phenomenon states that the optimal  set of weights  in a linear 
model  can  often  be  replaced  by  many  other  sets  of weights  without  losing  much 
accuracy (Dawes & Corrigan,  1974; Wainer,  1976). This provides one explanation of 
why  simple  heuristics  can  work  well.  Generally,  heuristics  often  have  two 
advantages. Besides their robust accuracy levels, they possess low application costs, 
as they require  a small  amount of information  that is  easy to process.  In  Study 8, 
strategies’ costs will be made explicit by introducing explicit information acquisition 
costs.
According to SSL,  strategies are selected proportional to their expectancies, and 
these depend on the gains and losses the strategies produce. I have defined gains and 
losses  explicitly in  monetary terms;  however,  in principle,  they could also  include 
non-monetary aspects, for instance, the cognitive costs of processing information (for 
the  distinction  between  information  acquisition  and  processing  costs,  see  also 
Johnson  &  Payne,  1985).  Study  8  tests  whether people  are  able  to  learn  the best- 
performing  strategies  for an  inference task for which the  strategies’  performances, 
defined  by  the  strategies’  payoffs,  differ  mainly  because  of different  information 
acquisition  costs.  Can  the  previous  conclusions,  that  people  adapt  their  strategy 
selection based on strategies’  performances, be generalized to yet another plausible 
inference situation?
Again I will test EBM against SSL. However, one might argue that EBM is less 
suited to the inference situation of Study 8, since the model predicts that individuals 
memorize  only  the  correct  choice  for  an  exemplar  and  it  does  not  predict  how 
individuals  also  evaluate  and  memorize  an  adequate  amount  of  information  for 
making an inference.  However,  in principle, this missing property does not restrict 
the application of EBM. Individuals following an exemplar-based inference process 
might decide from the beginning only to look up a constant subset of information to 
reduce  costs.  Then,  they  memorize  exemplars  on  the  basis  of  the  acquired
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people search for information is not predicted by EBM, but this does not restrict its 
application.
5.4.1.  Method
Forty people (23  women and  17 men) with an average age of 25 participated in 
the experiment. The computerized task, which was conducted in individual sessions, 
lasted  approximately one hour.  The participants  were  mainly  students  (78%)  from 
various  departments  at  the  Free  University  of Berlin.  Payments  depended  on  the 
participants’ performance; the average payment was €8 (£5.50).
The  instructions were similar to those in  Study 6.  Participants had to  select the 
more creditworthy company of two unnamed companies, described by six cues with 
given  cue  validities.  The  171  items  consisted  of three  initial  items  to  familiarize 
participants with the task, followed by seven trial blocks, each consisting of the same 
set of 24 items, presented in random order. Feedback was provided after the first trial 
block to  allow  learning.  The  two  strategies  made  unambiguous  predictions  for  all 
items and for 50% of the items they made different predictions. The validities told to 
the participants were the same as in Study 6. Again, due to the necessary properties 
of the item set -  the performances required and possible separability of the strategies 
-  the validities of the selected item set in the experiment deviated from the ones told 
to the participants (with deviations varying between 0.14 and 0.38).
The  experimental  design  had  two  factors:  environment  (between  subjects)  and 
trial block (within subjects).  In the compensatory environment, WADD reached an 
accuracy  of  79%  (i.e.,  19  correct  predictions  of  24)  compared  to  TTB  with  an 
accuracy  of 71%.  In  the  noncompensatory  environment,  the  strategies’  accuracies 
were reversed.  In  the compensatory environment,  participants  earned 75  cents  (50 
pence) for a correct decision, but paid 37.5 cents (25 pence) for each decision. For 
each acquired cue, an additional three cents (two pence) had to be paid,  so that the 
cost of acquiring one cue relative to the possible gain of a correct decision was 8%. 
With this payoff structure,  the  application of TTB  led to  a payoff of €15.50 (£11) 
compared  to  WADD  with  a  payoff  of  €6.50  (£4.50)  for  all  168  items.  In  the 
noncompensatory environment, participants earned 35 cents (24 pence) for a correct 
decision and paid 17.5 cents (12 pence) for each decision. For each acquired cue, an 
additional 0.5 cents (0.3 pence) had to be paid, implying relative information costs to
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WADD  with a payoff of €7.20 (£5). Thus,  in both environment conditions,  TTB’s 
performance,  defined as the overall payoff produced by a strategy,  was higher than 
WADD’s performance, due to lower information costs. Therefore, SSL predicts that 
people will learn to select TTB in both environment conditions.
5.4.2.  Results
I first analyzed how well participants improved their decisions through feedback. 
In Study 8, participants did not improve their payoffs across the seven trial blocks as 
much as was observed in Study 6 or Study 7. Average payoffs (in Euros) received by 
the  participants  across  the  seven  trial  blocks  in  Study  8  in  the  compensatory  and 
noncompensatory environment conditions are shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6. Learning curve in the different environments with information costs
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The  repeated  measurement  ANOVA,  with  the  average  obtained  payoff  as  the 
dependent  variable,  trial  block  as  a  within-subjects  factor,  and  environment  as  a 
between-subjects factor shows a weak learning effect: The average obtained payoff 
of €1.01  in the first block (SD = 0.93) increased to an average payoff of €1.51  (SD =
1120.85) in the last block, F(6, 33) = 2.2, p = .065,  rf = 0.28. Participants did worse in 
the  compensatory  environment  with  an  average  payoff  of  €5.77  (SD  =  4.65) 
compared  to  an  average  payoff  of  €9.37  (SD  =  4.15)  in  the  noncompensatory 
environment, F(l, 38) = 6.6, p = .014, rf - 0.15. Participants searched on average for 
too  much  information,  which  explains  why  they  received  a  lower  payoff  in  the 
compensatory environment, with relatively high information search costs, compared 
to  the  noncompensatory  environment.  No  interaction  between  trial  block  and 
environment occurred.
Figure 5.7 shows the percentage of choices predicted by TTB, the best-performing 
strategy in both environments. Here the percentage of predicted choices by the best- 
performing  strategy  in  the  compensatory  (A)  and  the  noncompensatory  (B) 
environment  conditions  of Study  8  are  shown  only  for  those  items  for  which  the 
strategies made different predictions.
Figure 5.7. Predicted choices for Study 8
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Additionally,  the  figure  shows  the  predicted  probability  with  which  the  best- 
performing strategy is selected by the SSL theory and the three alternative learning 
models.  SSL’s  prediction  differed  from  the  percentage  of predicted  choice  by  the 
best-performing  strategy  with  a  mean  square  error  of  0.15%.  The  fit  for  the 
exponential selection model was MSE = 0.14%, for the forgetting model it was MSE 
= 0.29%, and for the imagination model it was MSE = 0.14%. At the beginning of 
the  task  with  no  feedback  (first  trial  block),  WADD  predicted  more  choices  than 
TTB,  regardless  of the  environment.  This  again  indicates  an  initial  preference  for 
WADD, similar to yet weaker than in Study 6. After the first trial block, this weak 
preference changed. For both environments the fit of WADD decreased in favour of 
an increasing fit of TTB, again supporting the prediction that the participants learned 
to select the best-performing strategy.  In the last block, TTB predicted 68% of the 
choices  in  the  compensatory  environment  and  66%  of  the  choices  in  the 
noncompensatory  environment  when  considering  only  items  for  which  the  two 
strategies  make  diverse  predictions.  Since  the  validities  told  to  the  participants 
differed from those of the item  set used in the experiment, participants might have 
learned the validities of the item  set for the  strategies  they used.  However,  a TTB 
strategy  using  the  rank  order  of the  validities  of the  item  set predicted  only  70%
114(67%) of all choices of the compensatory (noncompensatory) environment compared 
with  TTB  using  the  rank  order  of  the  validities  told  to  the  participants,  which 
predicted  75%  (74%)  of  all  choices  for  the  compensatory  (noncompensatory) 
environment.  A WADD strategy using the validities of the item set predicted 65% 
(66%) of all choices for the compensatory (noncompensatory) environment. Again, 
as  strategies  with the presented validities produced the best outcome,  the usage of 
these validities rather than a learning of the actual validities of the item set can be 
assumed.
How did subjects search for information? In contrast to Study 6, in only 5% of all 
choices  did  participants  open  up  the  information  boxes  in  the  order  they  were 
presented on the screen.  Instead,  in  60%  of all choices, participants opened up the 
cues  in  the order of their validity.  Compared to  Study  6  and  Study 7,  participants 
looked  up  much  less  information,  since  on  average  participants  searched  for  only 
65% of all information. This can be attributed to the fact that information search did 
involve monetary costs.
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Table 5.3. Optimized parameter values for Study 8
How well did SSL predict the learning process? Analogously to Studies 6 and 7, 
each learning model was fitted separately to each individual’s data (see Table 5.3).
115SSL  captured  the  choices  with  an  average  probability  of  .75,  with  an  average 
predicted  probability  of  .76  for the  compensatory  environment  and  of  .74  for the 
noncompensatory environment. When only considering whether the alternative that 
was most likely predicted by SSL was chosen by the participants, SSL could predict 
82% of all choices. SSL obtained a good fit by taking the dynamics of the decision 
process into account. The average obtained initial preference parameter of Pttb = -43 
for SSL reflects a slight preference for the selection of WADD at the beginning of 
the task. The average obtained application error parameter of £  = .07 is only slightly 
larger in comparison to Study 6 and identical to that of Study 7,  and for only four 
participants was a value above .20 obtained. Thus, an adequate set of strategies was 
assumed.
How  well  did  SSL  compete  against  the  alternative  learning  models?  SSL’s 
estimated generalizability was better for the majority of participants when compared 
with  the  alternative  models,  although  SSL  did  not  significantly  outperform  the 
exponential  selection model,  since SSL reached a better AIC value for 60%  of the 
participants (p = .268 according to a sign test, for details see Table 5.3).
Again, the percentages of predicted choices by TTB and WADD were taken as an 
approximation  of  participants’  strategy  selection  and  were  compared  with  the 
probability  with  which  SSL  predicts  the  selection  (see  Figure  5.7).  For  both 
environments,  the  probability  predicted  by  SSL  with  which  the  best-performing 
strategy will be selected accurately matches the percentage of predicted choices by 
this strategy. The three alternative models did not obtain substantially better fits.
Identical with Studies 6 and 7, EBM was used to predict the inferences of the last 
two blocks on the basis of the preceding inferences excluding the first block. EBM’s 
parameters were fitted separately to each individual’s data using the G2 measurement 
as a goodness-of-fit criterion. For the six attention weights, the optimized parameter 
values, in decreasing order of the cues according to their validity, were: si = .28, 52 = 
.33, S 3 = .85, S 4 = .35, 55 = .21, and 56 = .52 for the compensatory environment; and 5i 
=  .07,  52 =  .12,  53  =  .65, 54 =  .65, 55  =  .53,  and 56 =  .66  for the noncompensatory 
environment. As in Studies 6 and 7, the attention weights did not correspond with the 
cue validities, and only to a small extent did cues with a higher validity have larger 
attention weight values.
116EBM  predicted  the  choices  with  an  average  probability  of  .64  for  the 
compensatory  environment  and  of  .67  for  the  noncompensatory  environment.  In 
comparison,  SSL  predicted  the  choices  of  the  last  two  blocks  with  an  average 
probability of .79 (.75) for the compensatory (noncompensatory) environment.  SSL 
was compared with EBM by determining which model had a better fit according to 
the G2  measurement, disregarding the model’s complexity. SSL had a better fit for all 
40  participants.  Thus,  in  Study  8,  SSL  clearly  outperformed  EBM  in  predicting 
participants’ choices.
In addition, analogously to Studies 6 and 7, I determined for all items in the last 
two  blocks  the  models’  average  predicted  choice  probability  of  the  most  likely 
alternative,  separately,  for  incongruent  items,  for  which  TTB  and  WADD  made 
diverse  predictions,  and  congruent  items,  for  which  the  strategies  made  identical 
predictions.  SSL’s  prediction  differed  as  assumed:  SSL  predicted  the  most  likely 
choice with an average probability of .69 for incongruent items compared to .91  for 
congruent items, t(39) = 8.27, p = .001; d =  1.31. Contrary to Study 6 and Study 7, 
EBM  also  predicted  this  difference,  but  to  a  lesser  degree,  since  the  most  likely 
choice  was  predicted  with  an  average  probability  of  .68  for  incongruent  items 
compared to .72 for congruent items, t(39) = 3.84, p = .001; d = 0.61.
Consistent  with  SSL  for  incongruent  items,  participants  chose  the  most  likely 
alternative predicted by SSL in 70% of all cases,  whereas for congruent items,  the 
most likely alternative was chosen in 96%  of all cases, t(39) = 8.42, p = .001; d = 
1.33. A similar effect was also found for EBM,  however much more strongly than 
predicted. For incongruent items, the most likely alternative predicted by EBM was 
chosen in 71% of all cases, whereas for congruent items the most likely alternative 
was chosen in 84% of all cases, t(39) = 6.01, p = .001; d = 0.95.
5.4.3.  Discussion
Study 8 provides further support for the adaptive view of strategy selection. As in 
Studies  6  and  7,  participants  in  Study  8  apparently  learned  to  select  the  best- 
performing  strategy.  In  both  environments,  the  strategy  initially  selected  was 
discarded in favour of TTB. However, the learning effect observed, measured by the 
observed  payoff,  was  weaker  than  in  the  previous  two  studies.  Apparently,  the 
inference task is more difficult than those in the previous studies. In Studies 6 and 7, 
participants  could  focus  solely  on  the  strategies’  accuracy,  which  determined  the
117strategies’  performance,  ignoring  the  number  of  cues  they  needed  to  look  up. 
However, in Study 8, the strategies’ performances depended on their accuracy and on 
their costs, namely, on the number of looked-up cues. Thus, participants had to trade 
off strategies’ accuracy against their information search costs, making learning more 
complicated.  Additionally,  this  trade-off  produced  costs:  When  deciding  which 
strategy  to  select,  all  information  had  first  to  be  acquired  to  compare  TTB’s  and 
WADD’s  performances.  Only  after a preference  in  favour of TTB  was  developed 
could participants search for a smaller amount of information, which would then no 
longer  allow  them  to  see  whether  WADD  would  perform  better.  In  contrast,  in 
Studies  6  and  7,  participants  always  had  the  possibility  of  acquiring  additional 
information  to  check  WADD’s  performance.  Obviously,  these  differences  make 
Study 8’s inference task more difficult and impede the learning process.
Nevertheless,  SSL  again  represents  a  good  account  of  the  observed  learning 
process of strategy selection. SSL not only predicts that TTB will reach a higher fit 
in predicting participants’ choices compared to WADD, it also provides a prediction 
of how the strategy selection process changes by learning.  In this, it goes beyond a 
cost-benefit framework. As in the previous two studies, SSL outperformed the more 
general learning models in terms of their generalizability, although the difference to 
the exponential  selection model was not significant. For a substantial proportion of 
participants, the exponential selection model reached an advantage in comparison to 
SSL, due to its ability to predict an accelerated initial learning process.
When comparing SSL with EBM, the former reached a better fit in predicting the 
choices  for  all  participants.  Moreover,  SSL  again  made  different  predictions  for 
incongruent  and congruent items  (for which TTB  and WADD  lead to  different or 
identical choices), consistent with the experimental results. EBM could predict these 
differences only to a small degree. In sum, in Study 8 EBM was least suitable when 
compared with SSL in describing participants’ inferences.
The introduction of search costs emphasizes SSL’s advantage as a reinforcement 
model  of  unsupervised  learning.  Although  in  Study  8,  feedback  was  given  on 
whether  a  decision  was  correct  or  incorrect,  no  information  on  whether  the 
participants could have done better by searching for fewer cues was provided. SSL is 
suitable for such a situation, since this information is not required for a reinforcement 
model.  Correct  inferences  based  on  less  information  simply  provide  greater
118reinforcement and can thus lead to a reduced information  search if this search was 
sufficient for making good inferences.
5.5.  Process Modelling
Do people select different strategies in different environments? Do they learn to 
select  the  strategy  that  performs  best?  How  can  we  predict  the  learning  process? 
These are the main questions of this section of performance prediction and guide the 
following discussion.
5.5.1.  Strategies for Inferences
What strategies underlie people’s inferences? The studies by Broder (2000, 2003), 
Broder and Schiffer (2003), Newell and Shanks (2003), Newell, Weston, and Shanks 
(2003), and Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999, 2003) provide experimental evidence that 
TTB out-competes other strategies in predicting peoples’  inferences when the costs 
of  applying  compensatory  strategies  are  high  or  its  application  is  cognitively 
demanding.  In  contrast,  compensatory  strategies  are better in predicting  inferences 
when  information  search  is  not costly  and  when  integrating  available  information 
leads  to  a  good  performance.  The  results  support  this  conclusion.  In  Study  6, 
information about cue values and cue validities was easily accessible, promoting the 
selection  of compensatory  strategies.  Consistently,  in  the  first  trial  block  (without 
feedback),  the  compensatory  strategy  WADD  was  best  at  predicting  participants’ 
choices.  This  result  is  important  as  it  indicates  that  in  an  unfamiliar  inference 
situation,  in  which  people  do  not  know  strategies’  performances  and  in  which 
application costs can be neglected, people prefer to  select compensatory strategies, 
presumably because they expect compensatory strategies to perform well. In fact, in 
a study on preferences (Chu & Spires, 2003) participants gave the highest ratings to 
WADD and relatively low ratings to a lexicographic heuristic when judging which of 
several strategies would “choose the best alternative”.
However,  application  costs  can  rerely  be  ignored.  In  Study  7,  in  which  the 
application  of  a  compensatory  strategy  required  greater  memory  demands, 
participants  had  no  initial  preference  for  the  compensatory  strategy.  Likewise,  in 
Study 8  in which explicit information  acquisition costs were introduced,  the initial 
preference for the compensatory strategy was less strong when compared with Study
1196.  From  previous  studies  examining  explicit  information  costs,  one  could  have 
expected an initial preference for noncompensatory strategies in Study 8. Presumably 
such  a preference  was  not observed because the  search  costs  were  relatively  low: 
even  in  the compensatory environment condition with the largest search  costs,  the 
costs relative to the gain of a correct decision (above the gain expected from random 
choice)  were  approximately  8%.  In  contrast,  Broder  (2000,  Experiments  3  and 4) 
used relative information costs of 20% and Newell and Shanks (2003) used relative 
information  costs  of  40%  in  their  high  search  costs  conditions,  so  that  the 
performance of WADD was even below that of random choice. This makes it less 
surprising that a preference for WADD was not observed in their studies, especially 
as participants received outcome feedback from the beginning of the task. However, 
here  I did not,  primarily,  examine the factors,  such  as  search  costs,  that  influence 
initial  strategy  selection;  instead  I  focused  on  the  question  of  whether  people 
adaptively change the strategies they select on the basis of feedback.
According to a cost-benefit framework, people trade strategies’ costs against their 
benefits. The current three choice studies provide examples of how strategies’  costs 
and  accuracies  favour  different  strategies.  According  to  the  accuracy-effort 
framework (Payne, Bettman,  & Johnson,  1993), people anticipate the accuracy and 
effort  of  a  strategy  when  selecting  a  strategy.  Several  task  characteristics  can 
influence  this  selection  process.  SSL  incorporates  this  initial  selection  process  by 
initial  strategy  preferences.  Consistently  in  the  three  studies,  I  obtained  different 
initial  preferences.  Whereas  in  Study  6  participants  had  an  initial  preference  for 
applying  WADD,  this  preference  was  less  pronounced  in  Study  8  and  was  not 
observed in Study 7. In Study 6, this preference might be ascribed to low anticipated 
costs  of information  search  and  information  processing.  However,  initial  strategy 
preferences  are  not  sufficient,  since  taking  a  learning  process  into  account  can 
explain how participants’  preferences for strategies change and thereby can lead to 
better predictions of the inferences. I argue that learning is the key feature for solving 
the strategy selection problem. In all three reported studies, feedback apparently led 
to  the  selection  of the best-performing  strategy.  In  sum,  according to  SSL,  people 
produce  an  initial  evaluation  of  strategies,  which  changes  continuously  through 
feedback when making inferences, leading to a dynamic  strategy selection process. 
In this  way,  unsuccessful  strategies become less likely to be selected.  A conscious
120cost-benefit  trade-off of  strategy  selection  could  mimic  such  a  learning  process. 
Therefore, this learning approach does not contradict the cost-benefit approach. On 
the  contrary,  it  supplements  it  with  a  computational  theory  of  how  the  strategy 
selection process could be accomplished.
However,  the  effect  of  feedback  will  naturally  depend  on  the  strategies’ 
performances,  in  particular  on  strategies’  differences  in  performance.  This  could 
explain  why  people  often  do  not  learn  to  integrate  information  according  to  a 
normative  standard  (Brehmer,  1980).  If  alternative  strategies  do  not  lead  to 
substantially  different  performances,  why  should  people  change  their  inference 
strategy according to the normative standard? Likewise, Smith and Walker (1993, p. 
245) argue that if people do not follow a normative standard, this can be “attributed 
to  low  opportunity  cost  of  deviations  from  the  rational  prediction.”  In  all  the 
company  choice  studies,  the  opportunity  costs  of  selecting  the  lower-performing 
strategy  were  high,  explaining  substantial  learning  effects.  Only  in  the  difficult 
inference  situation  of  Study  8,  in  which  participants  needed  to  restrict  their 
information search as early as possible to receive high payoffs, did weaker learning 
effects  occur.  Thus  learning  effects  seem  to  depend  on  the  gains  of  “optimal” 
behaviour.
5.5.2.  Strategy Selection Learning
Starting with  work by Restle  (1962),  the idea that the outcome of learning is  a 
strategy  that  specifies  how  the  individual  reacts  to  a  specific  situation has  gained 
growing  interest.  Most  of  this  work  has  been  accumulated  in  the  domain  of 
probabilistic  categorization  and  focuses  on  the  question  of  how  people  adjust  a 
parameter (such as a cut-off value, etc.) for the application of a single strategy (for a 
review  see Kubovy & Healy,  1980).  More recently, Busemeyer and Myung (1992) 
have extended this work by proposing a theory that additionally assumes a learning 
process of selection among strategies. For the domain of experimental games Stahl 
(1996, 2000) and Erev and Roth (2001) have proposed learning theories that assume 
a selection process among strategies. Strategy learning has also attracted attention in 
the  domain  of  skill  acquisition  (e.g.,  Anderson,  1993;  Newell  &  Simon,  1972; 
Taatgen & Wallach, 2002). According to the so-called “ACT-R theory” (Anderson, 
1993; Anderson & Lebiere,  1998),  the aim of reinforcement is the development of 
production  rules.  A  heuristic  like  TTB  can  be  represented  as  a  sequence  of
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(1985) and Huber (1980).
SSL extends the idea that people learn to select between cognitive strategies in the 
domain  of probabilistic  inferences.  SSL  assumes  that  people  have  varying  initial 
expectancies of the strategies they possess.  Only when  a strategy has been  applied 
does it receive reinforcement, thereby changing its expectancies.  Contrary to many 
recent learning theories (e.g., Erev & Roth,  1998; Camerer & Ho,  1999a; Rieskamp, 
Busemeyer, Laine,  2003),  SSL does not assume that the object of reinforcement is 
observable  action.  I think that such direct reinforcement,  which is  also claimed by 
EBM,  appears  unreasonable for an inference  situation in which the number of cue 
configurations can be extremely large. Here lies SSL’s advantage: generalizations to 
different cue configurations, in particular to new unobserved configurations, are easy 
to accomplish.
The three choice studies demonstrate that SSL can accurately describe the strategy 
selection process and that it outperforms all alternative learning models with respect 
to their estimated generalizability. The exponential strategy selection rule is able to 
increase the probability with which the best-performing strategy is selected, even for 
small expectancy differences. In particular, the exponential strategy selection rule is 
capable  of  predicting  an  accelerated  learning  process  at  the  beginning  of  the 
inference  situation.  This  possibility  was  useful  in  Studies  6  and  8,  in  which  the 
exponential  selection  model  obtained  a  higher  estimated  generalizability  in 
comparison  to  SSL  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  participants.  However,  when 
considering  the  participants  of  all  three  studies,  the  model’s  estimated 
generalizability  was  not  larger  and because the  exponential  selection  model  is  the 
more  complex  model,  SSL  appears  to  be  preferable.  The  second  mechanism 
considered, a forgetting process, which leads to a decline of expectancies over time, 
was  not  very  useful  in  predicting  the  learning  process.  This  result  is  surprising 
considering  that  many  models  incorporate  such  a  process  (e.g.,  Camerer  &  Ho, 
1999a,  1999b; Erev & Roth,  1998; Estes,  1976). The assumption that people imagine 
the  outcomes  of  unselected  strategies,  the  third  additional  learning  mechanism 
considered, does not seem to be essential for describing the learning process. In sum, 
none of the three additional learning mechanisms appears necessary to describe the 
observed  learning  processes.  SSL  was  also  tested  against  the  alternative  learning
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One  might  ask whether the mechanisms  could obtain  a better fit when  interacting 
with  each  other.  To  test  this  conjecture,  I  constructed  a  six-parameter  model  by 
extending  SSL  with  the  three  mechanisms  considered.  The  six-parameter  model 
predicted the choices with an average probability of .80, .75, and .76 compared with 
.79,  .74,  and .75 for SSL in Studies 6, 7,  and 8, respectively.  In all choice studies, 
when considering the estimated generalizability of the six-parameter model, SSL was 
not outperformed:  SSL reached a better generalizability for 55%, 93%, and 73% of 
all  participants  in  comparison  to  the  six-parameter  model  in  Studies  6,  7,  and  8, 
respectively.  Thus,  in  Study  6,  the  six-parameter  model  reached  a  similar 
generalizability  to  SSL  due  to  the  exponential  selection  rule.  Since  no  additional 
mechanism  is  essential  across  all  three  studies,  I propose to  stay  with  the  simpler 
SSL theory.
However, this conclusion needs to be limited to the situations I have studied; there 
are different inference situations in which these mechanisms might be important. For 
instance, in a domain in which strategies perform rather badly and produce losses, an 
exponential  selection  model  that  can  deal  with  negative  expectancies  might  be 
preferable to SSL. Moreover, in a dynamic environment in which the performance of 
strategies changes, a forgetting process becomes adaptive as it gives lower weight to 
reinforcement  received  long  ago.  Likewise,  a  dynamic  environment  could  also 
favour a process of imagination of unselected strategies, which would more quickly 
detect when alternative strategies outperform the preferred strategy.
SSL is the simplest learning model considered, so that one might ask whether the 
model could be further simplified. I constructed a two-parameter learning model, by 
dropping SSL’s application error parameter. For technical reasons (for applying the 
maximum likelihood method),  I assumed a constant application error of p =  .001. 
When testing SSL against this simplified two-parameter model, SSL reached a better 
generalizability for 77.5%, 82.5%, and 70% of all participants for Studies 6, 7, and 8, 
respectively.  In  addition,  I constructed  a two-parameter model  by  dropping  SSL’s 
initial preference parameter, assuming that people have equal initial preferences for 
the two strategies. In fact, this simplification does not reduce SSL’s generalizability: 
SSL  reached  a  better  generalizability  for  60%  and  57.5%  of  all  participants  for 
Studies 6  and 8, respectively.  In  Study 7,  the simpler model even reached a better
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initial preference for one of the two strategies was observed. Should, then, the initial 
preference  parameter be  dropped  in  favour  of a  simplified  SSL?  Studies  6  and  8 
demonstrate initial preferences for particular strategies, which can only be captured 
by the three-parameter SSL. Yet the initial preferences only play an important role at 
the beginning of the inference task, that is, in the first two trial blocks. If one is only 
interested  in  which  strategies  people  select  in  the  long run,  the  initial  preferences 
could be neglected. However, if one is particularly interested in how people begin to 
solve  an  inference  problem,  the  initial  preference  parameter becomes  an  essential 
component of SSL.
A basic assumption of SSL is that people learn to select strategies from an already 
existing set. The decision of which strategies to include in the strategy set has to be 
carefully considered and should be based on prior empirical evidence. When a set is 
assumed  that  is  too  large  or  too  small,  this  could  complicate  or  inhibit  strategy 
identification.  TTB  and  WADD  have  been  shown  to  work  well  for  predicting 
individuals’  probabilistic  inferences  (e.g.,  Broder,  2000;  Rieskamp  &  Hoffrage, 
2003)  and  are reasonable candidates  for the  strategy  set.  They can  be regarded  as 
prototypes  for  compensatory  and  noncompensatory  strategies;  people  might  apply 
variations, but these would be captured with the proposed strategies. For instance, if 
a linear model is applied with somewhat different weights than the used validities, 
this  variant  would  presumably  come  up  with  predictions  similar  to  WADD. 
However, SSL could also be applied with different or larger strategy sets.  Whether 
an  enlarged  set  would  also  pay  off  in  a  substantially  better  fit  is  an  empirical 
question.  Moreover one could argue that people generate new  strategies instead of 
selecting  existing  strategies.  That  WADD  was  already  successful  in  predicting 
participants’  choices  in  the  first  trial  block  of  Studies  6  and  7  speaks  against  a 
generation  process.  Likewise,  Rieskamp  and  Hoffrage  (1999,  2003)  showed  that 
TTB  is best in predicting people’s choices under time pressure, again in a situation 
without  feedback.  These  results  indicate  that people  already possess  -  and  do  not 
generate -  strategies that are at least similar to WADD and TTB.
5.5.3.  Predicting Inferences
The  focus  here  is  on  the  strategy  repertoire  approach  to  inferences  about 
companies. I propose a computational model of how people select among cognitive
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repertoire  perspective.  Although  this  perspective  is  supported  by the  experimental 
evidence, it needs further tests against alternative approaches.
In  the  domain  of  categorization,  memory-based  categorization  processes  have 
been proposed as an alternative approach to strategy-based categorization processes 
(for discussions  see,  for instance, Erickson & Kruschke,  1998; Nosofsky,  Clark,  & 
Shin,  1989;  Nosofsky  &  Johansen,  2000;  Smith,  Patalano,  &  Jonides,  1998). 
Theorists have argued that for well-defined categories,  strategies  were more likely 
applied, whereas for ill-defined categories, memory-based inference processes would 
prevail  (for  a discussion  and limitations  of this  view,  see  Nososfky,  1992).  When 
applying this  argument to  the  task of probabilistic  inferences,  we  should find that 
people are more likely to rely on a memory-based inference process, since the correct 
choices for the inference’s situation are ill-defined. For testing the strategy repertoire 
approach  against  the  memory-based  inference  approach,  I  tested  the  SSL  theory 
against a modified version of the exemplar model (EBM) proposed by Juslin, Jones, 
Olsson, and Winman (2003).
Did this comparison reveal a clear winner? When the results of all three studies 
are taken together, with respect to the models’  fit,  the models’  complexity,  and the 
models’  different predictions  for items  with  diverse  or identical  predictions  of the 
strategies,  the  answer  is  yes:  SSL  outperformed  EBM  substantially  in  predicting 
individuals’ inferences. In particular, in Studies 6 and 8, SSL was better at predicting 
the inferences. Although EBM was also partly able to predict the inferences,  when 
one considers EBM’s complexity with six parameters that were fitted to predict the 
inference  of  only  the  last  two  blocks,  SSL  with  only  three  parameters  appears 
preferable.  In  particular,  the  results  of  Study  8  support  a  strategy  approach, 
presumably for two reasons. First, the introduction of search costs leads participants 
to  limit  their  information  search  and  to  consider  strategies  that  enable  inferences 
without much  information.  Second,  when  one  assumes that the  information  search 
process  includes  a  substantial  amount  of  variability,  this  implies  that  even  for 
identical pairs of alternatives, participants could have acquired different information, 
which  could  have  distorted  EBM’s  prediction.  In  contrast,  the  higher  cognitive 
demands for applying cognitive strategies in Study 7 might have fostered a memory- 
based inference process as described by EBM.
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diverse or identical predictions of the strategies gave a clear-cut picture, especially in 
Studies 6 and 7, where SSL’s substantially different predictions for these two types 
of items were supported by the experimental evidence, contrary to EBM, which did 
not  make  these  predictions.  The  probability  with  which  EBM  predicts  a  choice 
depends on the similarity of an item with the other items and on the correct choices 
for the items. In principle, incongruent items could be more similar to each other in 
comparison to congruent items, so that even EBM could make diverse predictions for 
the two types of items. In Studies 6 and 7 this was not the case, whereas in Study 8, 
EBM,  to  a  small  degree  and  supported by  the  experimental  results,  made  similar 
predictions  as  SSL.  When focusing on  Study 6  and Study 7  where SSL and EBM 
made very different predictions, the empirical evidence speaks in favour of SSL.
5.5.4.  Adaptive Strategy Selection
The main aim was not to show the superiority of the strategy repertoire approach 
in comparison to the exemplar-based approach.  Instead this highlights that in many 
domains, researchers claim that cognition can be understood by assuming that people 
possess  a repertoire of cognitive strategies.  Following this  assumption,  I detect the 
necessity  to  provide  a  computational  theory  of how  people  select  strategies  from 
their repertoire. I propose the SSL theory as such a theory. The experimental results 
and the comparison of SSL with the exemplar model shows that SSL represents an 
adequate  description  of how people  select  strategies  from  their repertoire to  make 
inferences about companies.
In  inference  situations  in  which  memorizing  the  situation  and  the  correct 
responses is cognitively demanding, I expect that SSL provides a better account than 
EBM  for  probabilistic  inferences.  However,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  these 
conclusions  are  restricted  to  the  inference  problem  I  considered.  As  Study  7 
indicates,  there  might  be  inference  situations  in  which  people  could  switch  to  a 
memory-based inference process. Thus, people might frequently rely on a memory- 
based inference process when the number of exemplars is relatively small, contrary 
to these choice studies here, as discussed above. Moreover, there are many situations 
for which the assumption that people learn to select among cognitive strategies does 
not appear reasonable. Instead, people might simply learn direct actions in response 
to decision situations without comparing the situation to memorized situations. For
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models  appropriately describe how people learn to choose  actions  in constant-sum 
games.  Thus, there is no single best model to predict people’s inferences, but each 
model  might  work  best  in  particular  domains  and  one  needs  to  “understand  why 
different models are required to deal with different situations” (Estes,  1976, p. 39). It 
is  an interesting enterprise to explore for which domain a particular theory is most 
appropriate.
What are the underlying cognitive mechanisms of people’s inferences about states 
of the world? Among others, Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) 
have  argued that people possess  a set of strategies for the judgment and decision­
making problems they face. Based on the findings here, people’s reasoning seems to 
be ruled by a flexible selection of cognitive strategies. Contrary to the single-purpose 
mechanism  view,  different  strategies  seem  to  be  applied  in  different  situations. 
Furthermore, people appear to select their strategies adaptively,  such that strategies 
that perform well become more likely to be selected. Thus, the present three studies 
support  the  perspective  of  an  “adaptive  decision  maker”  who  selects  strategies 
according to the  environment.  SSL provides  a computational  theory that describes 
how  this  strategy  selection  process  could  take  place.  By  following  the  traditional 
roots of psychology in learning, the strategy selection problem receives a promising 
answer, which might also lead to a better understanding of financial decisions even 
beyond personal company evaluations.
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G e n e r a l D isc u ssio n6.  GENERAL DISCUSSION
The  work  introduces  a  variety  of new  methods  for  the  evaluation  of financial 
behaviour.  This  generally  documents  a  new  perspective  for  the  understanding  of 
financial behaviour.  The results  illustrate the variety of strategies used in different 
financial  domains.  Financial  strategies  also  strongly  differ  within  the  domain. 
Spending behaviour shows  systematic  variations  over people  in the way how  they 
pursue their individual  goals.  Saving behaviour strongly  differs  in how  commonly 
shared  saving  aims  are  followed up  individually  in  regard to  different  self-control 
mechanisms. The evaluation of companies has a shared semantic basis and different 
investment  strategies  can  be  learned  dependent  on  the  incentive  structure  of  the 
domain.  In  general,  adaptive  learning  processes  are  assumed  to  account  for  the 
observed differences over and within decision domains.
First,  I  discuss  this  postulation  of  alternative  models  which  are  grounded  in 
cognitive functioning.  Second,  the variability in financial behaviour is  striking and 
under  financial  personality  this  result  in  combination  with  the  behaviour  of  the 
market  is  discussed.  Third,  the  relation  to  economic  theory  is  outlined  in  the 
conclusion.
6.1.  Characterizing Mental Processes
Diutumal in cognitive sciences is the discussion on how mental mechanisms can 
be  represented  (Anderson,  1978;  Pylyshyn,  1980).  To  which  degree  can  mental 
mechanism be  captured  and  illustrated?  How  can  we  assume  that  specific  mental 
models  are  valid  given  that  someone  always  can  come  up  with  an  alternative 
explanation?  This  is  one  reason  why  fundamental  questions,  like  the  specificity 
versus universality of mental processes or to what degree the behaviour is “learned”, 
are continuously discussed and can not be solved conclusively. These questions are 
also of importance for financial decisions and for a foundation of cognitive finance. 
Spending,  saving,  and  investing  can,  thus,  be  evaluated  under  the  paradigm  of 
different mental processes. One distinction can be made between domain specificity 
and  universality  of  cognitive  mechanisms,  another  one  between  learning  and 
individual variation in financial behaviour.  In both cases different explanations  are 
provided for the observed processes of financial behaviour.
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One could ask how far spending, saving, and investing patterns in the real world 
are  a  function  of  general  cognitive  mechanisms  or  whether  they  can  only  be 
understood  in  terms  of  specific  environmental  constraints  and  socially  structured 
financial provisions. To proclaim a more domain specific approach here is mainly to 
derive the regularities within one domain as a basis for generalizations as a second 
step.  This  approach  is  rare  in  financial  decisions.  Thus,  as  we  have  seen  in  other 
domains  of choices  under uncertainty,  there  are  specific behavioural  tendencies  in 
place which strongly depend upon the framing of the decision. Only if we take this 
decision  frame  seriously,  can  we  derive  a fundamental  explanation  of behavioural 
variation. Financial decisions like spending, saving, or investing can be seen as such 
a decision frame, which activates context specific behaviour. This approach brings as 
a downside the limited predictability of behaviour. On the one hand, if the research 
domain  is  too  specific,  a useful  interpretation  of the underlying processes  appears 
arbitrary. On the other hand, if common grounds between domains are explored and 
regularities are found, this could bring a real advantage for the understanding of the 
usage of different strategies.  Then  general  conditions for the behavioural  variation 
into  one  or the other direction  are revealed.  This  focus  is  illustrated in  Chapter 4, 
where  general  mechanisms  are  sought for.  If we  can  explain how domain  specific 
behaviour evolves,  we can derive behavioural regularities from this end.  SSL is an 
example  of this.  Also  the  observed peculiarities  in  spending  and  saving  strategies 
must  be  understood  from  this  angle  of  general  mechanisms  in  domain  specific 
strategy usage.  Only if regularities  and universal principles  across domains  are the 
focus  of the research,  is  a domain  specific  approach useful to bring us  closer to  a 
discovery of the underlying mental processes  and we are  able to  answer questions 
like  how  stable  mental  processes  in  cognitive  finance  are.  Then  it  will  become 
possible  to  reveal  more  general  principles  without  only  referring  to  experimental 
abstractions which always are in danger of being ecologically invalid.
6.1.2.  Learning and Intra-/Interindividual Variation
The field of psychology breaks apart into two fields which stress differently the 
importance  of  nature  versus  nurture.  In  cognitive  sciences  the  focus  is  more  on 
general  mechanisms  although  learning  can  play  a  huge  part.  How  can  we  thus
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with a set of strategies and that we just learn to use one or the other strategy more 
frequently.  This  approach  is  supported  by  Tooby  and  Cosmides  (1990b)  which 
stresses the advantage of a coexistence of different strategies in a population. Then 
individual  adaptation  is  just  part  of  a  learning  process.  Alternatively  individual 
learning on its own, without referring to a set of universal psychological adaptations, 
accounts  for  the  observed  differences  in  financial  behaviour.  In  contrast,  Wilson 
(1994)  argues  for  a  genetic  polymorphism  leading  to  individual  variation.  In  this 
work we cannot discriminate between genetic or phenotypic adaptations and mainly 
stress the variation in observed strategies. If we knew to what degree their proportion 
changes over time and to what extent they are individually stable, we would have a 
better answer to  this  question.  So  far,  based  on  the  observed  strong  differences,  I 
only assume a reason for the variation which itself has to be further explored.
6.2.  Financial Personality
A strongly neglected area in finances is the evaluation of individual differences. 
To  some  degree  these  variations  have  been  documented  here.  They  make  the 
assumption  plausible  that  there  exists  something  like  a  financial  personality 
analogous to other dimensions of personality.
6.2.1.  Demand Variation
When regarding spending,  saving,  and investment strategies people show strong 
differences in their behaviour. Possible reasons for this variation have been discussed 
in  section  6.1.2.  To  take  these  variations  as  givens  appears  to  be  a  reasonable 
conclusion.  De  gustibus  non  est  disputandum.  The  term  financial  personality 
conceptualizes these behavioural variations to make them scientifically applicable. It 
stands for the differences in the financial demands people have.
Research regarding individual differences  in financial behaviour mainly regards 
general  risk  taking  attitudes  (Bromley  &  Curley,  1992;  Dulebohn,  2002).  For 
example  women  appear more risk  averse  in  retirement  allocations  (Jianakoplos  & 
Bemasek,  1998;  Powell  &  Ansic,  1997)  and  men  appear  to  be  more  prone  to 
excessive trading in investment decisions due to overconfidence (Barber & Odean, 
2001). My work here documents that risk attitude is only one facet of the individual
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much more diverse than assumed.
Given that the decision space is restricted, only within the interaction of suitable 
products can these demands sufficiently be elaborated.
6.2.2.  Tailored Products
If heuristics and biases are taken seriously, then accordingly suitable products can 
be  demanded.  A  first  development  into  this  direction  was  made  by  Thaler  and 
colleagues  (Benartzi  &  Thaler,  2002;  Thaler,  1994;  Thaler  &  Benartzi,  2004; 
Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). Their “libertarian paternalism” 
agenda shows  examples  of how  individual  behaviour can  be  improved.  The  work 
presented  here  goes  beyond  a  simple  manipulation  of reference  points  or  default 
levels  and  asks  for  the  underlying  cognitive  mechanisms,  of which  only  a  better 
understanding improves tailoring. It could lead to the development of better products 
on a general as well on an individual level.  In a similar vein, Laibson et al.  (1998) 
argue,  in  the  discussion  about  easing  penalties  on  early  withdrawals  from  saving 
plans  (compare  Farkas  &  Johnson,  1997),  for  an  acknowledgment  of  individual 
differences  for  giving  up  control.  The  general  overestimation  by  economists  of 
peoples’  understanding  of  their  personal  financial  situation  as  well  as  the 
misalignment between intention and action demand more tailored products. Here the 
individual perspective with support mechanisms and commitment features, including 
illiquid  assets,  helps  to  develop  self-control  devices  in  line  with  cognitive 
mechanisms which are also psychologically appealing.
From a service perspective, behavioural variations can directly serve to improve 
saving,  spending,  and  investment  tools.  Currently  the  huge  variation  in  financial 
products on the global market is mainly based on cultural and regional differences, 
but not oriented to the different demands within a local market. Product engineering 
is a common practice in most large industries, where for example sounds, electronic 
devices, etc. are adjusted to the demands of the customer. It is surprising that similar 
research activities are not observed in financial industries.
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Economists always have known that strong rationality assumptions are incorrect 
for individual agents, but assumed that rational models still lead to good aggregates 
of economic behaviour. However, this assumption has been increasingly thrown into 
doubt  and  many  economic  phenomena  may  be  fundamentally  psychological  in 
origin. Moreover, research in judgment and decision making has developed theories 
that  successfully connect with  analysis  in  economics  to  produce  valid behavioural 
models.  Over the  last  years,  economic  theorists  increasingly became  aware  of the 
empirical  shortcomings,  which can be seen  as  a crisis  in economics that has to be 
solved. How a shift will look like is difficult to predict. Weber and Camerer (2006, 
pp.  187-188) see the task of behavioural research as follows:
“Importantly,  most behavioural  economists  have  the goal,  not of developing  an 
alternative  to  economic  theory  and  methods,  although  instead  to  incorporate  new 
assumptions  and  methods  into  mainstream  economic  research.  Thus,  the  goal  of 
behavioural economists is not to develop a ‘behavioral economic theory’ but instead 
to improve economic theory so that it is also ‘behavioral’.”
This  asks  for  a  simple  expansion  of  the  standard  economic  model  without  a 
paradigm shift.
6.3.1.  Gains and Losses
If behavioural  results  are  simply  seen  as  an  add  on  to  the  standard  economic 
model,  the  development  of new  theories  is  bounded by existing  assumptions.  But 
from  a  standard  research  theory  perspective  (Popper,  1934),  only  the  same 
acceptance of new models fecundate the research progress.
The goal of informing and developing economic theory has to be taken seriously. 
The development of new methods for the understanding of economic behaviour can 
be seen as a huge advantage of behavioural research. How the generated results can 
be incorporated into economic theory is difficult to  say.  If the standard model can 
cope  with  a strong inflow  of contradicting evidence this  would  speak for a strong 
theory.  Important  is  that  new  methods  generate  a  better  understanding  of  the 
problem.  If  heterogeneity,  i.e.  variation  over  individuals,  is  informative  for  the 
general  understanding  of the  phenomenon,  these  results  cannot  be  neglected.  An 
example in standard economic research for individual variation comes from the stock
133market where noise traders, as agents with a specific behavioural characteristic, are 
assumed  to  form  the  overall  market  behaviour  (DeLong,  Shleifer,  Summers,  & 
Waldmann, 1990; Shleifer & Summers, 1990).
Behavioural  observations  will  in any case influence theory developments  in the 
future. A common scientific understanding (Ockham’s Razor) is that if models just 
increase  in  complexity,  nothing much  is  gained  and fundamental  changes  have  to 
take place.
6.3.2.  Future Perspectives
The  opening  of the  field  of finance  for behavioural  questions  provides  a  huge 
potential and clearly asks for necessary developments. Three points appear important 
for the future. First, finance theory will be able to acknowledge empirical findings in 
its theoretical development. Second, it provides the opportunity for interdisciplinary 
research.  And  third,  a  behaviourally  grounded  decision  model  could  facilitate 
knowledge transfer to practical questions in finance.
Empirical foundation
The incorporation of behavioural results could strengthen the economic model and 
its acceptance as a core research discipline. This must be a sensible process in order 
not to loose ground to informality. It is not useful to give up the strong homogeneity 
of finance theory with its advantage of consistency.  Only if behavioural results can 
improve  the  understanding  of basic  questions  in  finance  research,  does  a  change 
appear demandable.  Current movements in behavioural analysis try to achieve just 
this and can be seen as a huge chance for bringing finance theory back to the world. 
If the  understanding  of the  usage  of different  strategies  for  financial  decisions  is 
fundamental for the prediction of behaviour, taking these results into account cannot 
be  avoided.  The  usage  of  different  financial  strategies  can  result  in  naturally 
occurring observations  of behavioural  sophistication  and computational  limitations 
alike.  If  analogously,  cognitive  correlates  can  be  provided  systematically  in  the 
future,  an  empirical  but  also  cognitively  sound  theory  of  financial  behaviour 
becomes possible.
Interdisciplinarity
Combining theory and methods  from different disciplines  is  often  demanded to 
improve the research progress. Historically, this often led to new approaches with a
134highly reputative research practice. A recent convincing example is the merging of 
chemistry and biology into cell genetics.
The linkage between economics and other fields like anthropology, psychology, 
and  neurology  is  a radical  prospect.  If this  leads  to  new  advances  in  the  overlap 
between  social  and natural  sciences,  I think more can be  gained than  lost.  Recent 
examples show that this exchange already led to promising studies in anthropology 
(i.e.,  Henrich  et  al.,  2001),  in  psychology  (i.e.,  Hertwig  &  Ortmann,  2001),  and 
neurology (i.e., Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004).
The  development  of  new  ideas  appears  to  be  crucial  for  the  improvement  of 
economic theory. The recruiting of other disciplines appears to be a useful approach 
for this.
Practical importance
Research can always be measured by its practical applicability and its value for 
improving  issues  of  societal  importance.  If  financial  theory  is  based  on  actual 
observable behaviour  and underlying cognitive functioning,  a transfer to  everyday 
solutions becomes much easier to achieve.
A couple of research possibilities are introduced here for behavioural specifics in 
different  financial  domains.  Direct  examples  of  applications  are  provided  or  can 
easily be derived.  Segmentation, product development,  and performance prediction 
are  just  examples  of  this.  Many  other  applications  can  be  developed  under  this 
framework and a broad area for practical derivations opens up.
Key  areas  of interest,  with  practical  implications,  are  as  follows:  The  decision 
process  matters,  where  the  way  in  which  decisions  are  reached  and  the  variables 
which influence the decision process are of importance. Also, the individual variation 
of behaviour  can  be  captured  and  used  for  practical  applications.  Further  on,  if 
mental accounting is so common, even in well organized organisations, could it not 
just  be  rational  to  keep  apart  different  categories  and  structure  our  environment 
accordingly?
Cognitive processes play the key role in every decision.  A better understanding 
and modelling of these processes can improve performance in many ways. Thus, the 
acknowledgement  of  cognitive  finance  and  of  respective  differences  in  financial 
personality  cannot  only  provide  strong  economic  advantages  but  societal 
improvements in general.
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162APPENDIX
Appendix A: Derived Saving Structures
PERSON  ONE
(35-44 year old full-time employed woman)
SALARY
pooled savings
monthly!
fixed monthly
daily
7 would like to be informed 
about any back-sweep by 
letter or email’
Reserve 
max. £1,000 Donations
Holiday
Cash
Cash ISA
Family
Debit Card 
TV
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
max. £500 
min. -£500
Offset Mortgage
+ borrow
EXPENSES
163Mortgage
fixed monthly Holiday
A
‘Jam jar’  J
PERSON  TWO
(45-54 year old full-time employed man)
SALARY WIFE  TURNOVER  EXPENSES
  1   i  t
CURRENT 
ACCOUNT
min. £200
monthly
daily
Business
Account
manual Instant Savings
'Don’t want to 
pay any charges’
Credit Card
Cash ISA Credit Card
i
I
i
(business)
  PQoIed-sayjngs......
&
Want to maximize interest.
Would like to get notification by email.
It is important to save for specifics without interfering with other accounts. 
Spending / Buying categories are business -  private -  wallet -  house.
7 want to keep the 
business money 
separate from the 
other. ’
WAGES
(and all extras)
i
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
min. £10 
max. £50C
daily
'Whatever limit 
agreed  for monthly 
spenditure. Extra 
goes directly into 
pot A. ’
PERSON  THREE
(15-24 year old full-time employed woman)
‘To be spent on a 
pre-specified date 
only and otherwise 
automatically 
^transferred to pot B. ’
A B
medium interest direct high interest monthly
£10qA
min./max. £200 min. £300
‘If more is needed than 
this reserve, it is 
brought in from pot B 
as a informed or 
authorised sweep ’
Savings could be leftovers to cover 
later necessities or savings are for 
leisure.
A ‘two tier system’ protects from 
overspending.
Purpose 
(i.e. holidays)
‘If bill data agreed. ’
• The details are checked every 
month after the wages have gone in.
• Likes a yearly option to speak to a 
financial adviser.
• Significant extra amounts go 
somewhere else and would not be 
integrated into savings.
164PERSON  FOUR
(55-64 year old full-time employed woman)
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
min. £100
daily
monthly.
automatic £3000 annually
Extra money 
i.e. fixed rate 
bond
1
<feeder> 
max. £1,000
monthly
2
— ^ ‘Independent
* ” manuaT
/ \
Financial
Advisor’
‘Residual at end 
of month’
'If overdrawn 
automatic’
From a labour background and they 
tended to put money away on a 
regular basis into a building society: 
‘You did save!’ or ‘the rainy-day 
syndrome’. Besides this habit save 
for specific items.
monthly fixed amount
Sub drip-feed 
for i.e. Holiday
‘Access on 
agreed date ’
• Like to fall directly on the money if needed.
• The system should be secured ‘by the computer’. But 
you are still responsible for your money although you 
sometimes need penalties to get hold of it.
PERSON  FIVE
P EN SIO N   years or older retired woman)
fixed amount monthly
EXTRAS
monthly
fixed
amount
monthly Tracker Rainy-days 
max. £1,000
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
Saving is to buy something in 
particular, to put money away 
on a regular basis or for 
something unexpected.
3
ISA’s
4
Shares
• All other transfers are made manually. I.e  if I need money for the holidays I put that specific 
amount from the ‘Tracker Pot’ into the Current Account.
• If overdrawn then a little more careful the next months.
• Would like to have financial advice on income as a whole to move money accordingly. Don’t 
want to loose money.
• Don’t want too many accounts.
165PENSION
monthly  —
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
DIRECT DEBIT
PERSON  SIX
(65 years or older retired man)
>   Rainy-day 
max. £1000
4
Saving is to put money away 
for things you want in the 
future. Save for a better value.
Tracker 
»  main saving
• Do the transfers by 
telephone banking when 
required.
• For any extra money a 
financial advisor needed.
• If less money is available try 
to cut the costs.
Fixed bonds 
*  access once or 
twice a year
PERSON  SEVEN
(65 years or older retired woman)
monthly
7 only take out money 
occasionally for 
specific purchases ’
monthly daily
buy andjsell online
monthly
monthly
on demand
Building Society 
Postal 
max. 15K
Stocks
and
Shares
National 
Savings 
higher interest
Bonds
ISA’s
Deepfreeze 
max. $1,500
Feed 
max. £600
Insurance
Visa
Bill payments
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
min. £300 
max. £600
• The most important part of the system is to transfer 
the money to the Building Society to get higher 
interest. Getting older and need it automatically.
• All investments are agreed by a financial advisor.
Saving is to ensure not having to rely on council 
care. It is to stay independent and to make sure that I 
am sufficiently looked after.
Worried about money since husband died and has no 
clue.
166National
Insurance
15%
PERSON  EIGHT
(35-44 year old full-time employed woman)
SALARY AND EXTRAS
monthly £870-900
Life 
Insurance 
£4.50 monthly
Child’s 
University Fund 
£40 monthly
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
direct debit 
limit £400 
overdraft £50
Saving provides a 
reserve for contingency. 
People from Jamaica 
don’t trust in banks and 
organise saving on their 
own. Would like the 
bank to help me to lock 
money away.
‘With limited access. 
Take out money only 
on emergency. ’
direct
Rainy-day 
cash account 
£180 monthly
Telephone 
about£70 
monthly
Vacation 
£15 monthly 
nly if necessary
Home
Mortgage Improvement 
max. £1,000
• The fixed transfers are changed according to the 
financial situation. But if a large amount it is 
invested somewhere else.
• If overspending sees what can be put on hold.
Two weeks are 
interest free. 
Then it is backed 
up by the surplus 
from the cash 
account’
PERSON  NINE
(25-34 year old full-time employed woman)
My husband 
does that. ’
Account B CURRENT 
ACCOUNT 
min. £100 
max. £500
(when expected)
Mortgage
monthly
Sweep 
(leftovers)
Barclaycard
Saving means to manage your money 
so that you can buy something. It is for 
mortgage purposes or emergencies.
7 won’t build it up but find out about another account 
where I can move the money to create more interest. I 
think the interest rate is quite good at the moment. ’
• If you have too many automatic 
sweeps it gets dangerous. Would 
do everything else manually.
• Extras would be used to top up 
my ISA.
• Do internet banking quite a lot 
and it would be helpful to get the 
possibilities explained within the 
bank.
167PERSON  TEN
(45-54 year old full-time employed man) EXTRAS
fixed £300 direct
monthly
‘High rate savings 
instant savings. ’ >£3K overflow
‘Triggers at 3K to 
start a new pot’
Pot 4 
CJ + KJ 
max. £3000
ISA 
(zero savings 
to date)
Spend
Pot 2 
C.J. + K.J. 
overflow
Pot 3 C.J.
2 withdrawals 
p.a.
P otl 
C.J. + K.J. 
(joint account)
Bills
Mortgage
CURRENT 
ACCOUNT 
min. £100 
max. £500
There is flesh money on 
one side for the 
supermarket and the 
credit card and savings 
on the other side for 
wanted things. Or you 
put money away every 
month for i.e. a pension. 
Don’t keep money 
somewhere else and all 
savings are in the bank.
• Besides buying antiques as an investment.
• Do online banking to check if my money is still 
there.
• Mainly interested in high interest rates.
• Before decreasing monthly savings, first checks 
spending.
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
Barclays
(husband)
fixed monthly
Children (2x) 
i.e. PhD
monthly
PERSON  ELEVEN
(55-64 year old part-time employed woman)
EXTRAS
Saving Account  direct 
EGG 
Sainsbury’s 
  % -----------
direct
SALARY
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
min. £2,000 
max. £3,000
Australia $ 
(separate)
‘ At the moment 
my brother 
manages it but it 
would be nice to 
do it on my own. ’
Saving means putting 
money aside for a ‘rainy- 
day’ or purchases. It is 
important that the money 
works for you and not 
just sits around or is 
spent.
But is not good with 
savings and does not 
maximise.
• Direct transfers to the credit 
card would be handy.
• Threshold based automatic 
transfers are useful.
• Don’t want to loose control 
over the automatic transfers.
Joint Account
Shares Bonds ISA (sister)
168PERSON  TWELVE
(55-64 year old full-time employed woman)
SALARY
Mortgage
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
Nest Egg
Warwick 
District Council Credit Card
OCCASIONAL INPUTS
(significant extra amounts go into an ISA or a special purchase)
k
Saving means putting money aside 
for a specific purpose. Short or long 
term saving could be a direct debit or 
a standing order into a deposit 
account, an ISA, or even into a bond.
EXPENSES
Regular Savings
Holiday Account 
(specific)
‘Do something useful 
with it if it piles up. ’
DIVIDENDS
• The monthly fixed transfer amounts 
can be easily changed manually.
• Would like to include different sorts of 
pots in the overall concept like a further 
Current Account, a Regular Saving 
Account, or a Credit Card Account.
• Searches for reasons of overspending 
independent of the concept.
PERSON  THIRTEEN
(45-54 year old unemployed man)
weekly monthly monthly
monthly
£20-30 ‘ISA, mortgage, or 
pension but investments 
are separate. ’
Eric B 
Higher surplus 
max. £900
Eric C 
Direct Debit
Eric D 
Savings
Eric A 
Lower surplus 
min. £0  max. £600
CURRENT
ACCOUNT
min. £0 
max. £400
All transfers should be possible manually.
Wants to be informed monthly about saving status.
Saving is for the future when you 
retire - for a higher interest to have a 
bonus.
Automatic transfers are to budget 
yourself.
169Appendix B: The  10 Saving Factor Descriptions
FACTOR 1
SELF-CONTROL
Eigenvalue 4.39
To control my spending I would like to be able to lock money away so that 1  could not access it for a specific 
period.
I would like to have delayed access to some savings in order to decrease spending.
I would like to control my spending by limiting the ways in which I can get hold of my money.
0.83
0.82
0.82
I would like to structure my finances in such a way as to help me spend less.
1  would be more reluctant to spend impulsively if I was being rewarded for maintaining a high saving balance.
0.58
0.57
I want to be sure I always have money at hand.
I would like to link investments (ISA's, Bonds, or Stocks, etc.) within my financial structure.
1  feel uncomfortable if I do not have access to all my savings at any given time.
Maintaining hands-on control over my finances helps me to ensure it is sufficiently flexible to cope with unforeseen 
events.
I don't want to rely on one single company for all my finances.
-0.13
-0.13
-0.13
-0.19
-0.26
FACTOR 2
HANDS ON
Eigenvalue 3.06
I need to be constantly aware of my complete financial situation.
It would be important that my financial structure is stable over time.
I would feel uncomfortable unless I understood every single part of my financial structure.
0.66
0.64
0.60
1  want to be sure I always have money at hand.
Maintaining hands-on control over my finances helps me to ensure it is sufficiently flexible to cope with unforeseen 
events.
0.44
0.42
Being less aware of some of my money helps me to spend less.
I feel uncomfortable working out my financial situation on my own.
I would like to have automatic transfers to make me less aware of some of my money. 
I don't enjoy taking care of my money.
-0.21
-0.33
-0.35
-0.50
I want to be less involved with my finances. -0.58
FACTOR 3
ADVICE
Eigenvalue 2.83
I would like to have independent external advice about my savings.
I would like to have regular financial advice about my financial structure.
1  would like to have ongoing financial advice which helps me to save more.
0.82
0.81
0.72
I would like to be continually informed about my flows of money. 
1  like to have savings even if I am in debt.
0.39
0.34
I always want to keep a specific minimum amount of money in my current account.
I do not care how much I save as long I do not go overdrawn.
I want to keep the effort related to my finances low.
I would like to have automatic transfers to make me less aware of some of my money. 
Being less aware of some of my money helps me to spend less.
-0.05
-0.09
-0.10
-0.11
-0.14
FACTOR 4
REGULAR SAVINGS
Eigenvalue 2.65
I would set up standing orders to save regularly.
I want a minimum percentage of my income to be paid into my savings accounts. 
There is a minimum amount I would want paid monthly into mv savings accounts.
0.74
0.74
0.71
I would like to automate regular payments to ensure they are paid on time.
I would be more reluctant to spend impulsively if 1  was being rewarded for maintaining a high saving balance.
0.37
0.34
I don't enjoy taking care of my money.
A financial structure which was partially automated would be less secure. 
1  save until I reach the amount needed for something I wish to purchase.
I feel uncomfortable working out my financial situation on my own.
I need to be constantly aware of my complete financial situation.
-0.07
-0.11
-0.13
-0.18
-0.29
170FACTOR 5
AUTOM ATION
Eigenvalue 2.54
I would like to automate regular transfers to save time. 0.83
1  would like to automate regular transfers to savings accounts to overcome forgetfulness or laziness. 
I would like to set up an automated financial structure and let it run.
I would like to automate regular payments to ensure they are paid on time.
0.65
0.60
0.60
I would like to have automatic transfers to make me less aware of some of my money. 0.35
I don't have a problem with being charged if I act against restrictions I have previously set.
I restrict myself by only spending a certain amount on different types of purchases
I would feel worried that I did not have complete understanding of my financial situation if it involved automated 
features.
I would feel uncomfortable unless I understood every single part of my financial structure.
A financial structure which was partially automated would be less secure.
-0.06
-0.10
-0.12
-0.14
-0.16
FACTOR 6
LOW  EFFORT
Eigenvalue 2.08
I want the bank to do the work for me.
I would like to keep my finances as simple as possible.
0.77
0.73
I want to keep the effort related to my finances low. 0.54
I feel uncomfortable if I do not have access to all my savings at any given time. 
I want to be less involved with my finances.
0.37
0.29
Maintaining hands-on control over my finances helps me to ensure it is sufficiently flexible to cope with unforeseen 
events.
I would like to have automatic transfers to make me less aware of some of my money.
1  don't want to rely on one single company for all my finances.
I would set up standing orders to save regularly.
I would like to reach a specific saving level at a specified time.
-0.08
-0.10
-0.16
-0.16
-0.20
FACTOR 7
INTEG RATION
Eigenvalue 2.07
I would like to link all my finances into one integrated ffamew'ork. 0.75
I would like to keep all my finances together.
1  would like to link investments (ISA’s, Bonds, or Stocks, etc.) within my financial structure.
0.70
0.58
I would like to set up an automated financial structure and let it run.
I would like to have automatic transfers to make me less aware of some of my money.
0.33
0.24
I want to be less involved with my finances.
I don't want to rely on one single company for all my finances.
It would be important that my financial structure is stable over time. 
I would like to keep my finances as simple as possible.
I prefer my savings and my current account to b^ejrarate^^
-0.12
-0.13
-0.15
-0.17
-0.35
FACOTR 8
SECURITY WORRIES
Eigenvalue 2.04
If I give the bank day to day control over my finances I would be worried that they might make errors that I never 
notice.
I would feel worried that I did not have complete understanding of my financial situation if it involves automated 
features.
0.77
0.73
A financial structure which was partially automated would be less secure. 0.53
I would like to be continually informed about my flows of money.
I restrict myself by only spending a certain amount on different types of purchases
0.29
0.21
I would like the savings I have available for leisure to be dependent on the overall savings I hold. 
I want to keep the effort related to my finances low.
I would like to automate regular transfers to save time.
I know exactly what I am saving for.
I would like to set up an automated financial structure and let it run.
-0.10
-0.10
-0.10
-0.16
-0.18
171FACTOR 9 
PLANNED BUDGET
Eigenvalue 2.03
I restrict myself by only spending a certain amount on different types of purchases 0.74
I know exactly what I am saving for. 0.62
I feel uncomfortable if I do not have access to all my savings at any given time. 0.44
1  need to be constantly aware of my complete financial situation. 0.44
1  would like to be continually informed about my flows of money. 0.30
I would like to automate regular transfers to savings accounts to overcome forgetfulness or laziness. -0.16
1  would like to link investments (ISA's, Bonds, or Stocks, etc.) within my financial structure. -0.17
I don't enjoy taking care of my money. -0.17
It would be important that my financial structure is stable over time. -0.22
I would like to automate regular payments to ensure they are paid on time. -0.22
FACTOR 10
DISTRIBUTED SAVINGS
Eigenvalue 1.98
I would like to be able to distribute my regular savings between different accounts. 0.81
I would like to be able to divide my savings into different distinguishable saving categories. 0.68
I would like to link investments (ISA's, Bonds, or Stocks, etc.) within my financial structure. 0.34
I would like the savings I have available for leisure to be dependent on the overall savings I hold. 0.32
I would like to be able to specify maximum balances for specific savings accounts. 0.29
I would like to keep all my finances together. -0.11
I would like to structure my finances in such a way as to help me spend less. -0.13
I would like to have ongoing financial advice which helps me to save more. -0.17
A financial structure which was partially automated would be less secure. -0.20
I want to be sure I always have mone^tUhand^^ -0.21
172Appendix C: Individual RepGrid Results for the Concept ‘Company’
The  Ward  clustering  tree  is  shown  as  a  measure  of  distance  for  the  derived 
descriptors and companies.
not nice 3 4 | 5 5 5 5 5 I 5 nice
not secondary 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 1 secondary
no hidden importance 3 3 3 4 •1 4 5 5 1 hidden importance
enjoyable 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 1 not enjoyable
common 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 i. 5 not common
need 1 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 5 no need
essential 1 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 not essential
not prestigious 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 41 5 prestigous
not specific 2 2 4 3 3 4 4 5 5 specific
IP
Wolford 
Mercer 
GP Morgan 
Morgan Stanley
HP
Sony
IBM
HSBC
Sainsburry
not durable 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 4 2 durable
no quality 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 quality
not relaxed 2 4 2 1 2 4 4j 5 5 relaxed
rigid 3 4 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 not rigid
formal 4 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 4 not formal
not close 2 3 1 2 3 5 5 5 4 close
not affordable 2 3 3 3 1 5 5 5 5 5 affordable
luxury 1   ; 4 3 4 4 5 5 1 4 no luxury
rare positive experience 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 3 1 no rare positive experience
10.0  9.0  8,0  7.0
Ryanair
H& M
Tesco
Costcutters
BT
Barclays
Microsoft
Vodaphone
Chanel
173.60
.70
.80
.90
not typical 2) 5 5 4 2 2 1 3 5 typical
no quality 2 4 4 3 3 I 2 4 5 quality
no status 1 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 5 status
no identity 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 identity
no freedom of action 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 freedom of action
not spacious 2 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 spacious
not powerful 3 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 powerful
not dominant 2 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 dominant
international 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 1 not international
10p  9.0  80  7,0  6.0
BMW 
BASF 
Barclays 
Tesco 
Sainsbury 
Miele 
Aura log 
Assimil 
Costcutter
not cheap 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 2  2
not modern 5 3 3 | 4 5 5 3 2  4
not competitive 4 3 3 2 |m 4 2 3  5
not attractive 5 5 3 4 3 3 2 3  5
distant 5 3 3 3 3 2 3 3  5
not regular 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 4  5
not helpful 5 | 5 2 2 3 3 4 5  5
relaxing 2 1 2 2 3 4 1 4  5
feminine 1 2 4 5 5 5 5  5
,100 
cheap 
modern 
competitive 
attractive 
not distant 
regular 
helpful 
not relaxing 
not feminine
100  90  80
i  i  i
70
—i
Tesco 
Iceland 
Costcutter 
Casio 
Panasonic 
Titacaca 
H&M 
New Look 
Mary Kay
174useful 1   s 5 5 2 2 3 3 4 3 not useful
helpful 1 2] 5 4 3 3 3 1 4 not helpful
unprofessional 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 professional
not trustworthy 2 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 trustworthy
uneducated 2 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 educated
cheap 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 not cheap
not influential 1 2 1 3 3 4 4 4 5 influential
not abstact 1 1 1 3 3| 5 5 5 5 abstract
physical 1 1 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 not physical
10.0  9.0  8.0  7.0
PWC
Norwich Union 
Nationwide 
Nat  West
BT
NTL
Nike
McDonalds
Sainsbury
not big 2   2 4  5 5 5 4 3 3 big
not international 1   1 3  4 4 4 : 5 2 1 international
no quality 1   1 2  3 5 I 5 2 2 quality
not socially responsible 1   1 3  3 5 4 4 3 2 socially responsible
not concerned 1   1 3  2 5 4 5 4 3 concerned
not competent 1   1 2  3 5 4 4 4 4 competent
adversarial 1   1 2  2 5 5 5 5 5 not adversarial
exploitative 1   1 2  2 4 4 5 5 5 not exploitative
not well priced 1  3 2  3 3 4 4 5 5 well priced
10.0  9.0  8.0  7.0
Argos 
LX-direct 
University of Warwick 
Tesco 
Marks&Spencer 
Royal Bank of Scottland 
Halifax 
Student Loan Company 
First National
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